Dillon v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 11 July 1974
• Citation: 322 A.2d 332
• Parties: Charles DILLON v. Ernest H. JOHNSON, Maine State Tax Assessor; Town of Sumner, Maine, a municipal corporation.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 332

322 A.2d 332

Charles DILLON v. Ernest H. JOHNSON, Maine State Tax Assessor; Town of Sumner Maine, a municipal corporation.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 11, 1974.

Gordon E. Stein, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Hallowell, for plaintiff.

John M. Dudley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, Robert B. Dow, Jr., Norway, for defendants.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

This is a complaint brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. ¹ The purpose of the complaint was to seek a declaration that the 'enforcement of the 10-year residency requirement embodied in 36 M.R.S.A. § 653, subd. 1(F)(1) ² is a denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights (sic) to travel and to be afforded the due process and the equal protection of the laws.' Since there was no disagreement on the facts, the parties agreed to a report to the Law Court pursuant to Rule 72(b), M.R.C.P., for such final decision as the rights of the parties may require, stipulating that 'the sole issue is the pure legal question of the constitutionality of the 10-year residency requirement contained in 36 M.R.S.A. § 653(F).'

Tax exemption was sought for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972 on property owned by the plaintiff in the Town of Sumner which had an assessed valuation of $2,820. The plaintiff first acquired residence in Maine on May 1, 1970. At that time he was '100% totally and permanently disabled from a nonservice connected disability.' As certified by the Veterans Administration, the plaintiff had received an honorable discharge on May 9, 1946, from the United States Navy.

Inter alia the parties entered into the following stipulation:

'12. The Plaintiff submitted a timely application for a disabled veterans exemption from poll and property taxes pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. 653 to the Town of Sumner, Maine, for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972.

13. The Plaintiff's exemption applications for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972 were rejected solely because the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of 36 M.R.S.A. 653-F(1).'

The defendants in this action are the State Tax Assessor and 'Town of Sumner, Maine, a municipal corporation.' The tax assessors of the Town of Sumner are not named as parties defendant, despite the following provision of 36 M.R.S.A. § 653, subd. 1(G):

'Any person who desires to secure exemption under this subsection shall make written application and file written proof of entitlement on or before the first day of April, in the year in which the exemption is first requested, with the assessors of the place in which the person resides. The assessors shall thereafter grant such exemption to any person while he is so qualified and continues a resident of that place or until they are notified of reason or desire for discontinuance.'

The failure to make the assessors of the Town of Sumner parties defendant deprives the Law Court of jurisdiction to reach the constitutional issue framed by the parties and requires us to to discharge the report.

The powers and duties of the State Tax Assessor, as specified in36 M.R.S.A. § 51 et seq., do not include any authority over the assessors of the various cities and towns by which an exemption such as here denied can be mandated. Young v. Johnson, 161 Me. 64, 207 A.2d 392, 396 (1965). It is, therefore, clear that the inclusion of the State Tax Assessor as a party defendant does not make the assessors of the Town of Sumner parties to this litigation.

Through a long line of cases this Court has defined the position which assessors hold with reference to the municipality which they serve. They have certain responsibilities which are unique and distinct from those of other elected officials. Since their duties are defined by statute they are not subject to the direction and control of the municipalities in which they function. Young v. Johnson, supra. Although assessors of taxes when selected by a city or town are public officials, there is no such nexus between them and the municipality as will bring into being the relationship of principal and agent. Sears, Roebuck v. Presque Isle, 150 Me. 181, 107 A.2d 475 (1954); McKay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Cushing, 131 Me. 333, 162 A. 783 (1932).

Conversely, there is no statutory authority for granting a tax exemption conferred on anybody other than assessors. Since assessors are not agents of the municipality and since they are the only persons given the power to exempt property from taxation, certainly the other municipal officers have no right to either grant the exemption or order the assessors to do so. It is thus clear that joining the 'Town of Sumner, Maine, a municipal corporation,' as a defendant does not make the assessors parties defendant.

Since the assessors have not been made parties to this action, we deem that jurisdiction is lacking over the subject matter of this controversy. Should we decide that the 10-year residency requirement is unconstitutional, we would have no authority to order the assessors to grant the exemption requested since the assessors are not before us.

We held in City of Rockland v. Inhabitants of Hurricane Isle, 106 Me. 169, 173, 76 A. 286, 287 (1909), that jurisdiction required three essentials:

'First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; third, the point...