Dinan v. Patten

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19204.,19204.
• Citation: 317 Conn. 185,116 A.3d 275
• Parties: Althea DINAN v. Anne PATTEN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

317 Conn. 185

116 A.3d 275

Althea DINAN

v.Anne PATTEN et al.

No. 19204.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 17, 2014.

Decided June 16, 2015.

William J. Kupinse, Jr., with whom were Andrew M. McPherson, and, on the brief, Dennis M. Laccavole and Walter A. Flynn, Jr., Bridgeport, for the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff).

Michael P. Kaelin, with whom was William N. Wright, Stamford, for the appellees-cross appellants (named defendant et al.).

Jeffrey A. Cooper, Bridgeport, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Kelley Galica Peck, Richard A. Marone, Hartford, and Marilyn B. Fagelson, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Bar Association as amicus curiae.

PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD, ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

ESPINOSA, J.

The present case requires us to consider the method by which General Statutes § 45a–436¹ spousal share statute) requires a surviving spouse's statutory share to be calculated. The plaintiff, Althea Dinan, appeals, and the defendant Anne Patten, individually and in her capacity as trustee,² cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court affirming in part the decree of the Probate Court.³ The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the value of the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate as of the date of distribution, rather than the value of the estate at the time of the decedent's death; (2) determined that with respect to the period prior to the date of distribution, the plaintiff was entitled to the average yield of one third of the estate during that time; and (3) concluded that the Probate Court properly appointed distributors to set out the statutory share. In the cross appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the plaintiff's claim to a statutory share was not barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies; and (2) because state and federal estate taxes are not “debts and charges against the estate” pursuant to the spousal share statute, the statutory share should be calculated prior to the subtraction of taxes from the value of the estate. General Statutes § 45a–436 (a). We affirm the judgment of the trial court, and address each of the parties' claims in turn.

The record reveals the following relevant facts as found by the trial court, and procedural history. The plaintiff's husband, Albert A. Garofalo (decedent), died on July 21, 2000. Prior to his marriage to the plaintiff, the decedent executed a codicil to his preexisting will, thereby republishing his will, which had devised nothing to the plaintiff. Dinan v. Marchand, 279 Conn. 558, 560, 903 A.2d 201 (2006). The beneficiaries to the will were Patten, who is the decedent's daughter, and her three children, Nicole M. Toth, Aaron M. Toth and Alexis P. Toth. On October 27, 2000, the plaintiff timely elected her statutory share pursuant to the spousal share statute, § 45a–436 (c). See footnote 1 of this opinion. The plaintiff also challenged the validity of the will on the basis of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, and appealed to the Superior Court from the Probate Court's admission of the will and the codicil to probate. Following a jury trial, the trial court upheld the validity of the will in accordance with the jury's verdict, and that judgment was affirmed by this court on appeal. Dinan v. Marchand, supra, at 560–61, 903 A.2d 201.

On May 2, 2008, the plaintiff requested that her statutory share be set out. See General Statutes § 45a–436 (e). The request, and the failure of the parties to reach an agreement as to the value of the statutory share, prompted the current administrator of the estate, Donat C. Marchand,⁴ to file a motion with the Probate Court seeking direction from the court as to how to determine the amount of the statutory share. The issues before us in this appeal pertain to the February 16, 2010 decree of the Probate Court, issued in response to the administrator's motion.

In its decision, the Probate Court first concluded that the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate after the deduction of federal and state estate taxes. The court relied on the definition of the statutory share in the spousal share statute as “a life estate of one-third in value of all the property passing under the will, real and personal, legally or equitably owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his or her death, after the payment of all debts and charges against the estate ....” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 45a–436 (a). Because the court concluded that estate taxes are “charges” against the estate, it held that the statutory share must be set out after the taxes are deducted from the value of the estate. Next, the court exercised its discretion pursuant to § 45a–436 (e) to appoint distributors to set out the statutory share, observing that “[w]here distributors are appointed by a court of probate to divide an estate, they proceed upon the values determined by them as of the date of the distribution....” Willis v. Hendry, 127 Conn. 653, 669, 20 A.2d 375 (1940). In determining the annual amount payable to the plaintiff on her statutory share, the Probate Court relied on this court's decision in Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 110 Conn. 36, 48, 147 A. 290 (1929), and concluded that once her statutory share is set out, the plaintiff will be due income on that share from the date of the decedent's death to the time of distribution, based on the average yield of the estate for that period. Finally, the court concluded that the statutory share should be valued as of the time that the final account is presented.

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which tried the matter de novo. See In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 199, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002) (“[a]s a general matter, when a decision of the Probate Court is appealed to the Superior Court, a trial de novo is conducted”). The court first rejected the defendant's claim that, because the plaintiff had contested the decedent's will before requesting that her share be set out, she was barred from recovering her statutory share by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election of remedies and laches. Turning to the substantive issues, the trial court reversed in part the decree of the Probate Court, only as to that court's ruling that the value of the estate after the deduction of taxes should serve as the basis for the statutory share.⁵ The court disagreed with the Probate Court's conclusion that estate taxes constituted “charges” against the estate pursuant to the spousal share statute. General Statutes § 45a–436 (a). The court concluded instead that, consistent with the public policy principles underlying the state's proration statute, General Statutes § 12–401, the benefit of the marital deduction should inhere solely to the plaintiff. The court concluded, therefore, that the statutory share must be calculated on the basis of the value of the estate before the deduction of taxes. As to all other issues, the trial court affirmed the Probate Court decree. This appeal and cross appeal followed.⁶

For simplicity, before we set forth our rationale as to each of the five issues presented in the appeal and the cross appeal, we first summarize our holdings as to all of those issues, in the order in which we will discuss them. We hold that the trial court properly concluded that: (1) the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies do not bar the plaintiff from seeking her statutory share; (2) because state and federal estate taxes are not “debts and charges against the estate” pursuant to the spousal share statute, the statutory share should be calculated prior to the subtraction of taxes from the value of the estate; General Statutes § 45a–436 (a) ; (3) the value of the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate as of the date of the final accounting in anticipation of distribution, rather than the value of the estate at the time of the decedent's death; (4) with respect to the period prior to the date when her statutory share is set out, the plaintiff is entitled to the average yield of one third of the estate during that time; and (5) the trial court properly concluded that the Probate Court properly appointed distributors to set out the plaintiff's statutory share. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ITHE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND ELECTION OF REMEDIES

The defendant argues that the trial court improperly rejected her claim that the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies bar the plaintiff from claiming her statutory share because the plaintiff contested the decedent's will before she requested that her statutory share be set out.⁷ As to all of these doctrines, the defendant relies on the fact that, between 2000 and 2006, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the decedent's will, on the basis that it was the product of undue influence, until this court ultimately rejected her claim, affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 562, 903 A.2d 201. In 2008, only after she had lost her appeal, the plaintiff requested that the administrator set out her statutory share. As we explain herein, the defendant has failed to satisfy her burden under any of these doctrines. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff is not barred from seeking to recover her statutory share.

AWaiver

The defendant claims that the plaintiff waived her right to recover her statutory share by first pursuing her challenge to the decedent's will. “Waiver is a question of fact.... [W]here the factual basis of the court's decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.... Therefore, the...