Dinwiddie v. Brown, 15790.
| Decision Date | 03 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 15790.,15790. |
| Citation | 230 F.2d 465 |
| Parties | Leona DINWIDDIE, Appellant, v. R. J. BROWN et al., Appellees. Anne Elizabeth ROARK, Appellant, v. Gordon T. WEST et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
I. H. Spears, Pasadena, Cal., for appellants.
Milburn E. Nutt, Guy Rogers, Clyde Fillmore, Jack G. Banner, Elmer H. Parish, H. W. Fillmore, Wichita Falls, Tex., for appellees.
Before BORAH, TUTTLE and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
The sole question presented by these appeals is whether the complaint in either of the two actions involved here states a claim within the jurisdiction of a federal court, in the absence of diversity of citizenship. Although the cases are in most respects different from one another, they were both brought for alleged violations of the civil rights statutes,1 and were dismissed on identical grounds: for a failure to state the allegation material to the theory of recovery in each case, that the defendants "entered into a conspiracy to rob, cheat, defraud or deny to the plaintiff any right secured to her by the Constitution and laws of the United States or that the Plaintiff was denied due process of law or the equal protection of the laws cognizable under the Constitution and laws of the United States and under the Civil Rights Acts."
The complaint in the Dinwiddie case alleged that the plaintiff and her son in July, 1945 bought certain described property in Wichita Falls, Texas, and occupied the same as their homestead; that the defendants unlawfully conspired to defraud plaintiff of her rights as a citizen, in violation of the civil rights acts and of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; and that while she was lawfully seized of her property, the defendants, acting under color of state law, unlawfully entered upon the land and unlawfully ejected the plaintiff therefrom. Count II alleged generally that the defendants, while acting under color of state law, unlawfully conspired to defraud the plaintiff of her rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and the civil rights acts.
Two2 of the seven defendants named in the complaint did not file any pleading in opposition thereto. Defendant Crowell filed exceptions to the complaint. Defendants Brown and Johnson filed individual answers and also individual motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendants Bailey and Elder made similar motions. Each of the motions to dismiss was supported by affidavits and exhibits attached thereto. The plaintiff then submitted her own "Affidavit Against Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment" and the district court, considering both the pleadings and the affidavits and exhibits filed in support thereof, granted a motion to dismiss as to all the named defendants, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
It is clear that although the order of dismissal stated that it was granted on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the district court's failure to exclude affidavits and exhibits offered in support of the motion converted it into a motion for summary judgment.3
The plaintiff's affidavit, in material part, averred that the state of Texas has laws segregating white and Negro citizens and that white supremacy is the policy of the state; that as a result of such policy, "a Negro's word is considered as naught as against a white citizen's word"; and that "the total result of this policy and practice is that a Negro, and this plaintiff is a Negro, cannot and does not obtain the equal rights, privileges and immunities as white citizens guaranteed citizens of the United States by the Act of Congress and the Constitution of the United States, but are denied same with impunity, and the rights of Negro citizens are wholly ignored."
The defendants' affidavits and exhibits stated, in brief, that the plaintiff and the defendant Brown were in dispute over the title to the property described in the complaint, and that Brown brought a trespass to try title suit in state court against the plaintiff, who appeared and contested Brown's claim; that judgment was entered for Brown; that service of process in the state suit was made through the office of the sheriff of Wichita County, Bailey, and the writ of possession issued after final judgment was executed by a deputy of constable Elder. After obtaining possession, Brown sold the property to Johnson. It is not shown what connection, if any, the defendants Crowell, Berville, and Harrist had with the state action, or with this case.
Complainant Roark instituted her action about a month after the commencement of the Dinwiddie case. She alleged that she was seized of described property in Wichita Falls, as a residential and business homestead, when the defendants, acting under color of state law, unlawfully entered upon her land and unlawfully ejected her therefrom; that the defendants conspired to defraud her of her rights as a citizen, while acting under color of state law, and effectuated such conspiracy by the defendant West's taking "fictitious" deeds of trust on her property for large sums of money never in fact advanced to the plaintiff, the defendants well knowing the same to be void as to plaintiff's homestead; that the defendants robbed, cheated, and defrauded the plaintiff of large sums of money; and that Texas has segregation laws, which make it impossible for the plaintiff, a Negro, to have equal rights as a citizen. Count II in essence repeated the same allegations, particularly with regard to segregation, concluding, "because of this segregation and discrimination policy of the state of Texas, and these defendants, the defendants have violated the plaintiff's civil rights," to her damage in the sum of $250,000. Count III alleged that the plaintiff and West entered into an oral agreement whereby he was to take over her property and liquidate the debts against it for their mutual benefit, but that he later changed his mind and conspired with the other defendants to defraud her of her constitutional rights.
Defendants West and Rogers filed a joint answer, and defendant...
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