Dillard v. Baldwin County Com'n

• Decision Date: 18 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 87-T-1159-N.,Civ.A. 87-T-1159-N.
• Citation: 53 F.Supp.2d 1266
• Parties: John DILLARD, et al., Plaintiffs, Dale Eugene Brown, et al., Plaintiff-intervenors, v. BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

53 F.Supp.2d 1266

John DILLARD, et al., Plaintiffs Dale Eugene Brown, et al., Plaintiff-intervenors, v. BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 87-T-1159-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

June 18, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James U. Blacksher, Birmingham, AL, Lanie Guinier, Philadelphia, PA, Pamela Karlan, Charlottesville, VA, Julius L. Chambers, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City, Edward Still, Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Larry T. Menefee, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiffs.

Algert S. Agricola, Jr., Albert L. Jordan, Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff & Brandt, L.L.C., Montgomery, AL, James U. Blacksher, Birmingham, AL, Elaine R. Jones, Jacqueline A. Berrien, Norman J. Chachkin, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City, for intervenor-plaintiffs.

Claude E. Bankester, Taylor D. Wilkins, Jr., Wilkins, Bankester, Biles & Wayne, Bay Minete, AL, David R. Boyd, Jordan Dorman Walker, Jr., Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, AL, James H. Evans, William H. Pryor, Jr. Office of Atty. General, Montgomery, AL, Stanley E. Graham, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, TN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Four Baldwin County voters have intervened in this twelve-year-old voting rights lawsuit against the Baldwin County Commission and its members for the purpose of seeking relief from the remedial order and injunction entered in the case more than a decade ago. Currently before the court is a motion filed by the original plaintiffs to dismiss the intervenors' complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint-in-intervention will be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

This case began in 1986 when John Dillard and other African American voters brought suit against the Baldwin County Commission alleging that the at-large system used to elect its members violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973. The case was one among many Dillard suits in this court which challenged the at-large election systems used by dozens of cities, counties and school boards across Alabama. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.Supp. 1459 (M.D.Ala.1988) (setting forth the history and evolution of the Dillard cases).

Faced with the plaintiffs' lawsuit, the Baldwin County Commission conceded liability, and this court ordered relief that brought the commission into full compliance with § 2. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 694 F.Supp. 836 (M.D.Ala.1988), aff'd, 862 F.2d 878 (11th Cir.1988) (table). That order, with only minor modifications, is still in force today.

In October 1996, four Baldwin County voters moved to intervene as plaintiffs¹ in this case "to challenge certain aspects of the remedial order" entered eight years earlier.² Neither the defendants nor the original plaintiffs opposed the motion, but both parties expressly reserved the right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the intervenors' complaint. The court then granted the motion subject to the parties' reservations.

The complaint-in-intervention names as defendants the Baldwin County Commission and each current commissioner (sued in his or her official capacity). It alleges that "[t]he June 1988 injunction of this Court exceeds its authority grant[]ed by Congress in the Voting Rights Act, and violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments."³ The plaintiff-intervenors seek relief under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 (civil rights) and 1988 (attorneys' fees), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (declaratory judgments), and Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (relief from judgment or order).

The defendants answer by denying the substance of the complaint and by asserting two defenses: (1) that the intervenors lack standing to challenge the court's 1988 order; and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs raise the same defenses in the instant motion to dismiss.⁴

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Like any other complaint, the complaint-in-intervention may be dismissed for want of standing or for failure to state a claim only if it appears "beyond doubt" that the plaintiff-intervenors can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief.⁵ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); accord Fuller v. Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349-50 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Conley); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.1994). The court must construe the complaint-in-intervention liberally in favor of the intervenors and accept its well-pleaded allegations as true. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 810, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Liberal construction has its limits, though, and the court is under no obligation to re-write the complaint-in-intervention to assume facts not alleged. See Peterson v. Atlanta Housing Authority, 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993); Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

The plaintiff-intervenors in this case appear to have standing under Eleventh Circuit precedent insofar as they claim that the defendants' implementation of the court's remedial order violates their rights.⁶ See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n. 6 (11th Cir.1992); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982).⁷

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Section 1983

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, the plaintiff-intervenors must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.⁸ See, e.g., American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, ___, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). The defendants in this case, the Baldwin County Commission and the Baldwin County commissioners, are state actors. The intervenors allege deprivations of their rights secured by the tenth and eleventh amendments to the United States Constitution, but none of the defendants could possibly deprive them of any such rights. The tenth and eleventh amendments protect against certain exercises of federal power; they do not give individuals any rights against the exercise of state authority. The eleventh amendment, for example, protects state sovereign immunity in federal courts, see, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997), and the tenth amendment merely "confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States," New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2418, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). A county government could not violate either provision.⁹

The plaintiff-intervenors have therefore failed to state a claim against the Baldwin County Commission or its commissioners for which relief can be granted under § 1983 for violations of the tenth and eleventh amendments to the United States Constitution.¹⁰

2. Rule 60

The plaintiff-intervenors also purport to seek relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part as follows:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation."

This rule "merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief" and does not provide a substantive cause of action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 advisory committee's note. It therefore cannot provide a basis upon which the court might sustain the complaint-in-intervention. Furthermore, as its text makes clear, Rule 60 operates by motion only. The plaintiff-intervenors have not, however, filed any motions pursuant to Rule 60, nor would such a motion satisfy the requirement in Rule 24 that every would-be intervenor file "a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(c) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 7(a) (motions are not pleadings). The plaintiff-intervenors have therefore failed to state a `claim' under Rule 60 sufficient to withstand dismissal.

3. Attorney's Fees and Declaratory Judgment

The plaintiff-intervenors also ask for an award of attorney's fees and a declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (attorney's fees) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (declaratory judgments). These provisions are strictly procedural in nature, do not create independent causes of action for which the court might grant relief, and therefore cannot save the complaint-in-intervention from dismissal. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 n. 66, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2041 n. 66, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1796, 36...