Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson

• Decision Date: 19 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 03-CV-3209 (NGG)(MDG).,03-CV-3209 (NGG)(MDG).
• Citation: 598 F.Supp.2d 289
• Parties: DISABILITY ADVOCATES, INC., Plaintiff, v. David A. PATERSON, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, Richard F. Daines, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Michael F. Hogan, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Department of Health, and the New York State Office of Mental Health, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Page 289

598 F.Supp.2d 289

DISABILITY ADVOCATES, INC., Plaintiff, v. David A. PATERSON, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, Richard F. Daines, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Michael F. Hogan, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Department of Health, and the New York State Office of Mental Health, Defendants.

No. 03-CV-3209 (NGG)(MDG).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

February 19, 2009.

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Andrew Garry Gordon, Jeh Charles Johnson, Alissa Belkin Bauer, Anne Skeels Raish, Joshua Paul Groban, Beth Susan Frank, Paul Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Jeanette M. Zelhof, Lycette Nelson, Mfy Legal Services, Inc., John A. Gresham, Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc., William G. Lienhard, New York, NY, Ira Abraham Burnim, Jennifer Ellen Mathis, Washington, DC, Roger A. Bearden, Cliff Zucker, Disability Advocates, Inc., Albany, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Barbara K. Hathaway, Amy Marie Held, Attorney General's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

The "integration mandate" of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), as expressed in federal regulations and Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999), requires that when a state provides services to individuals with disabilities, it must do so "in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs." The Supreme Court explicitly held in Olmstead that "[u]njustified isolation ... is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability," observing that "institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable of or unworthy of participating in community life." 527 U.S. at 600, 119 S.Ct. 2176.

Plaintiff Disability Advocates, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "DAI") is a protection and advocacy organization authorized by statute to bring suits on behalf of individuals with disabilities. It brings this suit on behalf of adults with mental illness who live in twenty-one "adult homes." Adult homes are residential adult care facilities licensed by the State of New York (the "State") to provide long-term care and supervision to people with disabilities and/or mental illness. DAI alleges that these particular adult homes — all of which are located in New York City and have more than 120 residents, more than 25% of whom have mental disabilities — are segregated settings akin to psychiatric institutions. According to DAI, many of its constituents are qualified to live in "supported housing," an alternative form of housing in which individuals with mental illness live in their own apartments scattered throughout the community and receive supportive services. DAI thus alleges a violation of the integration mandate, claiming that its constituents are not receiving services in the "most integrated setting appropriate for their needs."

DAI has named as defendants the New York State Department of Health ("DOH") and the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH"), as well as Governor David A. Paterson and the Commissioners of DOH and OMH (collectively, "Defendants"), each sued in their official capacities.¹ DAI seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants "to take such steps as are necessary to enable Plaintiff's constituents to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs" (Compl. 34 (Docket Entry # 1)), and proposes an order requiring Defendants to offer supported housing to those of DAI's constituents who are qualified to move. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. ("Pl. Opp.") 27 (Docket Entry # 202).)

Defendants have brought a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Def. Mot. Summ. J (Docket Entry # 145); Def. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. ("Def. Mem.") (Docket # 172).) First, Defendants contend that DAI lacks standing to bring these claims and to seek system-wide injunctive relief. Second, they argue that Title II of the ADA does not apply to DAI's claims, because the adult homes are privately operated and the State merely licenses and inspects them. Third, they claim that adult home residents are already in the "most integrated setting," because adult homes and supported housing are "equally integrated" with the community. Fourth, they argue that DAI has not established that adult home residents are qualified to move to alternative housing. Fifth, they contend that the Governor is not a proper defendant. (See Def. Mem. 35, 44, 65, 82.)

In addition to these arguments on the merits of DAI's case, Defendants also seek summary judgment on their "fundamental alteration" affirmative defense. This defense, described in the regulations and discussed in Olmstead, provides that even if the individuals whose placement is at issue are not in the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs, the State need not take a particular action that would constitute a "fundamental alteration" of its programs and services, taking into account the State's available resources and its obligations to provide services to others with disabilities. Defendants contend that even if DAI could establish a violation of the integration mandate, Defendants should not be required to move adult home residents to alternative settings because doing so would impose a fundamental alteration. (See id. at 70-71.)

DAI has also brought a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment solely on the fundamental alteration defense. (Pl. Mot. Partial Summ. J. (Docket Entry # 176).) It contends that Defendants have failed to develop an effective plan to comply with the integration mandate of Title II and Olmstead — an "Olmstead plan" — with respect to adult home residents, and that this failure precludes Defendants from asserting a fundamental alteration defense. (Pl. Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. ("Pl. Mem.") (Docket Entry # 176).)

For the reasons below, the parties' Motions are DENIED. The court concludes that DAI has standing, that Title II applies to DAI's claims, and that the Governor is a proper party. Regarding whether DAI's constituents are in the "most integrated setting appropriate to their needs," including whether they are qualified to move to alternative settings, Defendants have not met their burden for summary judgment. On the fundamental alteration defense, summary judgment is denied to both Plaintiff and Defendants; the issues for trial are set forth below.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this case on July 1, 2003. (Docket Entry # 1.) Discovery concluded on November 14, 2006. (Status Conf. before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go, Nov. 14, 2006.) The parties filed their Motions for Summary Judgment on August 10, 2007, with opposition and reply memoranda to follow. (Scheduling Order dated Aug. 7, 2007 (Docket Entry # 179).) The parties requested extensions of time, and the two Motions were fully briefed on January 31, 2008.² (Docket Entries # 221-223.)

In conjunction with the Motions for Summary Judgment, Defendants also submitted two evidentiary motions seeking to exclude portions of Plaintiff's evidence. (Docket Entries # 173, 219.) One was fully briefed on January 31, 2008; the other was fully briefed on February 29, 2008. (Docket Entries #218, 229.) The court ruled on these motions on December 22, 2008 and presumes familiarity with that Memorandum & Order. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson ("December M & O"), No. 03-CV-3209 (NGG)(MDG), 2008 WL 5378365 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008).

Currently before the court are the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. The claims on which the parties seek summary judgment are fact-intensive and rely on a voluminous and comprehensive record containing more than 13,000 pages. The parties have provided hundreds of pages of briefing on the factual and legal issues and have submitted approximately 675 exhibits, including affidavits and declarations of fact and expert witnesses, government reports, and deposition testimony. The court wishes to compliment the parties on their extensive and thoughtful analysis of the complex legal and factual issues in this case. While the court is not required to look beyond the evidence cited in the parties' Rule 56.1 Statements and responses, see Morisseau v. DLA Piper, 532 F.Supp.2d 595, 618 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (discussing Local Civ. R. 56.1), it has considered additional evidence cited in the parties' memoranda of law in the interest of thoroughness.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911, 118 S.Ct. 2075, 141 L.Ed.2d 151 (1998). The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994).

The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Therefore, summary judgment is improper if there is...