Dingle v. State

• Decision Date: 15 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: Dingle v. State, 759 A.2d 819, 361 Md. 1 (Md. 2000)
• Parties: Ricky DINGLE v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Supreme Court

759 A.2d 819

361 Md. 1

Ricky DINGLE v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 87, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

September 15, 2000.

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Devy Patterson Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Harry B. Siegel, Columbia, brief of Amicus Curiae of the Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n filed on behalf of the Petitioner.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The issue this case presents,¹ which involves the voir dire process, had its genesis in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in the trial, for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon and related charges, of the petitioner, Ricky Dingle and two co-defendants.² During the voir dire process, the petitioner sought to have the trial court inquire of the venire panel whether any of them had certain experiences or associations.³ While the court agreed to, and did, make the inquiries the petitioner requested, it did so by joining with each of the petitioner's requested inquiries, one suggested by the State, namely an inquiry into whether the experience or association posited would affect the prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial.⁴ Thus, the inquiry the court conducted to satisfy the petitioner's concerns consisted of a series of two part questions, the answers to which, the court instructed, need not be revealed unless a member of the venire panel answered both parts in the affirmative.⁵ As to that, the venire panel was instructed as follows:

"You should only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question. If your answer is no to either part of the question, then you should not stand. So once again, only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question."

The prospective jurors who stood and confirmed that their answer to the second part of the question was in the affirmative, thus indicating that they could not be fair, were, if reached, excused for cause, either on motion of the State or of the defense. What occurred during the inquiry into the prospective jurors' experience with crime victimization is illustrative:

"THE COURT: Again, a number of two-part questions, ladies and gentlemen. Only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question.

"Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever been a victim of a crime, and if your answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case in which the state alleges that the defendants have committed a crime?

"So again, have you or any family member or a friend been the victim of a crime, and if the answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? If so, please stand.

"All right. The gentleman in the white shirt.

"MR. BLANEY: Bruce Blaney, 639.

"THE COURT: And because of some involvement with a—a crime, you feel you couldn't be fair and impartial, sir?

"MR. BLANEY: A friend of mine—

"THE COURT: Nope, I didn't— please just answer the question.

"MR. BLANEY: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may be seated.

"Again, ladies and gentlemen, if you'd please simply answer the question without elaborating, it would be very helpful.

"Yes, ma'am.

"MS. CARRIGAN: 679, Barbara Carrigan.

"THE COURT: Miss Carrigan, you're saying because of some exposure to crime, you couldn't be fair and impartial?

"MS. CARRIGAN: I could be fair. I'm sorry.⁶

"THE COURT: Okay. You could be fair. Then you may be seated.

"Again, only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question.

"Yes, sir.

"MR. MARSHALL: Tom Marshall, 643.

"THE COURT: All right. Mr. Marshall, you're saying that you could not be fair and impartial as a result of some exposure to crime?

"MR. MARSHALL: That's correct.

"THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Be seated.

"All right. The gentleman in the gray sports shirt.

"MR. FLANNIGAN: George Flannigan, 329.

"THE COURT: And you're saying you couldn't be fair and impartial, Mr. Flannigan?

"MR. FLANNIGAN: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated.

"The other gentleman in the gray sports shirt.

"MR. WORTH: James Worth, 637.

"THE COURT: And your answer is the same, sir?

"MR. WORTH: Yes.

"THE COURT: All right. You may be seated. Thank you.

"Ma'am.

"MS. MALICKI: Joan Malicki, number 658.

"THE COURT: All right. Miss Malicki, your answer is the same?

"MS. MALICKI: Yes.

"THE COURT: Be seated.

"MS. KNIGHT: Jeannine Knight, number 321.

"THE COURT: And Miss Knight, your answer is the same?

"MS. KNIGHT: Yes.

"THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may be seated.

"Ma'am? Your name and juror number?

"MS. SPOHN: Suzanne Spohn, number 76.

"THE COURT: All right. Miss Spohn, your answer is the same?

"MS. SPOHN: I don't think I could be impartial in this crime.

"THE COURT: Well, again, you can't be fair and impartial then. Thank you. You may be seated.

"All right. The gentleman in the white shirt.

"MR. FAKERI: Alexander Fakeri, number 87.

"THE COURT: And Mr. Fakeri, your response is the same?

"MR. FAKERI: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Be seated.

"Ma'am?

"MS. BURMAN: Pamela Burman, 673.

"THE COURT: And Miss Burman, you also feel the same way?

"MS. BURMAN: Correct.

"THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated."

The petitioner objected to the use of the two part format on a number of grounds, principally because he believed, and therefore argued, that asking compound questions and requiring an answer only if the prospective juror thought that he or she could not be fair, would, and, in fact did, result in a jury in which the venire persons themselves, by "unilateral decision," determined their fitness to serve on the jury. The petitioner also argued that conducting the voir dire in the manner the trial court did would, and in fact did, deprive the petitioner of information relevant and critical to the exercise of his challenges for cause. The objections were overruled. The court's rationale for the ruling is instructive:

"The court has asked the questions which the defense has presented in the two-part format I described on many occasions, and on many occasions we've had people stand up in response to those questions and say, Yes, Judge, I can't be fair and impartial, so it would appear to the court that the only reason for calling up the venire men here to the bench for individual voir dire is to allow the defense to develop more information which the defense intends to use in exercising its peremptory challenges, and therefore, the court declines to do so."

The petitioner's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was unsuccessful. That court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion. We shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, in the process confirming that the trial judge is charged with the impaneling of the jury and must determine, in the final analysis, the fitness of the individual venire persons. We shall hold that the voir dire procedure utilized in this case usurped the court's responsibility in this regard.

Voir dire, the process by which prospective jurors are examined to determine whether cause for disqualification exists, see Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996), is the mechanism whereby the right to a fair and impartial jury, guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,⁷ see Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d 435, 436 (1963), is given substance. See Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989). The overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury. See Boyd, 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996); Hill, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995); Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993); Bedford, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 117 (1989); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952). In Davis, 333 Md. at 33, 633 A.2d at 871, quoting Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 340, 378 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1977) (citing Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)), we said, "a fundamental tenet underlying the practice of trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be impartial and unbiased."

We recognized in Davis that:

There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, see Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1992 Cum.Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-207; or (2) "`an examination of a juror ... conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.'"

Id. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 871-72, quoting Bedford, 317 Md. at 671,566 A.2d at 117(quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946)). Thus, we said in Hill, 339 Md. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166 (quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959), in turn quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952)):

Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing the trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: "to ascertain `the existence of cause for disqualification.' " In so doing, the questions should focus on issues particular to the defendant's case so that biases directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant may be uncovered.⁸ See Alexander v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co. Inc., 181 Md. 415, 419, 30 A.2d 757, 758 (1943), in which the trial court's refusal to ask

...