Dillon v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-CV-1204-ACL |
| Parties | RANDAL DILLON, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Randal Dillon brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner's denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that despite Dillon's severe impairments, he was not disabled as he was capable of performing work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is presented in the parties' briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
Dillon filed his application for benefits on July 2, 2019. (Tr 249.) He claimed he became unable to work on December 31, 2018, due to arthritis, spinal stenosis, status-post spinal fusion, pain in both knees, carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression. (Tr. 17, 215.) Dillon was 46 years of age at his alleged onset of disability date. (Tr. 21.) His application was denied initially. (Tr. 109.) Dillon's claim was denied by an ALJ on December 14, 2020. (Tr. 11-22.) On August 10, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Dillon's claim for review. (Tr. 1-4.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
In this action, Dillon first argues that the “RFC is not based on some medical evidence/the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 24 at 3.) He next argues that the “decision fails to properly evaluate medical opinion evidence.” Id. at 6. Finally, Dillon argues that the decision “lacks a proper pain evaluation.” Id. at 12.
The ALJ first found that Dillon met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2024. (Tr. 13.) He stated that Dillon has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. Id. In addition, the ALJ concluded that Dillon had the following severe impairments: pseudoarthrosis, osteoarthritis, lumbar degenerative disc disease status-post surgeries, sciatica, left meniscus tear status-post arthroscopy, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, and anxiety disorder. Id. The ALJ found that Dillon did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 14.)
As to Dillon's RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). Specifically, the claimant is able to lift up to ten pounds occasionally. He is able to stand/walk for about two hours and sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday, with normal breaks. He is unable to climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds but is occasionally able to climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He is unable to tolerate exposure to unprotected heights and use of dangerous moving machinery. He is able to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes.
(Tr. 16.)
The ALJ found that Dillon was unable to perform his past work as an ironworker, but was capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as document preparer, administrative support worker, and surveillance system monitor. (Tr. 20-22.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Dillon was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 31, 2018, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 22.)
The ALJ's final decision reads as follows:
A. Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2003). Put another way, a court should “disturb the ALJ's decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice.” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
III.B. Determination of Disability
A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists … in significant numbers in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 343 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, reaching out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on his ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation...
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