Dillard v. Doe, 91-227

• Decision Date: 28 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-227,91-227
• Citation: 251 Mont. 379,824 P.2d 1016
• Parties: Kelvin DILLARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John DOE, and the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1016

824 P.2d 1016

251 Mont. 379

Kelvin DILLARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John DOE, and the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 91-227.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 29, 1991.

Decided Jan. 28, 1992.

James A. Manley, Manley Law Offices, Polson, for plaintiff and appellant.

Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Betsy Brandborg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, for defendants and respondents.

GRAY, Justice.

The appellant, Kelvin Dillard, appeals from an order of the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents, John Doe and the State of Montana. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the respondents.

Early on the morning of January 9, 1989, the appellant, Kelvin Dillard, was walking from his home on Fulkerson Lane near Flathead Lake to work the 7:00 a.m. shift at Flathead Lumber in Polson, Montana. It was dark, windy and snowing as the appellant followed Highway 35 west into Polson. Wearing a Levi coat, jeans, and a black hat and carrying his yellow hard hat, he walked next to the highway delineator posts with his back to the wind and blowing snow and to traffic headed in the same direction as he was. It did not appear to the appellant that the highway had been plowed yet.

The appellant testified in his deposition that as he walked "I kept turning around and looking behind me hopefully to thumb a ride with a car and watching out for the plow because I didn't want to get hit. I seen the plow as it rounded the corner at Fulkerson Hill." He knew the approaching vehicle was a snowplow because he could see the flashing yellow lights and hear the scraper.

The appellant's testimony of the events which occurred after he saw the snowplow round the corner is as follows:

A. I saw [the snowplow]. I says to myself, "Before that guy gets up here, I've got to get on the other side of the ditch, or I'm going to be buried in snow." I maybe walked another 25, 30 yards, stopped, hung my hard hat on the reflector, bent over to light a cigarette, and that's when I caught the reflection of his yellow flashing light in the snow and (indicating), he got me.

Q. With what did he get you?

A. I believe it was the blade.

The appellant was between the fogline and the delineator post with one foot on the pavement when he was hit. The snowplow continued on, its operator apparently unaware of what had occurred.

On August 7, 1989, the appellant filed suit against the operator of the snowplow, named in the complaint as John Doe, and the State of Montana alleging negligence and seeking to recover general, special and punitive damages. During discovery, the respondent State of Montana filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was held on January 16, 1991. Thereafter, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents.

In its memorandum and order granting summary judgment the District Court first determined that the appellant was negligent as a matter of law. The court determined that the appellant was negligent in that: (1) he violated Sec. 61-8-506, MCA, which requires a pedestrian to walk only on the left side of the roadway facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction; (2) he violated Sec. 61-8-507, MCA, which prohibits standing in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride; and (3) after hearing and seeing the snowplow, he "walked 25 yards further, stopped, hung his hard hat on the highway delineator post and bent slightly to light a cigarette with his back still to the traffic when he was hit either by the snowplow [blade] or by thrown snow."

The snowplow operator had not yet been deposed at the time of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The District Court found that the appellant's factual allegations failed to establish any negligence on the part of the snowplow operator and that the record was devoid of any evidence of negligence by the respondents. The court went on, however, for purposes of the summary judgment motion only, to infer and assume negligence by the respondents based on the appellant's allegations, even though those allegations were not supported by facts on the record. Assuming first that the snowplow was owned by the State and operated by its employee, John Doe, at the time of the accident, the court went on to assume that the snowplow operator was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to maintain control of his vehicle, driving too close to the appellant and driving too fast.

The District Court then concluded that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of comparative negligence: the appellant's negligence far exceeded the respondents' negligence. Thus, the court ruled that the respondents were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Did the District Court err in granting the motion for summary judgment?

In order for summary judgment to issue, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to facts deemed material in light of the substantive principles entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (1988), 233 Mont. 113, 117, 760 P.2d 57, 60. If the movant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Frigon, 233 Mont. at 117, 760 P.2d at 60.

Ordinarily, issues of negligence are questions of fact not susceptible to summary adjudication. Brohman v. State (1988), 230 Mont. 198, 201, 749 P.2d 67, 69. Liability should not be adjudicated upon a motion for summary judgment where factual issues concerning negligence and causation are presented. Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. However, in certain cases where reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the cause of an accident, questions of fact may be determined as a matter of law. Brohman, 230 Mont. at 202, 749 P.2d at 70, (citing Hartley v. State (1985), 103 Wash.2d 768, 698 P.2d 77, 81).

Here, the factual issues that were determined as a matter of law by the District Court were that the appellant was negligent and that his negligence exceeded the presumed negligence of the respondents. Thus, the question we must determine on appeal is whether the District Court correctly concluded that reasonable minds could not differ under the factual circumstances presented in this case. In so doing, we will follow the District Court in presuming certain acts of negligence by the respondents as established fact for purposes of appeal.

The appellant's negligence is clear on the record before us. He failed to walk on the left side of the roadway facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction, in violation of Sec. 61-8-506(2), MCA. In addition, instead of moving farther off the...