Dillaplain v. Xenia Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 21 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-104 |
| Parties | ROBERT P. DILLAPLAIN, Plaintiff, v. XENIA COMMUNITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 7).1 Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8). Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum. (Doc. 9). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for decision by the Court.
For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court must: (1) view the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009); Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009).
Defendant Xenia Community Schools Board of Education ("XBOE") is the governing body for the Xenia Community Schools ("XCS"). Defendants Steven Alex, Lee Rose, Barbara Stafford and William Spahr all serve as elected members of the XBOE. Plaintiff Robert P. Dillaplain, M.D. ("Dillaplain") also serves as an elected member of the XBOE, having served in that capacity for nearly twenty years. Dillaplain is also a licensed physician in obstetrics and gynecology, having practiced medicine for more than thirty-six years.
In spring 2010, while Dillaplain served as the President of the XBOE, Deborah Piotrowski ("Piotrowski") was selected as the new superintendent of the Xenia Community Schools. At that time, Dillaplain was a vocal supporter of Piotrowski. By the end of January 2011, however, Dillaplain began publicly questioning certain spending reductions proposed by Piotrowski and began making a number of requests to school administrators for documents and information. Dillaplain's requests for information were not welcomed by Piotrowski.
In November 2012, Dillaplain requested information from school administrators regarding an upcoming levy and certain unusual expenditures, including a substantial increase in legal fees incurred by the school district. These requests were met with resistance by the school administrators. In January 2013, the new XBOE President, Defendant Alex, directed school administrators that they were not obligated to respond to requests for information by a single XBOE member if they deemed the requests to be onerous. Thereafter, Piotrowski directed the treasurer not to provide Dillaplain withrecords that Dillaplain requested. Dillaplain subsequently obtained the same records by filing a citizen's public records request pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43.
In the January 14, 2013, Board meeting, Dillaplain publicly congratulated Piotrowski on the fact that she was applying for superintendent jobs in other school districts. Piotrowski perceived Dillaplain's statements as a slight. On February 6, 2013, Defendant Stafford complained that the minutes for the January 14, 2013 meeting were incomplete, stating that, "Dr. Dillaplain's congratulatory remarks to [Piotrowski] on her success in being considered for positions in other districts and his expressions of concern that she may be neglecting her duties in her current position, are not included."
In a XBOE meeting on February 11, 2013, Dillaplain questioned the extraordinary increase in legal expenses for the school district and asked that XBOE members be provided with relevant records. In that same meeting, the XBOE retired to executive session to discuss a complaint by other XBOE members against Dillaplain. Dillaplain made a specific, written request during the public portion of the XBOE meeting that the complaint against him be discussed in public pursuant to XBOE Policy, which states that:
The XBOE did not take action on Dillaplain's request for a public discussion of the complaints against him while in the public session. Instead, the Board members waited until they had moved into executive session to deny his request for an open meeting. The XBOE then proceeded to discuss and consider the complaint against Dillaplain in executive session. No written complaint was ever produced for discussion.
During the executive session, XBOE members were hostile to Dillaplain. Dillaplain alleges that XBOE members were yelling, calling him names, and making implied threats towards him. Dillaplain also alleges that XBOE members falsely accused him of being hostile towards women. While in the executive session, the XBOE discussed matters that had not been specified as one of the purposes for executive session and specifically directed its general counsel to draft a resolution of censure against Dillaplain.
The resolution for public censure, having been prepared by the Board's general counsel pursuant to the XBOE action on February 28, 2013, was submitted in draft to XBOE members before the March 11, 2013 XBOE meeting. On March 11, 2013, the XBOE voted on the resolution for public censure that had been pre-prepared by its general counsel. The XBOE voted on the resolution without presenting evidence to the public regarding the statements about Dillaplain. The XBOE voted and passed the resolution just as it had been drafted in advance of the XBOE meeting.
The resolution sets forth the opinion of other XBOE members that conduct and statements they observed by Dillaplain were "demeaning, insulting, abusive, veiledthreats, discriminatory and inappropriate for a member of the Board." Based on those observations and opinions, those members expressed their beliefs in that regard and publicly censured Dillaplain for the conduct they observed.
Dillaplain filed this action alleging that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. Dillaplain also asserts state claims of defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, and alleges violations of Ohio's Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22. In addition, Dillaplain seeks a declaration from the Court that Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights and that certain actions by the XBOE violated XBOE policy and Ohio's Open Meetings Act.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims asserted by Dillaplain pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, in determining a motion to dismiss, "courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id.
Accordingly, in order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is plausible where "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged?but it has not 'show[n]'?'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).
Dillaplain asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in his right to speech under the First Amendment and deprived him of his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that Dillaplain's federal claims must be dismissed for two reasons: (1) because Dillaplain asserts no violation of any right provided to him by federal law; and (2) qualifiedimmunity protects Defendants from suit and liability. Defendants also argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dillaplain's state claims.
"To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Waters v. City of Morristown, Tenn., 242 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Trapp v. Kimpel, No. 3:13-cv-18, 2013 WL 4510570, *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2013). "Qualified immunity shields...
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