Dilmore v. Alion Sci. & Tech. Corp., Civil Action No. 11-72
| Decision Date | 11 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-72 |
| Parties | JAMES A. DILMORE, Plaintiff, v. ALION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is a partial Motion to Strike Insufficient Reponses in Defendant's Answer, (Docket No. 24), wherein Plaintiff James A. Dilmore ("Dilmore") moves the Court to strike responses of Defendant Alion Science and Technology Corporation ("Alion") to certain paragraphs of the Complaint, to direct Alion to file an Amended Answer adequately addressing said paragraphs, and to direct Alion to expressly state its reason for terminating Dilmore. (Docket No. 24 at 3). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion [24] is DENIED.
This is an age discrimination suit filed pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. ("PHRA"). Because the factual background of this action is presented in great detail elsewhere,1 only the basic facts of the case are provided herein.
Dilmore is an adult resident of Pennsylvania. (Docket No. 11 at 2). Alion is an employee-owned technology company, whose headquarters are located in McLean, Virginia. (Docket No.4-1 at ¶¶ 3, 6). Alion maintains several offices in Virginia and the metropolitan D.C. area. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7). The company also maintains a small office near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 11).
This action arises out of Dilmore's termination in July 2010. (See Docket Nos. 1 at ¶ 3655, 17-3, 17-4). Dilmore was hired by Alion in October of 2004, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 7), and was, at some point, promoted to Vice President of Corporate Development. (Id. at ¶ 13). Yet, he claims that he was terminated due to illegal age discrimination.
Around the time of Dilmore's 65th birthday, Alion posted an advertisement for Plaintiff's position on its website. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30). Dilmore was only made aware of the advertisement by another Alion employee, and Dilmore raised the issue with a superior. (Id. at 31-32). Dilmore claims that the advertisement was subsequently removed. (Id. at ¶¶32, 35).
Shortly thereafter, on June 30, 2010, Dilmore was summoned to a meeting in Virginia to, so Dilmore claims, discuss work projects. (Id. at ¶ 36; Docket No. 17 at 1). At this meeting, according to Dilmore, he was informed that applications would be solicited for his replacement, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 38), and that Alion would no longer have a position for him. (Id. at ¶ 41). Dilmore was given a "General Release" agreement and an unsolicited offer of severance pay. (Id. at ¶ 45). Dilmore declined both. (Id. at ¶ 53). Hence, he was terminated. (See id. at ¶¶ 44-54). His discharge gives rise to the instance suit.
As to the facts pertinent to this motion, there are two broad categories of pleadings that Dilmore moves this Court to strike. The first category includes those pleadings in which "Alion denies any characterization of any documents or writings as a written 'admission,' which states a legal conclusion to which no response is required." (See Docket No. 22 at ¶¶ 14-23). An example of these pleadings from Dilmore's Complaint states that "By Alion's written admission, Plaintiff had tremendous experience managing large proposals." (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 15). To this end,Dilmore cites an employee performance review for the period ending September 30, 2008. (Docket No. 24-3 at 2).
The other category of pleading with which Dilmore takes issue is those pleadings that state that "[t]he averments of Paragraph [X] purport to interpret a document that speaks for itself." (Docket No. 22 at ¶¶ 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, 58). Paragraph 47 is exemplary of the Complaint's pleadings to which Alion responded: "The unsolicited agreement that Alion presented to Plaintiff and told him to sign falsely characterized Plaintiff's termination as a resignation." (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 47). Alion has not admitted or denied these statements, but simply claims that the document speaks for itself. Alion has also pled three affirmative defenses. Alion claims that Dilmore's claims are barred by the applicable administrative time limitations, that Dilmore failed to mitigate his losses, and that it is entitled to an offset of any damages that Dilmore could have earned through mitigation. (See Docket No. 22 at ¶¶ 69-71).
Dilmore commenced the current action by filing his Complaint on January 19, 2011. (Id.). Alion then filed a motion to change venue, with brief in support, on February 21, 2011. (Docket Nos. 4, 5). Dilmore filed his response thereto on March 7, 2011, (Docket No. 11), and the Court heard oral argument on March 11, 2011, (see Docket No. 14). The Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Alion's motion to transfer on April 21, 2011. (Docket Nos. 19, 20).
On May 13, 2011, Alion filed its Answer. (Docket No. 22). Following same, Dilmore filed the instant motion and supporting brief. (Docket Nos. 24, 25). Alion responded to the motion, (Docket No. 26), and Dilmore replied. (Docket No. 29). The parties also presented theirconcerns to the Court during the June 14, 2011 case management conference. (Docket No. 34). The motion is fully briefed, and is, therefore, ripe for disposition.
Dilmore's motion puts forth two distinct arguments. First, Dilmore challenges Alion's responses to ¶¶ 14-23, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, and 58 of his Complaint. (Id. at ¶3). Alion's Answer states that ¶¶ 14-23 are "legal conclusions," while the documents cited in ¶¶ 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, and 58 "speak for themselves." (See Docket No. 22, ¶ 14-23, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, 58). Dilmore argues that, because "Rule 8 requires admissions or denials," (Docket No. 24 at 1), this Court should strike Alion's answers and order Alion to properly admit or deny the challenged paragraphs. Since Dilmore never explicitly states what the legal basis is for this motion, the Court presumes that Dilmore is operating under Rule 12(f). Dilmore also requests, in relation to his motion to strike, that the Court order Alion to file an Amended Answer that properly responds to the pleadings at issue. (Docket No. 24 at 3).
Dilmore additionally requests that Alion expressly state its reason for terminating his employment. (Docket No. 24 at ¶ 2). Dilmore argues that the burden-shifting regime of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973), requires a defendant to "articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its adverse employment action, apparently in its Answer. (See Docket No. 25 at 2). Dilmore, therefore, seeks to have the Court compel Alion to expressly state its "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for terminating him in its Answer.
Alion responds to these arguments by first noting that motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are disfavored by the courts. See Tauro v. Baer, 2009 WL 2410952, *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009)(Conti, J.). Striking a defense is only appropriate when "the insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent." Id. (citing Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Alion asserts that Dilmore's "written admission" pleadings are merely legal conclusions, to which Alion need not further respond. (Docket No. 26 at 5). As to its responses that the documents "speak for themselves," Alion argues that its responses are appropriate given Dilmore's "sweeping and generalized characterizations of certain documents." (Id. at 6).
Alion also argues that Dilmore's motion confuses the pleading requirements of Rule 8(b) with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime. (Docket No. 26 at 3). McDonnell Douglas, says Alion, addresses only the production of evidence, not the averments in an Answer. (Id.). Alion also says that the appropriate time to provide "particular facts" pertaining to its legitimate, non-discriminatory termination of Dilmore is during discovery. (Id. at 3-4). Therefore, according to Alion, the statements in its Answer are more than sufficient.
Rule 12(f) provides that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike a pleading is within the sound discretion of the court. See Snare & Triest v. Friedman, 169 F. 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1909); Canady v. Erbe Electromedizin GMBH, 307 F.Supp.2d 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2004); Tauro, 2009 WL 2410952 at *1.
Because they are such drastic remedies, motions to strike are generally disfavored. Canady, 307 F.Supp.2d. at 7-8 . A court should only grant a motion to strike where the insufficiency of the defense is readily apparent, Cippollone, 789 F.2d at 188, or when it is clear that the allegations "have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties..." United States v. Rocky Mt. Holdings, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 891823, *6 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Because the pleadings at issue are direct responses to Dilmore's initial pleadings, they are clearly not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. This leaves insufficiency as the only ground upon which this motion can be granted.
Here, the Court is not convinced that the challenged paragraphs of Alion's answer are so insufficient as to merit their striking. As to paragraphs 14-23, Alion has clearly denied Dilmore's allegations. Dilmore characterizes statements made...
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