Director of State Dept. of Industrial Relations v. Winston County Com'n
Decision Date | 20 March 1985 |
Citation | 468 So.2d 177 |
Parties | DIRECTOR OF the STATE of Alabama DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS v. WINSTON COUNTY COMMISSION. Civ. 4605. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
George Cocoris, Gen. Counsel, and Frank D. Marsh, Asst. Gen. Counsel, State of Alabama Department of Industrial Relations, for appellant.
Hobson Manasco, Jr., Haleyville, for appellee.
This is an unemployment compensation case. There is apparently no question that the employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. The only issue before this court is who must "foot the bill."
The circuit court held that the Winston County Commission should not be assessed the employee's unemployment benefits. The Department of Industrial Relations appeals, and we affirm.
The employee was employed in the office of the probate judge of Winston County. After she was terminated, the State Department of Industrial Relations (the Department) assessed her unemployment benefits against the Winston County Commission (the Commission). The Department's hearing officer entered a final assessment against the Commission on March 29, 1983, and the Commission appealed to the Winston County Circuit Court. That court entered a judgment on September 25, 1984, finding that the laid-off employee was not an employee of the Commission and that the Commission was not responsible for her unemployment benefits. From this judgment, the Department appeals to this court.
As indicated, the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the laid-off employee was an employee of the Commission for purposes of charging the Commission with her unemployment benefits under Alabama law.
At the outset we note that the record before this court is not a paragon of clarity regarding when the employee was terminated. Both parties to this appeal, however, agree in brief that Ala.Code (1975), §§ 25-4-10(a)(2)b. and -10(a)(2)d. was the law which was applicable in the initial appeal to the circuit court. This court accepts the parties' statements as accurate and decides this appeal based upon the application of the stated statute.
The evidence before the circuit court revealed that the Commission had exercised no control over the laid-off employee. It had neither hired nor laid off the employee. It did not supervise her work or pay her salary. All of these matters had been handled by the probate judge.
Moreover, it has not been shown that the Commission even had the right to exercise control over the employee. We note that, under Ala.Code (1975), § 12-13-40(4), the Winston County probate judge was authorized to employ at his own expense the subject employee. On the other hand, Ala.Code (1975), § 11-3-11, which sets forth the powers and duties of county commissions, does not include the authority to hire or supervise employees of county probate offices or other county offices.
Based upon the evidence and the law, we find that no master-servant relationship existed between the employee and the Commission and that the employee was not an "employee" of the Commission under § 25-4-7.
The Department argues, however, that the Commission must be assessed the unemployment benefits under Ala.Code (1975), §§ 25-4-10(a)(2)b. and -10(a)(2)d. These two provisions are part of the statute which defines what constitutes employment for purposes of unemployment compensation. Because we deem these two subdivisions of § 25-4-10(a)(2) to be rather confusingly ordered therein, we set them forth in full herein:
It is clear and unambiguous, from the wording used in subdivision b., that employment for purposes of unemployment compensation includes services performed in the employ of the state, its instrumentalities, or any political subdivision of the state. With regard to subdivision d., however, it is not clear, due to the language used, which does not conform to the introductory language of sections (a) and (2) of the statute, that "employment" also includes services performed for a "governmental entity" of a political subdivision. Subdivision d. merely defines the term "governmental entity."
It has long been a rule of statutory construction in this state that it is the duty of the court to construe every word in each section of a statute consistent with other sections in pari materia. Winner v. Marion County Commission, 415 So.2d 1061 (Ala.1982); Darks Dairy,...
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