Dirickson v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2023
• Docket Number: 19-CV-7149
• Parties: MERRILEE DIRICKSON, Plaintiff, v. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

MERRILEE DIRICKSON, Plaintiff, v. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC., Defendant.

No. 19-CV-7149

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

February 20, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARY M. ROWLAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Merrilee Dirickson worked in sales for Defendant Intuitive Surgical, Inc. until Defendant terminated her. Defendant maintains it did so because of Plaintiff's poor work performance. Plaintiff sees it differently, claiming that Defendant subjected her to a hostile work environment discriminated against her because of her sex, and retaliated against her. Plaintiff brings a variety of federal and state-law claims to seek redress for her alleged injuries. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. [130]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id.

BACKGROUND

As a preliminary matter, Defendant raises evidentiary objections regarding Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of facts and statement of additional facts. This Court maintains broad discretion to enforce the local rules governing summary judgment motions, Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008), and addresses Defendant's evidentiary objections before turning to the facts of the case.

Defendant contends that many of Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's statement of facts contain additional “facts” rather than dispute the cited fact. Id. This Court has reviewed some of these responses and agrees that Plaintiff often improperly introduces new additional facts in her responses to Plaintiff's facts. See De v. City of Chicago, 912 F.Supp.2d 709, 715 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that the “the nonmoving party's additional facts belong in a separate statement”). One such example, among many, is contained in Plaintiff's response to Defendant's fact 45. See [151] ¶ 45. Defendant's fact 45 contains a simple assertion that Plaintiff complained about gender discrimination in two emails on February 20, 2018 and on March 1, 2018. Id. Instead of simply admitting or disputing these facts, Plaintiff responds to this fact with seventeen pages of additional factual assertions presenting her account of events. See id. This is frustrating to the Court, as it appears Plaintiff has “intended to complicate rather than simplify the court's task.” Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F.Supp.2d 461, 463-64 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Regardless, given the length of the parties' submissions, this Court will not strike these responses wholesale, and will instead evaluate them on a fact-by-fact basis, to the extent pertinent to the analysis.

Defendant argues that fifty-five of Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's statement of facts do not cite to record evidence and impermissibly cross-reference other facts. [170] at 10. Again, this Court sees no need to dive into these responses at the outset and will assess these facts on a case-by-case basis, to the extent material to its analysis.

Defendant moves to strike the declaration of Plaintiff's former colleague, Amanda C., because it lacks foundation, includes hearsay, and states legal conclusions. [170] at 12. This Court has reviewed Amanda C.'s declaration [153-42] and agrees that it contains several statements that are not admissible. For instance, Amanda C. speculates that Defendant permitted one supervisor to remain employed at the company despite being fully aware that he was a serial sexual harasser. Id. ¶ 6. Speculation is, of course, not evidence. Piotrowski v. Menard, Inc., 842 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 2016). Amanda C. also offers impermissible hearsay, stating that she heard from someone else that the supervisor had sex with a subordinate in a hotel room. Id. ¶ 7; Fed.R.Evid. 801. This Court disregards these inadmissible statements. Amanda C.'s declaration, however, does contain many other statements that are not based on hearsay or speculation and do not state legal conclusions. For example, she attests to her own experience of being sexually harassed by a supervisor, and of another experience with coming forward to complain about sexual harassment. [15342] ¶¶ 6-7. These are facts based on her personal knowledge and are not otherwise inadmissible. Thus, this Court will not strike the entirety of Amanda C.'s declaration.

With these evidentiary issues resolved, this Court turns to the background facts, which it takes from Defendant's statement of facts (DSOF) [132], Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of facts (PRSOF) [151] and statement of additional facts (PSAF) [152], and Defendant's response to Plaintiff's statement of additional facts (DRSAF) [172].

I. The Parties

Defendant operates a robotics company that sells the DaVinci Robot; the Robot assists surgeons in performing minimally invasive surgery. DSOF ¶ 1. Defendant employed Plaintiff from April 2013 to January 2019, most recently as an Area Sales Manager (ASM) in Chicago. Id. ¶ 2.

Defendant initially hired Plaintiff in 2013 as a Clinical Sales Representative (CSR) and promoted her twice within two years-first to Senior CSR in 2014, and to ASM in 2016. PSAF ¶ 1. In 2014, Plaintiff attained 103% of her sales quota; in 2015, she reached 100% of her sales quota. Id. In 2016, she attained 115% of her sales quota and ranked 13th out of 27 ASMs nationally. Id. As a CSR and senior CSR, Plaintiff grew the company's general surgery business in her territory over 600%. Id. ¶ 2.

II. ASM Responsibilities

When Defendant made Plaintiff an ASM in 2016, she moved from Defendant's “clinical” to “capital” side of its business. DSOF ¶ 7. While they collaborate with each other, the “clinical” sales force primarily builds relationships with individual doctors and promotes the use of existing Robots for surgeries, while the “capital” sales force typically sells new or upgraded Robots to hospitals. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant's “capital” sales strategy applicable to ASMs includes the fundamental “5 Pillars” sales approach: (1) clinical selling; (2) QTI (quantify the impact); (3) MDE (market development event) strategy; (4) impending events; and (5) executive discovery and validations. Id. ¶ 10. The first pillar-clinical selling-requires ASMs to identify, target, and engage with surgeons with the goal of developing them into advocates of Defendant's robotic products. Id. ¶ 11. The second, QTI, entails observing and meeting with surgeons who use Defendant's products, analyzing their surgical data to quantify the value of the Robot, and presenting each surgeon with individualized, quantitative analysis demonstrating the medical and economic impact of Defendant's Robots. Id. ¶ 12. Pillars three and four-MDE strategy and impending events-require ASMs to assist surgeons in planning and presenting the data gathered during the second pillar at educational events. Id. ¶ 13. And the final pillar, executive discovery and validations, requires ASMs to present to hospital executives. Id. ¶ 14.

III. Plaintiff's Performance As An ASM

In 2016, Plaintiff's first year as an ASM, she ranked 14th out of 29 ASMs and exceeded her quota. Id. ¶ 15.

According to Defendant, in 2017, Plaintiff's then-manager, Andy Stoner, determined that Plaintiff was having difficulty utilizing the “capital” sales force's fundamental sales strategy which impacted her performance. Id. ¶ 16. In October 2017, Stoner wrote himself an email, documenting a conversation he claims to have had with Plaintiff. [133-19]; DSOF ¶ 19. In it, he wrote “Since she is not happy in the ASM role, we discussed her moving forward in the ASM role or moving to a CSR role. . . . I told her that [she] has high support to continue [working] with [Defendant] but that there were some concerns with her ability to do the ASM job. At that time she asked me if I could get Chip to waive her non-compete clause.” [133-19] at 2. Plaintiff disputes that she said the things Stoner wrote, particularly with respect to her unhappiness in the ASM role. PRSOF ¶ 19. According to Plaint...