Dipoma v. McPhie, No. 20000466.

• Court: Supreme Court of Utah
• Writing for the Court: RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice
• Citation: 29 P.3d 1225,2001 UT 61
• Docket Number: No. 20000466.
• Decision Date: 20 July 2001
• Parties: Mary Ann Lucero DIPOMA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Brian McPHIE and Does 1-20 whose true names are unknown, Defendants and Petitioner.

29 P.3d 1225
2001 UT 61

Mary Ann Lucero DIPOMA, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Brian McPHIE and Does 1-20 whose true names are unknown, Defendants and Petitioner

No. 20000466.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 20, 2001.

29 P.3d 1226

Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff

Paul M. Belnap, Darren K. Nelson, Andrew D. Wright, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 On writ of certiorari, defendant Brian McPhie ("McPhie") seeks reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' determination that payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional requirement for the commencement of an action under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Mary Ann Lucero Dipoma ("Dipoma") was involved in an automobile accident with McPhie on November 29, 1993. On November 24, 1997, five days prior to the running of the four-year statute of limitations,¹ Dipoma filed a pro se complaint against McPhie in the district court seeking damages for injuries she allegedly sustained in the automobile accident. Dipoma's complaint was accompanied by a personal check in the amount of $120 for payment of the required filing fee.² The clerk of the court accepted Dipoma's check and stamped her complaint "filed."

¶ 3 On December 29, 1997, after the four-year statute of limitations had run, Dipoma's personal check was returned to the clerk of the court for insufficient funds. Although the record does not disclose when Dipoma was notified that her check had been returned, it was certainly no later than March 10, 1998, when Dipoma again attempted to pay the filing fee by mailing a second personal check to the court. However, because Dipoma's first check had been dishonored, the court clerk notified Dipoma that the court would not accept her second check and that she must "pay with another form." No other action was taken by Dipoma until five months later when, on August 11, 1998, Dipoma paid the $120 filing fee with a certified check—nearly nine months after the four-year statute of limitations had run. Thereafter, on August 26, 1998, a summons and a copy of the complaint were served on McPhie.

¶ 4 On February 18, 1999, McPhie moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dipoma's complaint was not "filed" until August 11, 1998—the date she paid the required filing fee—and that, therefore, her action was not commenced within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted McPhie's motion, holding that a complaint accompanied by a check later returned for insufficient funds is not filed for purposes of satisfying a statute of limitations. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Dipoma's complaint.

¶ 5 Dipoma appealed,³ arguing to the court of appeals that the trial court erred in its determination that payment of the required

29 P.3d 1227

filing fee is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement of an action at the trial level. In response, McPhie argued that even if the filing fee is not a jurisdictional requirement, the court of appeals should nevertheless affirm the trial court's dismissal of Dipoma's complaint on the alternative ground that Dipoma did not tender the required filing fee within a reasonable time

¶ 6 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, see Dipoma v. McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 1 P.3d 564, holding that the plain language of rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff only to file a complaint in order to commence an action and that, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Dipoma's complaint for failure to tender the required filing fee prior to the lapse of the applicable limitation period. Moreover, the court of appeals declined to address McPhie's argument that Dipoma did not tender the required filing fee within a reasonable time because McPhie had failed to raise the issue before the trial court.

¶ 7 McPhie filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court, seeking review of the decision of the court of appeals. We granted the petition. In this appeal, McPhie raises two arguments. First, McPhie argues that the court of appeals erred in its determination that payment of the required filing fee is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement of an action at the trial level. Second, McPhie argues that even if payment of the filing fee is not jurisdictional, the court of appeals erred by failing to affirm the trial court's dismissal of Dipoma's complaint on the alternative ground that Dipoma unreasonably delayed the payment of the required filing fee.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 "When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, `we review the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court.'" Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1214 (quoting Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997)). Inasmuch as the issues presented in this case are questions of law related to the construction of statutes and rules, we accord no particular deference to the court of appeals' ruling; we review it for correctness. Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ¶ 13, 9 P.3d 762.

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER FILING FEES ARE JURISDICTIONAL

¶ 9 We first address McPhie's argument that the court of appeals erred in its determination that payment of the required filing fee is not a jurisdictional requirement for commencement of an action at the trial level.

¶ 10 Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint be "filed" in order to commence a civil action. The rule provides:

(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced ... by filing a complaint with the court....

(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint....

Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a)-(b). Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines "filing." It states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e). However, despite the above, McPhie argues that filing requires not only depositing papers with the court, but also payment of the required filing fee. In doing so, McPhie acknowledges that rule 3 is silent as to whether payment of filing fees is required before a complaint can be considered "filed." Nevertheless, McPhie argues that rule 3's filing requirement incorporates sections 21-1-1,⁴ 21-1-5,⁵ and

29 P.3d 1228

21-7-2⁶ of the Utah Code, which set forth the court clerk's duty to collect filing fees. Because these sections require the court clerk to collect filing fees "in advance" of the performance of service, McPhie argues that payment of the filing fee must be a jurisdictional requirement. Dipoma argues, in response, that rule 3 contains no language requiring filing fees, nor expressly incorporates sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly determined that payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional requirement for the commencement of an action

¶ 11 This court has not addressed the issue of whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional requirement for commencing an action at the trial level. However, this court has addressed whether filing fees are jurisdictional on appeal. In doing so, this court has consistently looked to the plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional language into the rule. For example, in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), this court addressed the question of whether payment of docketing fees is a jurisdictional requirement under rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed the filing of appeals prior to 1985. Rule 73 stated in pertinent...