Dingle v. United States Dep't of Educ.
| Docket Number | 20 CV 183 (EK)(LB) |
| Decision Date | 15 March 2023 |
| Parties | ROBERT DINGLE, JR., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Robert Dingle, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging defendant violated his rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges defendant violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the New York State General Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, and under New York common law. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges, inter alia, that “[f]or at least fourteen years,” the United States Department of Education (“DOE”) “has consistently hired debt collectors to harass plaintiff for an unknown debt.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3 [ECF No. 36].[1]Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), and in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Honorable Eric Komitee referred defendant's motion to me for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion should be granted and plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND[2]
The crux of plaintiff's amended complaint is the allegation that defendant is “pursuing a debt that does not exist.” Am. Compl. ¶ 19. In 1998, plaintiff attended a six-month program at Apex Technical School (“Apex Tech”) to study automotive technology. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 1; Olds Decl., Ex. A, Deposition Transcript (“Tr.”) p. 12:12-25 [ECF No. 61-1]. Plaintiff received loans from Apex Tech and Citibank to fund his schooling. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 2. In 2001, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Apex Tech in Civil Court, Kings County disputing his tuition payments. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 3. On April 25, 2001, plaintiff and Apex Tech settled the lawsuit by stipulation: Apex Tech released plaintiff from “all claims for unpaid tuition charges and fees and other claims against plaintiff existing on the date hereof.” Compl., Ex. B, Stipulation of Settlement [ECF No. 1 at 13]. Only Apex was named as defendant; neither Citibank nor the DOE were party to the civil court action.[3]Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 5.
In June 2007, defendant issued a promissory note to a “Robert Dingle Jr.” for his student loan.[4] Olds Decl., Ex E, Promissory Note (“PN”) [ECF No. 61-5]; Plf.'s Opp, Ex. A, Loan Application and Promissory Note [ECF No. 69 at 10]. Defendant attaches a document dated June 7, 2007, which states “I promise to pay the [DOE] all [loans] disbursed under the terms of this [note] to discharge my prior loan obligations, plus interest, and other fees that may become due...”, signed by “Robert Dingle Jr.” PN at 1. On August 3, 2007, the DOE issued plaintiff a Federal Direct Consolidated Loan (“FDCL”). Olds Decl., Ex. D, DOE 2018 Letter at 2 [ECF No. 61-4]. The DOE declared the FDCL in default and assigned it to the DOE's Default Resolution Group on or around January 27, 2013. Id.
The DOE's records reflect that on July 29, 2013, the DOE sent plaintiff a notice stating that the FDCL's “account” would be referred to the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) if the DOE did not receive payments within sixty-five (65) days of the date of the notice. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 10. The account was referred to Treasury, id. ¶ 11, and Treasury withheld several income tax refund payments to plaintiff in June 2014 and May 2017, DOE 2018 Letter at 1, 3.
Between August 25, 2017 and December 5, 2017, plaintiff made four payments towards the consolidated loan's balance. DOE 2018 Letter at 1. On January 30, 2018, the DOE's Default Resolution Group sent plaintiff another letter acknowledging the four payments made and noting that plaintiff still owed unpaid principal and accrued interest on the loan. Id. On February 14, 2019, the Default Resolution Group sent plaintiff another letter restating that plaintiff's prior payments had been “credited” and that the outstanding balance in the account needed to be paid. Olds Decl., Ex. F, DOE 2019 Letter at 1 [ECF No. 61-6]. The letter also stated that the DOE had contracted with a private collection agency, Coast Professionals, Inc. (“Coast Professionals”), and placed the loan with the agency for collection. Id. at 1-2.
Prior to receiving the DOE's letters, plaintiff told the DOE that he did not sign the 2007 promissory note, that he “did not owe any loans, and pleaded with [defendant] to cease and desist from offsetting his income tax and stop debt collectors from calling his home.” DOE 2018 Letter at 2-3; Am. Compl. ¶ 6. The DOE responded to plaintiff in 2018 and 2019, and detailed the process by which plaintiff could contest the signature on the promissory note and the validity of the loan. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 16. This process includes completing and submitting a “Loan Discharge Application: Unauthorized Signature/Unauthorized Payment” form along with supporting information, including notarized samples of plaintiff's signature, to the Default Resolution Group for investigation. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15; DOE 2018 Letter at 2; DOE 2019 Letter at 2. Defendant alleges that plaintiff never submitted a loan discharge form[5]nor provided any other information to challenge the signature on the promissory note or the underlying FDCL.[6]
Rather than pursue the DOE's internal dispute process, plaintiff contacted Citibank to inquire about the loan he took out while attending Apex Tech. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Citibank told plaintiff that it had no record of any outstanding debt owed by him and that it had sold its student loans to Sallie Mae Consumer Banking (“Sallie Mae”) and Discover Bank “some years ago.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. Plaintiff thereafter contacted Sallie Mae, which informed him that it and another bank, Navient, had purchased Citibank's student loans, and that Sallie Mae and Navient “split some years later.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff contacted Sallie Mae, Navient, and Discover Bank, and requested that each bank “check” for “debts whatsoever” that plaintiff may owe. Id. ¶ 14. None of the banks identified any debt owed by plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the DOE violated his constitutional rights, because (a) the student loan debt at issue had not been pending long enough to qualify for a Treasury offset, (b) the DOE did not give plaintiff the required notice prior to the offset, and (c) the DOE has not proven that the student loan debt belongs to him. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant violated the FDCPA by misrepresenting the “character, amount, or legal status of a debt,” and is liable for fraud because the DOE “had full knowledge that [it] had no legal basis upon which to collect funds.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 25. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for violations of his constitutional rights, mental anguish, deliberate indifference, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief “for all liens, and collection activities and immediate return of funds.” ECF No. 1 at 6.[7]
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his original complaint against the DOE and Coast Professionals on January 9, 2020.[8]ECF No. 1. Coast Professional answered on January 23, 2020. ECF No. 11. The DOE answered on November 2, 2020. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff and counsel for Coast Professionals notified the Court that they had reached a settlement and would be filing a stipulation dismissing the case as to Coast Professionals. ECF No. 27. A stipulation of dismissal was filed on January 21, 2021, and Coast Professionals was terminated from the action on the same date. ECF No. 31.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 30, 2021. ECF No. 36. The DOE answered the amended complaint on June 4, 2021. ECF No. 41. Discovery followed. The DOE now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) and in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. ECF No. 60.[9]Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion,[10]ECF No. 69, and defendant replied, ECF No. 71.
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3). Rule 12(h)(3) provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Of note, the distinction between a Rule 12(b)(1) and a Rule 12(h)(3) motion “is largely academic, and the same standards are applicable to both types of motions.” Greystone Bank v. Tavarez, No 09-CV-5192, 2010 WL 3325203, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2010);[11]Brotman v. United States, 111 F.Supp.2d 418, 420 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ().
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only hear matters over which they have subject matter jurisdiction. Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2001). “The absence of such jurisdiction is non-waivable; before deciding any case” the Court must be satisfied that it is “properly within [the Court's] subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (collecting cases). Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000); Aydinyan v. Bogomolova, No. 16-CV-1126, 2016 WL 7337953, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-1126, 2016 WL 7324084 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2016) (emphasis added). Plaintiff as the party...
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