Directv, Inc. v. Wright

• Citation: 350 F.Supp.2d 1048
• Decision Date: 14 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 1:04CV0242RWS.,CIV.A. 1:04CV0242RWS.
• Parties: DIRECTV, INC., Plaintiff, v. John WRIGHT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

350 F.Supp.2d 1048

DIRECTV, INC., Plaintiff, v. John WRIGHT, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 1:04CV0242RWS.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 14, 2004.

Robin L. Gentry, Needle & Rosenberg, Atlanta, GA, Mark Edwin Henderson, David C. Holloway, Russell Adam Korn, Michael I. Krause, Jerry Chieh Liu, William Franklin Long, III, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, GA, for DirecTV, Inc., Plaintiff.

ORDER

STORY, District Judge.

Now before the Court for consideration is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [8-1]. After considering the entire record and the arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following Order.

Background

Plaintiff DirecTV, Inc. ("DirecTV") is a California company in the business of providing television programming to millions of subscribers in the United States through a digital satellite system.¹ DirecTV sells programming to customers and provides different levels of programming to different customers based on the particular subscription package the customer purchases. To prevent unauthorized access to its programming, DirecTV employs a conditional access system which encrypts its satellite transmissions. Subscribing customers are provided access cards that, upon activation with DirecTV, allow customers to decrypt and view the DirecTV programming to which they have subscribed.

DirecTV generates its revenues through sales of subscription packages, and therefore, devotes substantial resources to the development and improvement of its conditional access system. DirecTV's need to develop increasingly sophisticated security measures is driven by "pirates" — individuals who seek to circumvent DirecTV's security measures to gain unlimited access to DirecTV programming. One of the primary means by which pirates attempt to gain access to DirecTV programming is through the use of various hardware and software devices designed to disable the security of the access card.

On January 24, 2002, DirecTV executed a writ of seizure with the assistance of the United States Marshall's Office on Michael Worley and EQ Stuff, Inc. ("EQ Stuff"). Plaintiff asserts that EQ Stuff specialized in the sale of pirate access devices and other equipment used to illegally receive DirecTV's satellite signals. Pursuant to the writ, DirecTV obtained business records from EQ Stuff. These business records show that EQ Stuff sold to Defendant John Wright several items including: an "EQ Smartcard Glitcher" (unlooper); (2) an "EQ Zapulator;" and (3) and "EQ Atmel Programming." Defendant's purchases were made on September 19, 2001 and September 25, 2001.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (the "FCA") and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, (the "Wiretap Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21. Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) Unauthorized reception of satellite signals in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); (2) Importation of pirate access devices in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); (3) Unauthorized interception of electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); and (4) Possession of pirate access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). Defendant's motion to dismiss contends that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because the statute of limitations has expired.

Discussion

I. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) empowers the Court to grant a defendant's motion to dismiss when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering whether to grant or deny such a motion, the Court may look only to the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). In addition, the pleadings are construed broadly so that all facts pleaded therein are accepted as true, and all inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1373 (N.D.Ga.2001). Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir.1992). Motions to dismiss are disfavored and are rarely granted. Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir.1978); Woodham v. Fed. Transit Admin., 125 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1108 (N.D.Ga.2000).

As a preliminary matter, Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint is due to be dismissed. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 2512 does not create a private right of action. DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1129 (11th Cir.2004). Accordingly, Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

II. Counts I and II

Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint arise under the FCA, 47 U.S.C. § 605. Defendant's pro se Motion to Dismiss does not specifically address the individual counts in Plaintiff's Complaint but generally asserts that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's actions is 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e) and therefore the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. As to the § 605 claims, Plaintiff responds that the statute of limitations for 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) is the three year statute of limitations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), and so the Complaint was timely filed.

In order to determine whether Plaintiff's § 605 claims were timely filed, the Court must first determine the applicable statute of limitations. Determining the statute of limitations for activity under a federal statute is governed by federal law. Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Corp. v. 898 Belmont, Inc., 366 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir.2004). The FCA does not provide a statute of limitations for actions under 47 U.S.C. § 605. When Congress fails to supply a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the courts "have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law." United Paperworks Int'l Local # 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 931 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989)). The Supreme Court has made it clear that state statutes are the "lender of first resort" and this practice is "longstanding" and "settled." North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995). "Since 1830, `state statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of action' when federal legislation made no provision.'" Id. at 33-34, 115 S.Ct. 1927 (quoting Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)). Moreover, it is appropriate and realistic to presume that Congress was familiar with this precedent and expected its enactments to be interpreted in conformity with it. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927.

The Supreme Court has recognized, however that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Therefore, where application of the state limitations period would stymie the policies underlying the federal cause of action, the court may look to a limitations period provided by an analogous federal law which is more in harmony with the objectives of the cause of action. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927. The reference to federal law, however, is the exception and the court will "decline to apply a state limitations period only when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of the litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see United Paperworks Int'l, 931 F.2d at 835.²

Here, the parties failed to fully address the question of the appropriate statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that the three-year statute of limitations found in the Copyright Act applies to its claims under § 605. By contrast, broadly construing Defendant's pro se motion, he argues for the application of the two-year statute of limitations found in the Wiretap Act. This Court's own review of the applicable caselaw suggests that both parties' arguments find some support in the cases. Compare Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir.2001) (applying three-year federal Copyright Act limitations period to claims under § 605); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 255 F.Supp.2d 307, 314 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (same); DirecTV v. Brady, No. A 03-1450, 2004 WL 1752853, at *3 (E.D.La. Aug.4, 2004) (same) with, DirecTV v. Johnson, No. 03 C 8504, 2004 WL 2011392, at *3 (adopting two-year statute of limitations from Wiretap Act to § 605 claims). It appears to the Court, however, that the parties have skipped over the primary inquiry by going directly to a federal law analogy for the applicable statute of limitations. See North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927 (stating that state statutes are the "lender of first resort").

Prior to considering the applicability of a federal law limitations period, the Court must first determine whether state law provides an appropriate analogous statute. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34, 115 S.Ct. 1927; Kingvision, 366 F.3d at 221 ("if there is an analogous state limitations period, absent any impediment of implementation of national policies if that state period is applied, courts are not required to examine federal limitations periods.") The Court declines to follow the parties'...