Le Dioyt v. Keith County

Decision Date20 January 1956
Docket NumberNos. 33724-33728,s. 33724-33728
Citation161 Neb. 615,74 N.W.2d 455
PartiesGeorge E. LE DIOYT and Helen M. LeDioyt, Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF KEITH, Board of Equalization of Keith County, Nebraska, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of the Assessment of Lot One (1) of LeDioyt's Sub-Division, etc. Robert K. SCOTT and Nola A. Scott, Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF KEITH, Board of Equalization of Keith County, Nebraska, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of the Assessment of the West Twenty-three (23) feet of Lot Four (4), etc. Waldo A. NICHOLS and Kathleen Nichois, Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF KEITH, Board of Equalization of Keith County, Nebraska, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of the Assessment of Lots Five (5) and Six (6), etc. Carl P. NICHOLS and Beatrice C. Nichols, Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF KEITY, Board of Equalization of Keith County, Nebraska, Appellants. In the Matter of the Assessment of Lot Two (2) and the East Twenty-four (24) feet of Lot Three (3), etc. David A. WELSH and Irma L. Welsh, Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF KEITH, Board of Equalization of Keith County, Nebraska, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of the Assessment of All of Lot Six (6) and the West Thirty (30) feet of Lot Seven (7), etc.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. An appeal to the district court from action of the county board of equalization is heard as in equity, and upon appeal therefrom to this court, it is tried de novo.

2. Individual discrepancies and inequalities in the valuation of real property for tax purposes must be corrected and equalized by the county board of equalization. The duties of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment are unrelated thereto and have no direct relationship to the duties of the county board of equalization. However, the final orders of each must be given effect.

3. A real estate classification and reappraisal committee appointed under the provisions of section 77-1301, R.R.S.1943, does not put a binding value upon any property. It merely makes recommendations to the county assessor and furnishes evidence for the use of the county board of equalization. Its duties in no manner disturb the requirements as to uniformity of taxation.

4. Approximation both as to value and uniformity is all that can be accomplished, because absolute mathematical equality in the valuation of properties for tax purposes is unattainable. Therefore, substantial compliance with the requirements of equalization and uniformity in taxation laid down by the federal and state constitutions is all that is required, and such provisions are satisfied when designed and manifest departures from the rule are avoided.

5. The sale price of property may be taken into consideration in determining the actual value thereof for tax purposes, together with all other elements pertaining to such issue. However, sale price standing alone is not conclusive of the actual value of property for tax purposes and other matters relevant to the actual value thereof must be considered in connection with the sale price to determine actual value. The true test in all cases is to arrive at actual value, meaning value in the market in the ordinary course of trade.

6. The burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to establish his contention that the value of his property has been arbitrarily or unlawfully fixed by the county board of equalization at an amount greater than its actual value, or that its value has not been fairly and properly equalized when considered in connection with the assessment of all other property, so that this disparity and lack of uniformity result in a discriminatory, unjust, and unfair assessment.

7. The burden imposed on the complaining taxpayer is not met merely by showing a difference of opinion between his witnesses and the county assessor or county board of equalization with regard to value unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed upon his property when compared with valuations placed on other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of a systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain legal duty, and not mere errors of judgment.

8. Generally, the valuation of property for tax purposes by the proper assessing officers should not be overthrown by the testimony of one or more interested witnesses that the values fixed by such officers were excessive or discriminatory when compared with values placed thereon by such witnesses. Otherwise, no assessment could ever be sustained.

9. Mere errors of judgment by tax officials will not support a claim of discrimination. There must be something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principles of practical uniformity. The good faith of such officers and the validity of their actions are ordinarily presumed, and when assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party.

10. Courts should not usurp the functions of tribunals created by law for ascertaining the actual value of property for tax purposes or constitute themselves a taxing board or board of equalization.

Beatty, Clarke, Murphy & Morgan, North Platte, for appellants.

McGinley, Lane, Powers & McGinley, Ogallala, for appellees.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE and BOSLAUGH, JJ.

CHAPPELL, Justice.

In 1953 the Keith County board of equalization, hereinafter called the county board, placed a valuation for tax purposes upon five separate described properties in Ogallala respectively owned in fee simple by George E. LeDioyt, Robert K. Scott, Waldo A. Nichols, Carl P. Nichols, David A. Welsh, and their respective spouses. All of the latter parties will be hereinafter called plaintiffs, or separately designated by name of the husbands. Each and all of plaintiffs' properties were recently constructed, modernly improved, commodious residence properties, favorably located, and respectively occupied by plaintiffs. Four of such homes were of brick veneer construction, and one was of brick veneer and stone construction. Thereafter each plaintiff filed a complaint, identical in form and character, with the county board. Each complaint alleged in substance that: (1) The separate valuations for tax purposes placed upon their described properties by the county assessor and the county board were arbitrarily made without foundation in fact to establish actual values, and that such properties were each overvalued for tax purposes in excess of their actual values; and (2) there existed a gross inequality between the values placed upon their respective properties and the values placed on other classes of real property assessed in the county, which resulted in a discrimination and an inequitable, unfair tax burden being cast upon plaintiffs, contrary to Article VIII, section 1, Constitution of Nebraska, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

After a hearing, the county board rendered an order denying each and all of plaintiffs' complaints. Therefrom, each and all plaintiffs separately appealed to the district court. There they each filed petitions on appeal which were identical in form and character. The county of Keith, the county board of equalization and its members, including the county assessor, were named as defendants. Collectively they will be called defendants.

Plaintiffs' petitions each alleged in substance that their respective properties had been arbitrarily overvalued in excess of their actual value by defendants for tax purposes. Each then alleged that a gross inequity existed between the value placed by defendants upon their respective brick veneer or brick veneer and stone constructed properties and the values placed by defendants upon comparable wood or frame constructed properties within the county, which resulted in an inequitable and unfair tax burden being cast upon each and all plaintiffs, contrary to the constitutional provisions aforesaid. Plaintiffs prayed that a just value should be placed on their properties for tax purposes in accord with their actual value, and for equitable relief.

In each of such cases, defendants filed an answer, identical in form and character, denying generally, and alleging in substance that in the valuation of each of plaintiffs' properties for tax purposes, they acted in good faith with proper motives and in conformity with laws then applicable, and did value same for such purposes proportionately and uniformly with values placed upon all other tangible property and franchises in the county; that plaintiffs' properties were not assessed for tax purposes at a higher proportion of their actual value than the values for tax purposes placed upon all other tangible property and franchises; and that for 1953 plaintiffs' properties were not assessed at their actual values but were each assessed at much less, although they were assessed by valuation proportionately and uniformly with all other tangible property and franchises whereby plaintiffs were in no manner prejudiced or harmed by the action of defendants. They prayed for a denial of any relief to plaintiffs, and for dismissal.

By stipulation, all five cases were consolidated for trial in the district court where they were so tried on the merits. However, separate judgments identical in form and character were rendered in each case. Each judgment found and adjudged that during 1953 properties of frame construction comparable with the brick veneer or brick veneer and stone properties belonging to plaintiffs were valued for tax purposes at 50 or 60 percent of their actual value, while plaintiffs' properties were each valued for tax purposes at approximately all of their actual value; that for 1953 and preceding years, the actual value of comparable frame or brick veneer and stone properties in the county was approximately the same; that the system of appraisal used by the county for tax purposes had resulted in a discrimination against p...

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16 cases
  • Carpenter v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • 12 Abril 1965
    ...is required and that such provisions are satisfied when designed and manifest departures from the rule are avoided. LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455; 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, s. 152, p. In light of the above principles, have the appellants sustained their burden of proof......
  • Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. Pennington County
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • 16 Abril 1959
    ...is excessive. Appellants relying principally upon Bennett v. Board of Review, 234 Iowa 800, 13 N.W.2d 351 and LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455, contend that the assessing authority's valuation is reviewable only for arbitrariness or failure to follow standards prescri......
  • S. S. Kresge Co. v. Jensen
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • 14 Junio 1957
    ...Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 489; County of Howard v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Neb. 339, 63 N.W.2d 441; LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455. There is no contention here made that the assessment made by the county board of equalization is void, or that it resu......
  • Lucas v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • 25 Octubre 1957
    ...The evidence on behalf of appellants is not sufficient to satisfy the burden cast upon them in this case. In LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455, 457, it is said: 'The burden imposed on the complaining taxpayer is not met merely by showing a difference of opinion between......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • Neb. Const. art. VIII § VIII-1 Revenue; Raised By Taxation; Legislative Powers
    • United States
    • Constitution of the State of Nebraska 2022 Edition Article VIII
    • 1 Enero 2022
    ...165 Neb. 547, 86 N.W.2d 381 (1957). Substantial compliance as to value and uniformity is all that is required. LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455 (1956). Uniformity as to class is required of tax on intangible property. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Heintze, 159 Neb. 520, 67 N.W.2......

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