Dimartino v. Sage
| Decision Date | 13 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-00498 (KAD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Kevin DIMARTINO, Michael MILCHIN, Steven PAGARTANIS, Kenneth PELLETIER, John MATERA, & Eugene CASTELLE, Petitioners, v. ACTING WARDEN Jessica SAGE, Respondent. |
Kevin Dimartino, Michael Milchin, Steven Pagartanis, Kenneth Pelletier, John Matera, and Eugene Castelle, together the “Petitioners, ” filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, on April 28, 2021.[1] Therein, the Petitioners claim that they have been subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement insofar as the Respondent has been deliberately indifferent to their serious medical conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.[2] They seek release to home confinement. Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent, Acting Warden of Federal Corrections Institution Danbury, Jessica Sage.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice. Additionally, the Petitioners' Amended Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 19, is denied as MOOT.
In their amended petition, Petitioners allege that they are currently inmates in Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody at the Federal Corrections Institution Danbury (“FCI Danbury”). They purport to bring their petition “on behalf of all current and future inmates who are in the custody of BOP at FCI Danbury.”[3] (ECF No. 6, 1.) Petitioners generally allege that systemic inadequacies of medical care constitute deliberate indifference to their medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment. (Id.) Petitioners maintain that the Respondent's health care system for inmates fails to diagnose serious conditions, provide timely care administer appropriate medications, employ adequate staff and identify and correct its own failings. (Id. at 2.) The amended petition also includes general allegations relevant to FCI Danbury's approach to the COVID-19 pandemic.[4](E.g., id. at 6.) Of significance here, the only form of relief sought is an “order granting home confinement to plaintiffs who suffer from serious medical concerns, or at risk of serious medical concerns so they may address these medical concerns ” or “any further relief as the court deems necessary.” (Id. at 1, 2 (emphasis added).)
As to the individual Petitioners, they specifically allege that the Respondent maintains a gross backlog of pending sick call requests and that, as a result of these backlogs, the Petitioners have been subject to significant delays in receiving medical care, putting them at risk of serious harm. (Id. at 2.) Attached to the amended petition were medical and treatment histories for each of the six petitioners, and these histories demonstrated that the petitioners suffer from a variety of medical conditions for which various treatment modalities have been recommended. (Id. at 4-5.) These histories include particularized allegations of delayed medical care, for example, an allegation that one of the petitioners has not received outside medical care notwithstanding an “urgent” referral in September 2020.[5] (Id. at 5.)
On May 5, 2021, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing the Respondent to respond to the amended petition. The Respondent filed an appearance, a motion to substitute a party, [6] and a motion to dismiss on May 24, 2021. (ECF Nos. 12-14.)
On June 16, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Respondent's motion to dismiss as well as a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 17.) The Court granted the motion for extension of time on June 25, 2021 while denying the motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 18.)
Petitioners filed an amended motion to appoint counsel that included a response to the Respondent's motion to dismiss on July 22, 2021. (ECF No. 19.) Petitioners followed this submission on July 29, 2021 with a Notice of Related Case, which indicated that this case was related to the Whitted v. Easter matter, supra, and requested that Petitioner's case be transferred to Judge Shea.[7] (ECF No. 20.)
On August 6, 2021, James Whitted filed a motion to appear as Amicus Curia and to file a brief addressing some of the issues raised in the Respondent's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) The Court granted the motion and provided the Respondent an opportunity to respond, an opportunity of which the Respondent did not avail herself. (ECF No. 22.) The Amicus brief filed by Mr. Whitted advanced three arguments in favor of Petitioners: (1) that the settlement agreement in Whitted did not bar this action; (2) that, as noted during the Whitted litigation, there were systemic issues with the health care system at FCI Danbury; and (3) that appointing counsel in this matter is appropriate. (ECF No. 21.) Amicus did not substantively address the question of whether this action was subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the issue on which this decision turns.
The court “reviews a motion to dismiss a habeas petition according to the same principles as a motion to dismiss a civil complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Spiegelmann v. Erfe, No. 3:17-cv-2069 (VLB), 2018 WL 1582549, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (citing Purdy v. Bennett, 214 F.Supp.2d 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see also Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F.Supp.3d 411, 452-53 (D. Conn. 2020) ().
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.” Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).
In seeking dismissal of the petition, the Respondent advances four arguments: (1) The relief sought by the Petitioners is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) The Petitioners have failed to demonstrate or plead any exhaustion of their administrative remedies under either the judicially created exhaustion requirements for a § 2241 petition or the statutorily created requirements in the PLRA (3) The petition is barred by the settlement in Whitted v. Easter; and (4) A multi-party habeas class treatment is not appropriate in this case. In response, Petitioners renew their request for counsel, disagree with the Respondent's characterization of their claims, assert that they have exhausted administrative remedies-or alternatively that the administrative review process is unresponsive to their needs-and reiterate that the conditions of confinement at FCI Danbury are unconstitutional. And as noted above, the Petitioners had the support of Amicus with respect to some of these issues.
Prisoners who are being held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” may file for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In the Second Circuit, federal prisoners may use a § 2241 petition to challenge the conditions of their confinement, to include a claim that prison staff have been deliberately indifferent to their medical needs, regardless of whatever claims and remedies may be available under a different authority. See Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145, 150 (D. Conn. 2008). The Respondent does not challenge the Petitioners' ability to advance their claims by way of a § 2241 petition. Instead, Respondent argues that the PLRA applies to this petition and that the PLRA bars the relief sought by Petitioners.
The Court first addresses the threshold question of whether the PLRA is even applicable to § 2241 habeas petitions under existing Second Circuit precedent. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that habeas petitions are not “civil actions” within the meaning of the PLRA for the purposes of in forma pauperis filings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, allowing habeas petitions to be filed without meeting the PLRA's filing fee requirements. See Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996) overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see also Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 182-84 (2d Cir. 1996) (). However, Reyes involved a petition filed pursuant to § 2254 that challenged the fact or duration of the prisoner's confinement. The decision did not address whether § 2241 petitions that challenge a prisoner's conditions of confinement are “civil actions” within the meaning of the PLRA.
In Jones v. Smith, the Second Circuit confirmed that whether the PLRA applies to § 2241 petitions remains an unanswered question. See 720 F.3d 142, 147 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013). Therein, the Circuit assumed,...
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