Dinardo v. It's My Amphitheater, Inc.

Decision Date01 March 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action CBD-19-1841
PartiesJILLIAN DINARDO, Plaintiff, v. IT'S MY AMPHITHEATER, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Charles B. Day United States Magistrate Judge

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant's Motion”), ECF No. 30. The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion, the opposition thereto and Defendant's Reply. No. hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.

I. Factual Background

On June 26, 2016, Plaintiff Jillian DiNardo attended the Kerfuffle music festival at the Merriweather Post Pavilion, in Columbia, Maryland. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Upon arrival, Plaintiff was directed to park in a specific garage (“Lot 4”). Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff left the festival around 10:45 p.m. Id. at ¶ 18. As Plaintiff approached her car, Plaintiff was sexually and physically assaulted by an unknown adult male in Lot 4. Id. Plaintiff alleges that during the assault, she screamed for help to no avail, as there was no security guard on duty to hear her or intervene.” Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff also states that she reached into her car and honked the horn, which startled her assailant. Id. at ¶ 20. “The attacker [then] fled the scene, jumped from the parking garage balcony, and disappeared into the night.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the assault, she suffered severe, persistent, and permanent, emotional, mental, and psychological injuries. Id. Plaintiff also states that she was diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Acute Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id. at ¶ 21.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on June 21, 2019. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.[1]

II. Standard of Review

A court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A court must construe the facts alleged and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that no genuine issue of fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. [T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.

“Once the moving party discharges its burden . . . the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2002). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is that party's responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). “The disputed facts must be material to an issue necessary for the proper resolution of the case.” Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Adver., L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995). There must be “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted). However, “when a party fails to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the court should grant summary judgment.” Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC, 988 F.3d 756, 765 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2021).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that she was an invitee to Lot 4, and Defendant owed her a duty to exercise reasonable care, “to eliminate foreseeable and known dangerous conditions for invitees by, among other things, installing lights, installing security cameras, and posting security personnel in premises under its control, operation, and management, including but not limited to Lot 4.” Compl. ¶¶ 14, 23. Plaintiff contends that Defendant breached its duty when it failed to install adequate lighting or security cameras, and when it failed to post, ensure the presence of, or otherwise provide security personnel in Lot 4. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff asserts that as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's breach: 1) Defendant created a foreseeably dangerous condition and put invitees such as Plaintiff at an unreasonable risk of harm; 2) Plaintiff suffered a sexual assault and resulting injures; 3) Plaintiff received extensive psychiatric and psychological treatment; and 4) Plaintiff continues to suffer economic damages, expenses for medical treatment, and emotional and psychological pain and suffering. Id. at ¶¶ 26-30.

Defendant avers that it did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty, and even if it did, it did not owe Plaintiff a duty to protect her from the criminal activity of a third party. Def.'s Mot. 1, ECF No. 30.

A. Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff.

“A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which the court is located, including the forum state's choice of law rules.” Rybas v. Riverview Hotel Corp., 21 F.Supp.3d 548, 559-60 (D. Md. 2014). For tort claims, “Maryland applies the law of the state where the alleged harm occurred (lex loci delicti').” Id. at 560. In this case, the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The alleged events took place in Maryland. Therefore, the Court applies the substantive tort law of Maryland.

To establish a claim for negligence in Maryland, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty.” Moore v. Jimel, Inc., 147 Md.App. 336, 337-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (citing Valentine v. On Target, 353 Md. 544, 549 (1999)); accord Tallmadge v. K-C Bldg. Ass'n of Bowie, Inc., 223 Md.App. 775 (2015) (citing Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 145 Md.App. 161, 169 (citations, internal quotation marks, footnote and emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 371 Md. 264 (2002).

Thus, to prevail, Defendant must prove that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding any of the four elements above. Miller v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., No. CV CBD-14-2697, 2016 WL 374103, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2016), order clarified on reconsideration, No. CV CBD-14-2697, 2016 WL 1696541 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2016). “The threshold requirement is the existence of a duty.” Tallmadge, 223 Md.App. 775 (citing Sterling, 145 Md.App. at 169, 802 A.2d at 444). It is the Court's responsibility to determine whether a legal duty exists. Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 162 Md.App. 207, 218, 873 A.2d 483 (2005) (“Whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of the elements of negligence is generally a question for the fact finder, but the existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court.”). If there is no duty, then the negligence claim cannot withstand summary judgment. Evergreen Assocs., LLC v. Crawford, 214 Md.App. 179, 187, 75 A.3d 1038, 1043 (2013).

It is well-settled that in premises liability cases in Maryland, a possessor of land or a landowner, owes an invitee:

[The] duty to exercise reasonable care to ‘protect the invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk' that the invitee would be unlikely to perceive in the exercise of ordinary care ... and about which the owner knows or could have discovered in the exercise of reasonable care.

Fleming v. Scott, No. 636, Sept. Term, 2020, 2021 WL 1747936, at *3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 3, 2021). A possessor of land includes:

(a) A person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or;
(b) A person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or;
(c) A person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).

Elliott v. AZZ, LLC, No. 1960, Sept. term, 2017 2021 WL 1149698, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 25, 2021) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965)). The duty owed by a possessor of land depends on the individual's status on the property. Elliott, 2021 WL 1149698, at *7 (citing Rowley v. City of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464, 505 A.2d 494, 498 (1986); Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 241-42, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978) (citing Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 521, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (1972)). The status may be that of an invitee, licensee by invitation, bare licensee, or trespasser. Id. Generally, [t]he highest duty is owed to an invitee; namely, the duty to ‘use reasonable and ordinary care to keep the premises safe for the invitee and to protect the invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk which the invitee by exercising ordinary care for the invitee's own safety will not discover.' Macias v. Summit Mgmt., Inc., 243 Md.App. 294, 317, 220 A.3d 363, 376 (2019) (citing Deboy v. City of Crisfield, 167 Md.App. 548, 555, 893 A.2d 1189,...

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