Dillard v. Pitchess, Civ. No. CV 73-2947-WPG.

• Citation: 399 F. Supp. 1225
• Decision Date: 26 August 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. CV 73-2947-WPG.
• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
• Parties: Clarence Lee DILLARD, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Peter J. PITCHESS et al., Defendants.

399 F. Supp. 1225

Clarence Lee DILLARD, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Peter J. PITCHESS et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. CV 73-2947-WPG.

United States District Court, C. D. California.

August 26, 1975.

Terry Smerling and Anita Susan Brenner, Greater Watts Justice Center, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, Robert C. Lynch, Asst. Chief Deputy, Frederick R. Bennett, Dennis L. Myers, Deputy County Counsels, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILLIAM P. GRAY, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action in which the plaintiff seeks to challenge, on constitutional grounds, the conditions under which prisoners awaiting trial are housed and maintained in the Los Angeles County Jail facility located on the top floors of the Hall of Justice in the City of Los Angeles (the jail). A declaratory judgment and sweeping injunctive relief are requested. Part of the relief sought will be granted.

THE PARTIES.

The action was commenced on about December 19, 1973, by the filing of a handwritten complaint in which Clarence Lee Dillard raised several disturbing contentions regarding living conditions at the jail, where he was then a prisoner awaiting trial. Shortly thereafter, Terry Smerling, an attorney affiliated with the Greater Watts Justice Center, filed a comprehensive amended complaint as a class action on behalf of Mr. Dillard and all other unconvicted prisoners at the jail.

The named defendants are the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, his principal assistants, and the members of the County Board of Supervisors.

After appropriate proceedings, the court later designated the plaintiff class to consist of all pre-trial prisoners incarcerated at the jail from December 19, 1973, until May 11, 1974, and appropriate notice was given to the members of the class.

JURISDICTION.

This court has jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter of the litigation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal. 1972).

However, the defendants have questioned the jurisdiction of this court to make any adjudication, because of mootness. By the time the trial began, on about June 11, 1974, Mr. Dillard had been convicted of the pending criminal charge and had been transferred to another facility to serve his sentence.¹ The defendants suggest that inasmuch as the principal plaintiff was no longer a prisoner at the jail, he could not be a proper representative of the plaintiff class.

If such a contention were to be considered valid, a constitutional challenge to conditions at a pre-trial detention center, such as the jail, could virtually never be litigated, because the claims of any particular inmate would likely be mooted within a relatively short period of time and before a case could be brought to trial. However, it is well established that the fact that the case has become moot as to the named plaintiff does not bar his litigating the issues on behalf of the other members of the class. Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F. 2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93 (N.D.Ohio 1971); see Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1972).

The foregoing does not completely dispose of the contention of mootness. Almost a year has passed since the taking of evidence was completed, and a judgment has not yet been rendered. In the meantime, most, and perhaps all, of the designated members of the class may have had their detention at the jail terminated, for one reason or another. The suggestion is made on behalf of the defendants that these circumstances cast doubt upon the ability of this court to adjudicate the many issues raised on behalf of prisoners at the jail.

In the proceedings that resulted in the designation of the above-described class, it was pointed out by counsel for the defendants that the matter of living conditions of a pre-trial detainee that affect his ability to prepare for and participate in his defense at trial can be raised at such trial. The court was thus mindful of the possibility that an adjudication in this action could have res judicata effect with respect to pre-trial prisoners that might be considered to be members of the class. It was largely for this reason that a specific designation of a class was made and notices sent to the members thereof in order that they might "opt out" if so disposed.

A further reason for designating a class composed of prisoners occupying the jail during a specific period was to provide a means whereby evidence could be limited to a time frame coterminous with the period of incarceration of members of the class. Thus, the defendants became aware that the case that they were obliged to defend would be restricted to conditions and events occurring between December 1973, the commencement of the action, and May 11, 1974, thirty days prior to the scheduled beginning of trial.

For the reasons noted above, the court sought to follow the technical requirements of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was apparent to all concerned throughout this litigation that its focus was upon the matter of whether relief should be granted, not just for the benefit of current occupants of the jail, but for the benefit of all future pre-trial prisoners in the custody of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County.

The trial took about fifteen days of court time over a period of more than two months, and each side sought and was granted substantial continuances in the schedule for the filing of extensive post-trial briefs. But the principal delay in announcing a decision has stemmed from the fact that I have found it necessary to read many reported cases, review substantial portions of the record, make personal visits to the jail and the other detention facilities of the county, and do a considerable amount of pondering, in order to reach and articulate a satisfactory resolution of the many complicated issues in this matter. Under such circumstances, I cannot believe that the difficulties inherent in this task must be compounded by the requirement that a complete decision be promulgated according to a time schedule that is dependent upon the turnover of a particular group of pre-trial prisoners at the jail.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) was filed in 1970 as a class action and involved a challenge of the constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion statutes. The plaintiff was pregnant when the action was instituted, but, as the Supreme Court opinion pointed out, the record did not show that she was pregnant at the time of trial or when the trial judge's opinion and judgment were filed. Because of this, and because the 1970 pregnancies of the plaintiff and the members of her class would certainly have been terminated prior to the argument before the Supreme Court in late 1971, the appellant suggested that the entire matter was moot. In responding to such contention, Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, referred to the usual rule that in federal cases an actual controversy must exist from the time the action is instituted to the completion of the appellate process. He then pointed out that if such a rule were applied to pregnancy litigation, virtually no such case could be carried to final judgment, including appeal. He then stated: "Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be `capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 410 U.S. at 125, 93 S.Ct. at 713 (citations omitted). The opinion thereupon held that the termination of the plaintiff's 1970 pregnancy did not render her case moot. It necessarily follows that the case was not made moot by the termination of the pregnancies of all of the other "similarly situated" members of the plaintiff class.

In consideration of mootness, the analogy between pregnancy and pre-trial confinement seems very close. I conclude that, under authority of Roe v. Wade, this case has not become moot and that this court retains jurisdiction to render an enforceable decision.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HALL OF JUSTICE

COUNTY JAIL AND DETENTION CONDITIONS

The Hall of Justice is a fifteen-story building, square or rectangular in appearance, that was constructed in about 1925 in the civic center of Los Angeles. The lower nine floors then, as now, housed county offices and courts, and the upper floors have always been occupied by the county jail. Originally, this was the only jail facility operated by the county and had a maximum occupancy of about 3,000 prisoners. However, over the years, the expanding jail population has necessitated the construction of additional facilities in other locations, some of which will be mentioned later in this memorandum.

At the present time, the jail here concerned is used principally for the maximum detention of about 900 pre-trial prisoners and the less restricted accommodation of about 365 "trusties," who perform most of the labor incident to the operation of the institution.

The housing areas for pre-trial prisoners are divided into modules, each of which contains one or more rows of about fifteen cells. The cells along each row open onto a common hall or walkway that is about eight feet wide. Each of the cells is enclosed by a solid wall on three sides and by steel bars and a steel barred and remotely operated door at the end next to the walkway. Each cell is about eight feet by six feet in dimension. A cold water washstand and a toilet are at the end away from the door. An upper and a lower bunk-type bed, made of sheet steel, fold down from one of the walls, taking up about half the floor space of the cell when they are in the down position. The bedding consists of a thin mattress, a washable mattress cover...