Dillingham v. Putnam
| Decision Date | 24 June 1890 |
| Citation | 14 S.W. 303 |
| Parties | DILLINGHAM v. PUTNAM. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
R. Dearmond and O. T. Holt, for appellant. W. W. Wilkins and C. B. Randle, for appellee.
The legislature at its last session enacted a statute which, in all appeals prosecuted by receivers, requires that Gen. Laws 1889, p. 58. In this case appellant seeks to prosecute an appeal upon a bond, which binds himself and sureties for costs only, while the bond required by the statute above quoted, requires a bond that will bind principal and sureties absolutely, to satisfy the judgment in case of affirmance. The appeal is prosecuted by appellant as a receiver, and for the purpose of having revised a judgment rendered against him in his official capacity, and appellee moves to dismiss the appeal because a supersedeas bond has not been filed.
It is urged that the statute in question is violative of the constitution in that the act embraces more than one subject, and because it is a special law regulating the practice or jurisdiction of the courts, or placing a limitation on civil actions. The statute quoted is found in an act entitled "An act to amend sections 2 and 6 of chapter 131 of `An act to provide for the appointment of receivers, and to define their powers and duties, and to regulate proceedings under such appointment of receivers,' as passed by the twentieth legislature, and approved April 2, 1887." It is believed that the appointment, the fixing of the powers and duties of receivers, and the regulation of proceedings, when it becomes necessary that such appointments shall be made, powers exercised, and duties performed, are so intimately connected as to make an act such as that in question valid under the terms of the constitution, which provides that "no bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." The matter of receivers or receiverships is the subject of the act, and is single in the sense of the constitution, for it is this to which the entire act applies. Receivers can only exist through the appointments of courts. Their powers must be such as the law or the order appointing may lawfully give, and the many steps through which those things can be fixed and determined are but proceedings. The purpose of the provision of the constitution cited has been so often stated that it is unnecessary to repeat it, and looking to that, the entire purpose of the act, and the past decisions of this court, we must hold that the statute in question is not violative of section 35, art. 3, of the constitution. Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S. W. Rep. 865. Nor is it believed that the act, within the meaning of the constitution, is a special law regulating the practice or jurisdiction of the courts, for it affects the proceedings in every receivership, and it would seem that it in no respect comes within the evil intended to be prevented by that section of the constitution which prohibits the passage of enumerated special laws. On the contrary, a proper act on this subject, as in cases of appeals by executors, administrators, guardians, and by municipal corporations created under the general law, would seem to be proper.
The section of the constitution forbidding the passage of special or local laws on enumerated subjects forbids the passage of such laws "for limitation of civil or criminal actions," (Const. art. 3, § 56,) but we do not understand the act in question within the meaning of the constitution to be such a limitation. We understand that section of the constitution to forbid the passage of a law which would extend or restrict the time within which an action should be brought against or in favor of one person, when upon a like cause of action a longer or shorter period of limitation is provided for persons generally of like status. It is suggested, however, that the act, if given effect, will in many cases deprive this court of power to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by the constitution, and, if this be true, the act cannot in so far be given effect. The constitution...
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...by due course of law. Id. at 294; accord Clark v. Goss, 12 Tex. 395 (1854); O'Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex. 336 (1852). In Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 14 S.W. 303 (1890), this court stated, "A law which practically takes away from either party to litigation the right to a fair and impartial ......
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...supersedeas bond, without reference to the appellant's ability to pay, also violated the open courts provision, Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 3-5, 14 S.W. 303, 304-05 (1890), as did a city charter which exempted a city from liability for injuries caused by street defects, unless the cit......
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STATE REJECTION OF FEDERAL LAW.
...at 1320 (tracing historical pedigree). (141) See, e.g., Runge & Co. v. Wyatt, 25 Tex. Supp. 291, 294 (1860); Dillingham v. Putnam, 14 S.W. 303, 304 (Tex. (142) Texas Ass n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. (143) Id. (144) See id. at 448. On the merits, the majority relied again on the open-co......