Dimenstein, Application of
| Decision Date | 03 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 160312,160312 |
| Citation | 410 A.2d 491,36 Conn.Supp. 41 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | In re Application of Morton J. DIMENSTEIN. |
The plaintiff, who had been "permanently" disbarred in 1968, filed an application for reinstatement to the Bar. The standing committee on recommendations for admission to the Bar, notwithstanding its favorable findings regarding the plaintiff's conduct and character, declined to recommend reinstatement because of the "permanent" nature of the order of disbarment. No distinction, however, is made between permanent and lesser degrees of disbarment in either the statute (§ 51-84) dealing with disbarment or in the rule of practice (§ 36) dealing with reinstatement, which places no qualifications on who may apply for reinstatement. For those reasons and because the plaintiff demonstrated the reformation of character required to entitle him to resume his role as an attorney, his application for reinstatement was granted.
Joseph B. Morse, New Haven, for the grievance committee of the judicial district of New Haven.
This is an application for reinstatement to the Bar by Morton Dimenstein, who was disbarred in December, 1968. He had been sentenced to prison for a term of two to five years, after pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to bribe a public official. Prior to that time, he had been practicing law for eleven years. He was released on parole in April, 1970. It is the third application for readmission filed by the applicant as of record appears. The status and history of the prior applications have no bearing on this panel and its ultimate decision.
A hearing on the present application was held before the New Haven standing committee on recommendations for admission to the Bar, and its report was filed, favorable in its findings, regarding the applicant's conduct and character. The committee, however, declined to recommend reinstatement because the 1968 order of disbarment stated that the applicant was "permanently" disbarred. The initial issue before this court involves the meaning of the term "permanently" as used in the disbarment proceedings. More particularly, the question is whether "permanent" disbarment forever precludes the applicant from gaining readmission to the Bar. Although the statutes and case decisions of Connecticut make it clear that disbarment is a recognized disciplinary procedure, the precise issue of the instant case has not previously been decided.
Disbarment of attorneys is provided for in § 51-84 of the General Statutes, which states that "Attorneys admitted by the superior court shall be attorneys of all courts and shall be subject to the rules and orders of the courts before which they act, which may fine them for transgressing such rules and orders, not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and may suspend or displace them for just cause." Section 29 of the 1978 Practice Book provides that "(t)he superior court may, for just cause, suspend or disbar attorneys . . . ."
The courts, in interpreting § 51-84, have distinguished suspension from disbarment. Inherent in suspension is a fixed time period for the inability to practice law; Grievance Committee v. Sinn, 128 Conn. 419, 422, 23 A.2d 516; whereas disbarment is equivalent to an indefinite hiatus in the practice of law. In re Application of Koenig, 152 Conn. 125, 131-32, 204 A.2d 33.
The above quoted statute is devoid of any reference to gradations of disbarment. Neither it nor the Practice Book distinguishes between permanent disbarment and some lesser degree of disbarment, implying instead that every suspended or disbarred attorney may seek reinstatement. "Any application for reinstatement or readmission to the bar shall be referred, by the court to which it is brought, to the standing committee on recommendations for admission . . . ." Practice Book, 1978, § 36. At one time, the reinstatement procedures of the Practice Book did distinguish between persons suspended for failure to pay certain bills and those suspended or disbarred for other reasons. This suggests that had the authors of the present section wished to create a distinction between permanent as opposed to some lesser category of disbarment, they could have done so.
Although there is no Connecticut case which has addressed the issue of the present case, other states have reviewed the question of the meaning and impact of the term "permanent" in the context of a disbarment order. Those decisions uniformly negate the concept of an absolute or irrevocable disbarment, and construe the word "permanent" as meaning "indefinite," until circumstances warrant a change. Even in those jurisdictions which, unlike Connecticut, provide by law for permanent disbarment for some crimes, extreme caution is exercised before concluding that "permanent" means forever. Although disbarment is not punishment for a crime, but, rather, the withdrawal of a privilege, it cannot be denied that the requirement of permanent, irrevocable disbarment, is, in effect, a consequence so severe that it partakes of the nature of punishment, and a statute providing for the same must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental canon that penal statutes must be strictly construed. Matter of Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 292, 26 N.E.2d 260; Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782. A Mississippi statute provides that a disbarred attorney "shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counselor in any court (of) this state," and there is no statutory provision for reinstatement. Miss.Code § 223 (1906). Despite this language and the lack of a procedure for reinstatement, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that, although a disbarred attorney may not practice while the judgment of disbarment stands, that judgment may be opened if in the opinion of the court reinstatement is warranted. Ex Parte Redmond, 120 Miss. 536, 82 So. 513. Thus, even the "never afterward" language of the statute was found not to preclude readmission.
A Tennessee case addresses the question of reinstating...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Reinstatement of Walgren, Matter of
...416 N.E.2d 256 (1981) (5 years); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Inc. v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969) (2 years); In re Dimenstein, 36 Conn.Supp. 41, 410 A.2d 491 (1979) (6 years); Pharr v. Standing Comm., 32 Conn.Supp. 183, 346 A.2d 115 (1975) (5 years after C. Sufficiency of Punishment......
-
Presnick, Matter of, SAC
...a court "may suspend or displace [attorneys] for just cause." Suspension need not be permanent or total. In re Application of Dimenstein, 36 Conn.Sup. 41, 43, 410 A.2d 491 (1979). Suspension may be summary, and is an inherent power of the particular constitutional court. See In re Durant, 8......
-
Avcollie, Application of
...to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of untrustworthy practitioners. In re Kone, supra; In re Application of Dimenstein, 36 Conn.Sup. 41, 44, 410 A.2d 491 (1979). "The proceeding to disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but i......
-
Steinkamp v. Jacque, CV-H-7904-40-HD
... ... The plaintiff, on April 5, 1979, filed an application for waiver of fees and payment of costs. On April 9, 1979, this court ex parte, found that the plaintiff was indigent and ordered all fees, costs ... ...