Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'r

Decision Date08 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-12251,99-12251
Citation225 F.3d 1271
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) John DILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, Dale Eugene Brown, George R. Johnson, et al., Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.(No. 87-01159-CV-T-N), Myron H. Thompson, Judge.

Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Intervenors Dale Eugene Brown, George R. Johnson, James Austin, Jr., and Alvin Lee Pitts (the "Intervenors") appeal the district court's order granting the original Plaintiffs' (the "Dillard Plaintiffs") motion to dismiss the Intervenors' complaint. The Intervenors sought to intervene as plaintiffs in order to challenge the district court's 1988 remedial order which changed the size of the Baldwin County Commission from four commissioners to seven in order to remedy a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court dismissed the Intervenors' complaint, holding that while the Intervenors had standing to bring their complaint, they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because we conclude that the district court correctly found that the Intervenors had standing to bring their claims, but incorrectly held that they failed to state a claim, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

I.

This case has had a long and protracted history. In 1986, John Dillard and other African American voters brought suit against the Baldwin County Commission alleging that the at-large system used to elect its members violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973. At the time of this challenge, the Baldwin County Commission was composed of four persons elected at-large, one from each of four numbered districts. The case was one among many Dillard suits in the district courts which challenged the at-large election systems used by dozens of cities, counties, and school boards across Alabama. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.Supp. 1459 (M.D.Ala.1988) (setting forth the history and evolution of the Dillard cases).

The Baldwin County Commission conceded liability and the district court ordered relief. To remedy the violation, the district court ordered the Commission to increase its membership from four to seven persons elected from single-member districts in order to ensure a majority-black voting district. The court noted that only 15.34% of the County's population was black and the number was expected to decrease after the 1990 census. Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 694 F.Supp. 836, 839-40 (M.D.Ala.1988),amended by, 701 F.Supp. 808 (M.D.Ala.1988), aff'd, 862 F.2d 878 (11th Cir.1988) (table). Therefore, the court concluded, "to create a majority-black voting-age district in the county, the size of the commission must be increased to seven." Id. at 843. The court's remedy created a district with a black population expected to be over 63% in 1990.

In October 1996, the Intervenors moved to intervene in the case as plaintiffs and sought to have the 1988 remedial order vacated in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994), and this Circuit's holdings in White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir.1996), and Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc ), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083, 115 S.Ct. 1795, 131 L.Ed.2d 723 (1995). In their complaint, the Intervenors alleged that by increasing the size of the Commission from four to seven members in order to create a majority black district, the district court "exceede[d] its authority granted by Congress in the Voting Rights Act, and violate[d] the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments...." Complaint at 7. The Intervenors asked the court to enter an order modifying the injunction and providing for the establishment of a districting plan composed of four single-member districts with the probate judge acting as chair of the Commission. The Intervenors did not seek a return to at-large election of the commissioners.

Neither party opposed the Intervenors' motion, but both reserved the right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the Intervenors' complaint. The district court granted the Intervenors' motion to intervene subject to the parties' reservations.

In December 1996, the Dillard Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention arguing that the Intervenors lacked standing to challenge the 1988 Order and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On June 18, 1999, the district court granted the Dillard Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss. The district court held that the Intervenors had standing to challenge the 1988 injunction "insofar as they claim that the defendants' implementation of the court's remedial order violates their rights." Order at 6. However, the court concluded, the Intervenors failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. According to the district court, the Intervenors failed to state a claim under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments because the rights deprivation they alleged was the result of state rather than federal authority, and they failed to state a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because they did not allege that the 1988 injunction resulted in vote discrimination on account of race. The court also concluded that Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 did not provide a proper vehicle for the Intervenors to seek relief from the injunction.

II.

We review the district court's order of dismissal de novo and will uphold a dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Southeast Florida Cable, Inc. v. Martin County, Fla., 173 F.3d 1332, 1335 n. 5 (11th Cir.1999). Standing is a jurisdictional issue which is also reviewed de novo. See Engineering Contractors Assn. of South Florida Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 903 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004, 118 S.Ct. 1186, 140 L.Ed.2d 317 (1998).

A.

Indeed, standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1016, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Florida Assoc. of Med. Equip. Dealers v. Apfel, 194 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir.1999); EF Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 983 (11th Cir.1990). We are obliged to consider standing sua sponte even if the parties have not raised the issue. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.1999). In this case, the Appellees2 have argued that the Intervenors lack standing to pursue their claims and that the district court's dismissal of the Intervenors's complaint for failure to state a claim should be affirmed on this alternative ground.

To satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing, a plaintiff must make three showings:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations and footnote omitted). See also Church v. Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir.1994).

Appellees claim that the district court erred in finding that the Intervenors had Article III standing to challenge the 1988 injunction. Appellees' first argument is particular to Appellants' standing to bring their Tenth Amendment claim. They say that Appellants cannot have standing to assert their Tenth Amendment claim unless they establish standing to bring some other constitutional or statutory claim. Second, and more broadly, Appellees claim that the Intervenors have not alleged a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury to establish standing. Finally, Appellees assert that this Circuit's case law, which suggests that the Intervenors have alleged an injury sufficient to establish standing, has been overruled by subsequent Supreme Court rulings. We are not persuaded and address each argument in turn.

First, Appellees argue that private plaintiffs cannot have standing to assert Tenth Amendment claims except in circumstances where they establish some particularized injury which is redressable under some other constitutional or statutory provision. Appellees rely for support on Seniors Civil Liberties Assn., Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1992) and Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.1982). Neither case supports their contention.

In Seniors, the plaintiffs, individual residents of a housing complex for older persons and the Seniors Civil Liberties Association (SCLA), challenged the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, which prohibited discrimination against families with children. The individual plaintiffs lived in a housing complex that...

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