Dircks v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.
| Decision Date | 11 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00451-JMS-MG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
| Parties | KATHRYN DIRCKS, BARRY DIRCKS, Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, et al. Defendants. |
Hon Jane Magntts-Stinson, Judge United States District Court Southern District of Indiana.
Pro se Plaintiffs Kathryn Dircks ("Kathryn") and Barry Dircks ("Barry") filed this civil rights lawsuit[1] concerning a series of events that began on March 4, 2019 that resulted in Kathryn being involuntarily committed, Barry engaging in a standoff with local law enforcement, and their minor children, T.D. and N.D., being temporarily removed from Kathryn and Barry's custody in connection with child welfare proceedings. Plaintiffs filed this wide-ranging lawsuit asserting more than 28 disparate claims against 107 defendants whose connections to Plaintiffs vary greatly, ranging from medical malpractice claims against doctors and nurses related to Kathryn's treatment during her commitment, a defamation claim against an individual for Facebook comments, Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims against members of law enforcement related to the standoff with Barry, and legal malpractice claims related to Kathryn and Barry's representation in child welfare proceedings. Plaintiffs were able to round up an eye-popping 107 defendants because they apparently sued every individual and organization that appeared on Kathryn's medical records, child welfare records, and law enforcement records related to the incidents, without regard to any particular defendant's level of participation in the events.[2]
Pending before the Court and ripe for review are ten Motions to Dismiss filed by the following groups of Defendants: (1) the Zionsville Defendants, [3] [Filing No. 124]; (2) the Delamater Defendants, [4] [Filing No. 126]; (3) Defendant Jason Potts, [5] [Filing No. 128]; (4) the Boone County Defendants, [6] [Filing No. 130]; (5) the Whitestown Defendants, [7] [Filing No. 132] (6) the Lebanon Defendants, [8] [Filing No. 134]; (7) the Anonymous Doctor Defendants, [9] [Filing No. 135] (8) the DCS Defendants, [10] [Filing No. 139]; (9) the Thorntown Defendants, [11] [Filing No. 141]; and the Anonymous Medical Defendants, [12] [Filing No. 147].
In total, Plaintiffs allege 14 federal civil rights "counts," each with numerous sub-claims within each count, and 14 state-law counts under supplemental jurisdiction.
Two standards are relevant to evaluate the Motions to Dismiss. The DCS Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). All other moving parties seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only.
Rule 12(b)(1) requires a district court to dismiss an action when it lacks authority to consider and decide the dispute. Just like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See Ctr. For Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). If jurisdiction is not evident from the face of the complaint, a court may also consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether it has authority to hear the claims. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 930 F.3d 812, 821 (7th Cir. 2019). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level." Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
Furthermore, "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The liberal construction afforded pro se filings "relates to both the pro se plaintiff's factual allegations and their legal theories." White v. City of Chicago, 2016 WL 4270152, at *13 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 15, 2016). Although pro se parties are subject to less stringent pleading standards, "[i]t also is well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules." Loubser v. United States, 606 F.Supp.2d 897, 909 (N.D. Ind. 2009). And the Supreme Court has made clear that it has "never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The following are the factual allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint, (the "SAC") that are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, which, consistent with the standards of review articulated above, the Court must accept as true only for purposes of deciding the pending Motions to Dismiss.
Kathryn and Barry are a married couple who reside in Boone County, Indiana with their two minor children, T.D. and N.D. [Filing No. 122 at 4; Filing No. 122 at 20.] At the time of the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit, T.D. was four years old and N.D. was 18 months old. [Filing No. 122 at 4.] Barry is a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("LDS"). [Filing No. 122 at 20.] About a decade ago, Barry was involved in a standoff with law enforcement that resulted in Barry being handcuffed. [Filing No. 122 at 29.] Barry was not arrested or charged with a crime following that incident. [Filing No. 122 at 29.] In the wake of that incident, Barry has been advised never to speak with law enforcement or to allow law enforcement into his home without an attorney. [Filing No. 122 at 29.]
The incident that precipitated the series of events culminating in this lawsuit is Kathryn's involuntary psychiatric commitment, which lasted for a period of 18 days.
During the early hours of March 4, 2019, just before 3:00 a.m., a family member (not Barry) took Kathryn to Anonymous Hospital A for treatment for an acute mental-health condition. [Filing No. 122 at 21.] Anonymous Hospital A presented Kathryn with intake and consent forms, but staff prevented Kathryn from fully reading the paperwork. [Filing No. 122 at 22.] After Kathryn requested that address and phone number changes be made on the forms, Defendant Sharonda Reed took the paperwork away from Kathryn and "a consent was signed on behalf of Kathryn by Reed stating Kathryn 'refused.'" [Filing No. 122 at 22.] Hospital staff gathered vitals, took blood, and obtained historical information from Kathryn, and eventually Anonymous Doctor C asked that hospital social workers evaluate Kathryn. [Filing No. 122 at 23.] As part of that process, Anonymous Social Worker 5 contacted Barry via phone and interviewed him. [See Filing No. 122 at 23.]
Anonymous Doctor C signed a "Physician's Emergency Statement" declaring "that Kathryn may be mentally ill and dangerous or gravely disabled due to [Kathryn]'s delusional behavior." [Filing No. 122 at 24.] Anonymous Doctor C reported that Kathryn believed that "people [were] after her and her family." [Filing No. 122 at 24.] Shortly thereafter, Anonymous Social Worker 5 completed an "Application for Emergency Detention of Mentally Ill. Person," stating that "Kathryn was dangerous to herself because she was brought in with delusional behavior believing others will harm her and she was refusing to tell staff her address, phone numbers, or any identifiers." [Filing No. 122 at 24.]
At around 8:00 a.m. that same day, Kathryn was transferred from Anonymous Hospital A to Anonymous Center A "on authorization of Anonymous Doctor C, Anonymous Doctor F, and Anonymous Social Worker 5." [Filing No. 122 at 25.] At Anonymous Center A, Anonymous Doctors B and D assumed care of Kathryn and had her blood taken again. [Filing No. 122 at 25.] The doctors and nurses at Anonymous Center A ordered and administered medication to Kathryn. [See Filing No. 122 at 31.] According to Kathryn, she took this medication against her will because she was frightened. [Filing No. 122 at 31-32; Filing No. 122 at 42.] The next day, March 5, 2019 Kathryn was moved from a 20-bed unit at Anonymous Center A to an 8-bed unit "where there is no choice in food offered and only a small hallway is available to get exercise." [Filing No. 122 at 43.] Anonymous Center A also increased...
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