Dingley v. Oler Oler v. Dingley
Decision Date | 05 April 1886 |
Parties | DINGLEY and another, Copartners, etc., v. OLER and another, Copartners, etc. 1 OLER and another, Copartners, etc., v. DINGLEY and another, Copartners, etc. Filed |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Dingley Bros. in the superior court of the county of Kennebec, in Maine, against W. M. Oler & Co., of Baltimore, to recover damages for the alleged breach of an agreement, whereby it was averred the defendants undertook and promised, in consideration of 3,245.25 tons of ice delivered to them by the plaintiffs in 1879, to return and deliver to the plaintiffs the same quantity of ice from the defendants' ice-houses, in the year 1880. The case was removed by the defendants into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maine, when the cause was put at issue by a plea of non assumpsit, and was submitted to the court by the parties, the intervention of a jury having been duly waived. The court made a special finding of the facts, and, in pursuance of the conclusions of law based thereon, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of $7,335.35. Exceptions were taken by each party to rulings of the court, on which errors are assigned, the cause being brought here for review on writs of error sued out by the respective parties. The court found as matter of fact, that late in the season of 1879 the plaintiffs, finding themselves in possession of a large quantity of ice undisposed of, and which threatened to be a total loss, pressed the defendants to buy some or all of it. Both parties were dealers in ice, cutting it upon the Kennebec river, and shipping it thence during the season; that is, while the river is open. The offers of the plaintiffs were rejected, but the defendants, by their letter of sixth September, 1879, made a counter offer to take a cargo and 'return the same to you next year from our houses.' The plaintiffs, by their letter of September, 1879, accepted this offer, and several cargoes were delivered upon the same terms. The total delivery was 3,246.25 tons.
In July, 1880, one of the plaintiffs spoke to one of the defendants about delivering the ice; and he replied that he did not know about that,—delivering ice when it was worth five dollars a ton, which they had taken when it was worth fifty cents a ton, but he promised to write an answer. July 7, 1880, the defendants wrote, repeating their objections, and saying, among other things, 'we must therefore decline to ship the ice for you this season, and claim as our right to pay you for the ice in cash at the price you offered other parties here, (that is, fifty cents,) or give you ice when the market reaches that point.' The plaintiffs, tenth July, 1880, wrote that they had a right to the ice, and had sold it in expectation of its delivery, to which the defendants answered fifteenth July, 1880, reciting the circumstances of the case, and the hardship of such a demand, and again denying the obligation. The letter contains this sentence: 'We cannot, therefore, comply with your request to deliver the ice claimed, and respectfully submit that you ought not to ask this of us,' etc., asking for a reply or a personal interview. Neither appears to have been given, and this action was commenced July 21, 1880. The court further found that ice was worth five dollars a ton in July, 1880, and fell later in the season to two dollars a ton.
Thereupon the court held, as matter of law, that there was a contract executed by the plaintiffs, and to be executed by the defendants, who were bound to deliver 3,245.25 tons of ice from their houses on the Kennebec river during the year 1880; that the year means the shipping season; and that the defendants had the whole season, if they chose to demand it, in which to make delivery; and that the letters of July 7th and 15th, from the defendants to the plaintiffs, contained an unequivocal refusal to deliver any ice during the season; that the defendants having unqualifiedly refused to ship the ice, this action can be maintained, though brought before the close of the season, but that the damages are not to be reckoned by the price of ice in July; that what the plaintiffs lost was 3,245.25 tons of ice sometime during the season; that the price of ice went down after July to two dollars a ton, and the measure of damages must be reckoned at this rate, with interest from the date of the writ.
To these conclusions of law the plaintiffs below excepted, contending that the right to fix the time for delivery under the contract had vested in them; that it was properly exercised by their demand in July, 1880; that the refusal to deliver at that time constituted the breach of the contract by the defendants, and fixed the damages at five dollars per ton, the market value of the ice on that day.
The defendants below excepted, contending on their part that the letters of July 7th and 15th did not constitute an unequivocal refusal to deliver any ice during the season, amounting to a renunciation, and, in that sense, a breach of the contract; and that the action was prematurely brought, the right of action, if any, not accruing until after the expiration of the period within which, by the terms of the contract, they had the option to deliver.
The letter of July 7, 1880, from the defendants to the plaintiffs, is as follows:
'BALTIMORE, MD., seventh July, 1880.
W. M. OLER & CO.'
The letter was answered by Dingley Bros., on July 10, as follows:
'GARDINER, July 10, 1880.
'Messrs. W. M. Oler & Co., Baltimore—DEAR SIRS: Yours of 7th is in hand, and we must say the conclusion you have come to greatly astonishes us. Our sole object in making this exchange, no one knows better than yourselves, was to tide us over to such a time during this season as the ice could be marketed at some reasonable figure, and in confirmation of this we refer you to your proposition, made under date of September 6th, viz.: 'It would, of course, be more convenient for us to ship this cargo from our own houses; but remembering past favors, we feel inclined to assist you in your present difficulty, and will load this cargo from your house, should our terms be agreeable to you.
DINGLEY BROS.'
The defendants' letter of July 15th was in reply to this, and is as follows:
'BALTIMORE, MD., fifteenth July, 1880.
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