Dipaola v. Riddle, 77-1293

• Decision Date: 21 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1293,77-1293
• Citation: 581 F.2d 1111
• Parties: Ronald Augustus DiPAOLA, Appellant, v. Walter RIDDLE, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, James D. Swinson, Sheriff, Fairfax County, William J. Powell, Sheriff, Sussex County, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1111

581 F.2d 1111

Ronald Augustus DiPAOLA, Appellant, v. Walter RIDDLE, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary James D. Swinson, Sheriff, Fairfax County, William J. Powell, Sheriff, Sussex County, Appellees.

No. 77-1293.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 6, 1977.

Decided Aug. 21, 1978.

John Kenneth Zwerling, Richmond, Va. (J. Flowers Mark, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for appellant.

Jerry P. Slonaker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va. (Anthony F. Troy, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellees.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge, and THOMSEN ^*, Senior District Judge.

HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:

Prior to and during the trial in the state court for the possession of marijuana with the intention of distributing it, DiPaola sought the suppression on constitutional grounds of marijuana that had been seized. At that time, however, he did not object to the search on the ground that there had been a "no knock" entry of the house and no announcement that the ununiformed intruders were policemen. DiPaola had been in the basement of the house, and his counsel represented that he knew nothing of the manner in which entry was effected. One of the persons arrested, however, was on the first floor of the house and knew of the "no knock" entry. He was represented by the same lawyers who represented DiPaola, and they reported that they did not learn of the nature of the entry from their other client until shortly after a jury found DiPaola guilty, though this was several months before the court imposed its sentence upon DiPaola. The question is whether DiPaola had an opportunity to fully litigate his "no knock" entry claim in the courts of Virginia so as to foreclose his assertion of that claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding under the rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).

I.

Acting upon an informant's tip, a regular, full time, but undercover policeman went to a house in Fairfax County, Virginia posing as a prospective purchaser of marijuana. His informant and DiPaola were in the yard. DiPaola invited him into the house, and the three went down into a basement room where there were two others. They negotiated for the purchase of twenty pounds of marijuana, and the box was given to Colavita, the policeman, for inspection. After the negotiations were complete, on a signal from Colavita, several policemen in civilian clothing and with drawn guns entered the house. The front door was forced open. A glass pane in the kitchen door was broken so that it might be unlocked from the inside. Perhaps jokingly, one of the intruders informed the people on the first floor of the house, "This isn't a bust. This is just a big rip-off."

One of the intruders, immediately after his entry into the house, went down into the basement room. Another soon followed. They identified themselves as policemen, and they arrested DiPaola and his two companions, and at least pretended to arrest Colavita, the policeman who had been invited in as the purchaser of the marijuana. They returned upstairs with the four persons placed under arrest and the marijuana, and then disclosed to the occupants of the first floor their identity as policemen.

Before and during DiPaola's trial, his lawyer sought the suppression of the marijuana, contending that there was no probable cause for a search by the policemen who participated in the forceful entry, and that there was no warrant.

Only one of the persons on the first floor of the house at the time of the forced entry was arrested. That one, Scheps, was represented by the same lawyers who represented DiPaola. Scheps, of course, knew all about the forced entry, but the lawyers later filed affidavits that Scheps did not tell them about the manner in which the intruding policemen gained their entrance until they were preparing for Scheps' trial, shortly after the jury had found DiPaola guilty. During DiPaola's trial, they say, they were unaware of the factual basis of the claim that is now asserted in DiPaola's behalf by other lawyers.

II.

When this federal habeas claim was first asserted, the district court concluded that the writ should issue. The statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109, requiring federal law enforcement officers to knock and to identify themselves, had no application to the conduct of these state policemen, but the district court thought that the breaking of the doors and the absence of any immediate announcement was so egregious that it amounted to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. ¹ The Commonwealth appealed, and, thereafter, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Stone v. Powell. We remanded for reconsideration in light of Stone v. Powell. The district court then held that the claim was foreclosed by that opinion of the Supreme Court, and DiPaola then brought the case back to us.

III.

Stone v. Powell's rule of preclusion is not dependent upon a finding that the contention was asserted and fully litigated in the state courts. It is enough that the state provided the mechanism and an opportunity for such full and fair litigation....