DiSabatino v. Salicete

• Decision Date: 12 December 1995
• Docket Number: 1995,23,1994,Nos. 462,s. 462
• Citation: DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344 (Del. 1995)
• Parties: Michael DiSABATINO, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Mary Anne SALICETE, Petitioner Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1344

671 A.2d 1344

Michael DiSABATINO, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Mary Anne SALICETE, Petitioner Below, Appellee.

Nos. 462, 1994, 23, 1995.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Dec. 12, 1995.

Decided: Jan. 16, 1996.

Upon appeal from the Family Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.

Court Below--Family Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County; CN87-1766.

Thomas S. Neuberger (argued), Wilmington, and Gary L. Smith, Newark, for appellant.

Daniel F. Kelleher, Trzuskowski, Kipp, Kelleher & Pearce, P.A., Wilmington, for appellee.

Michael J. Rich, State Solicitor, Peter S. Feliceangeli and W. Michael Tupman, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, amicus curiae, for Delaware Dept. of Justice.

Chandlee Johnson Kuhn, Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Wilmington, amicus curiae, for Delaware Family Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Ass'n.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc)

HOLLAND, Justice:

The parties were divorced on July 1, 1993. Thereafter, the appellee, Mary Anne Salicete ("Salicete") filed a series of petitions for a Rule to Show Cause. Each petition alleged that the appellant, Michael DiSabatino ("DiSabatino"), had violated prior orders of the Family Court.

The Family Court conducted hearings, made findings of fact, and entered dispositions on several of the petitions. The first order at issue in this appeal was entered on November 16, 1994. It imposed sanctions upon DiSabatino which: placed him on curfew; restricted his driver's license; and ordered him to pay Salicete the sum of $18,000 by December 1, 1994. DiSabatino filed a notice of appeal from that judgment on November 30, 1994, but did not seek to have it stayed.

On December 27, 1994, the Family Court conducted a hearing and concluded that DiSabatino was in contempt of its November 16, 1994 judgment. The sanctions imposed included DiSabatino's commitment to the Department of Adult Corrections as of December 28, 1994 at 12:00 noon. DiSabatino was to be incarcerated until such time as he purged himself of the contempt finding, by paying to Salicete the sum of $18,000 with interest at 8% from December 1, 1994. DiSabatino filed a notice of appeal from that judgment on January 25, 1995.

DiSabatino's two appeals were consolidated. ¹ DiSabatino contends that each of the proceedings and judgments in the Family Court were for "serious" criminal contempt. The undisputed record reflects that DiSabatino was denied the full panoply of rights which are afforded to an accused person, inter alia, the right to trial by jury. Thus, DiSabatino argues the adjudications of contempt and the sanctions imposed by the Family Court must be reversed.

This Court has concluded that the proceedings and sanctions in the Family Court were criminal in nature and "serious." Therefore, DiSabatino was entitled to invoke all the protections of the constitutional rights that are guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, including the right to a trial by jury. Consequently, the judgments of the Family Court are reversed.

Facts

On November 23, 1993, Salicete filed a petition for a Rule to Show Cause. The petition alleged that DiSabatino had violated the automatic restraining order, which had been entered pursuant to 13 Del.C. § 1509(a). ² The Family Court conducted a hearing on December 14, 1993. It concluded that DiSabatino had violated the restraining order during the period of November 18-20, 1993, by: approaching Salicete at a tavern; pouring a glass of wine over her head; addressing her with profanity; and driving to her house at 3:30 a.m., where he insulted her from his parked vehicle.

As sanctions for the violation, the Family Court assessed DiSabatino $1,500. It ordered the assessment to be paid to Salicete from DiSabatino's share of the marital estate at the time of the property division hearing. The Family Court advised DiSabatino that the monetary assessment would be doubled for any future violations. DiSabatino was also ordered to pay Salicete's attorney's fees.

On May 20, 1994, Salicete filed another petition for a Rule to Show Cause. This petition alleged that DiSabatino had violated the automatic restraining order again, the Family Court's order of December 14, 1993, and had abused her. The Family Court conducted a hearing on July 14, 1994. It found DiSabatino to be in contempt by going to an establishment where he knew Salicete would be a patron. It found DiSabatino had committed abuse by calling Salicete vulgar names in the presence of others.

As a sanction for the contempt, the Family Court assessed DiSabatino $3,000, to be paid to Salicete from his share of the marital estate at the time of the property division. As a sanction for the finding of abuse, the Family Court ordered DiSabatino to: participate in an anger control program; have no contact with Salicete; and turn over his fire arms to a neutral third-party. DiSabatino was also ordered to pay a portion of Salicete's attorney's fees.

On August 22, 1994, Salicete filed another petition for a Rule to Show Cause. The petition alleged that DiSabatino had violated the automatic restraining order again and the Family Court's prior orders. The Family Court conducted a hearing on November 16, 1994. It found DiSabatino in contempt of the restraining order and its prior orders by: going to Salicete's residence on August 17, 1994 at about 5:00 a.m.; honking the horn; threatening to kill her; and appearing again at her home the following day, when the early morning incident was being investigated by the police.

As sanctions for the findings of contempt, the Family Court assessed DiSabatino $6,000 for the August 17, 1994 violation and $12,000 for the August 18, 1994 violation. Both payments were ordered to be paid to Salicete by December 1, 1994. As additional sanctions, the Family Court ordered DiSabatino to: surrender his driver's license to the Division of Motor Vehicles for an occupational license restricting his driving to the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday; and abide by a curfew restricting him from leaving his home after 7:00 p.m. on any day of the week. The Family Court also warned DiSabatino that any further violations would result in a home confinement program, monitored by the use of an ankle bracelet.

Salicete filed another petition for a Rule to Show Cause when DiSabatino failed to pay her the $18,000 of assessments. The Family Court conducted a hearing on December 27, 1994. The Family Court found DiSabatino in contempt for not paying $18,000 to Salicete by December 1, 1994. As a sanction for that contempt finding, DiSabatino was committed to the Department of Adult Corrections, until such time as he paid the $18,000 plus 8% interest from December 1, 1994 to Salicete. The sentence was made to be effective at noon on December 28, 1994. The Family Court stated that the sentence would be vacated upon notice that the assessment had been paid.

Contempt Power Inherent Judicial Authority

Courts have "an inherent contempt authority, ... as a power 'necessary to the exercise of all others.' " United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2559, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). As the United States Supreme Court has stated:

That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United States [and Delaware], when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once became possessed of the power.

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2131, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) ("Young v. United States "). By virtue of that inherent authority, courts have the power to impose either civil or criminal sanctions for contempt. Id. The relatively broad civil and criminal contempt power, that is inherently vested in the judicial branch of government, has been explained traditionally, as follows:

Courts independently must be vested with "power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and ... to preserve themselves and their [judicial] officers from ... insults...."

United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2559 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)).

The inherent contempt power of the Delaware courts and the breadth of its scope are well established. The General Assembly has provided that no conduct constitutes a crime unless it is made an offense by the "Criminal Code or by another law." 11 Del.C. § 202(a). In Section 202(b), however, the General Assembly expressly recognized that subsection (a) did not affect the inherent power of a court "to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree." 11 Del.C. § 202(b) (emphasis added). ³

Thus, independent of contempt as a statutory crime, ⁴ Delaware courts have the inherent power to impose criminal sanctions for contempt. Although many constitutional criminal procedural protections are required when a court invokes its inherent authority to initiate an action for criminal contempt, those "proceedings are not intended to punish conduct prescribed as harmful by the general criminal laws." Young v. United States, 481 U.S. at 800, 107 S.Ct. at 2133-34. Rather, "they are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court." Id.

Consequently, when the court exercises its inherent contempt authority to commence a contempt proceeding that is of a criminal nature, it is not a criminal prosecution. Young v. United States, 481 U.S. at 804, 107 S.Ct. at 2136. ⁵ The proceeding is for an offense against the court, as an institution of public justice. Id. Accordingly, even a court which has no criminal jurisdiction has the inherent power to...