Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson

Citation653 F.Supp.2d 184
Decision Date08 September 2009
Docket NumberNo. 03-CV-3209 (NGG).,03-CV-3209 (NGG).
PartiesDISABILITY ADVOCATES, INC., Plaintiff, v. David A. PATERSON, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, Richard F. Daines, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Michael F. Hogan, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Department of Health, and the New York State Office of Mental Health, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Andrew Garry Gordon, Anne Skeels Raish, Francine Nicole Murray, Gayle Sharon Gerson, Jonathan R. Bolton, Liad Levinson, Sandra Lynn Sheldon, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY, Charlyne M. Brumskine Peay, Urban Justice Center, New York, NY, Ira Abraham Burnimm Jennifer Ellen Mathis, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Washington, DC, Jeanette M. Zelhof, Kevin M. Cremin, MFY Legal Services, Inc., New York, NY, John A. Gresham, Roberta L. Mueller, Roger A. Bearden, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc., New York, NY, Timothy A. Clune, Cliff Zucker, Disability Advocates, Inc., Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Amanda Maisels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, Michael J. Goldberger, U.S. Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.

Barbara K. Hathaway, Matthew Silverman, Amy Marie Held, Scott J. Spiegelman, Attorney General's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER SETTING FORTH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

The Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999), that "[u]njustified isolation ... is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability," observing that "institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable of or unworthy of participating in community life." 527 U.S. at 597, 600, 119 S.Ct. 2176. The "integration mandate" of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., as expressed in federal regulations and Olmstead, requires that when a state provides services to individuals with disabilities, it must do so "in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs." The "most integrated setting," according to the federal regulations, is "a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A.

Plaintiff Disability Advocates, Inc. ("DAI"), a protection and advocacy organization authorized by statute to bring suit on behalf of individuals with disabilities, brings this action on behalf of individuals with mental illness residing in, or at risk of entry into, "adult homes" in New York City with more than 120 beds and in which twenty-five residents or 25% of the resident population (whichever is fewer) have a mental illness. Adult homes are for-profit residential adult care facilities licensed by the State of New York (the "State").

Following a five-week bench trial, DAI has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its constituents, approximately 4,300 individuals with mental illness, are not receiving services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. The adult homes at issue are institutions that segregate residents from the community and impede residents' interactions with people who do not have disabilities. DAI has proven that virtually all of its constituents are qualified to receive services in "supported housing," a far more integrated setting in which individuals with mental illness live in apartments scattered throughout the community and receive flexible support services as needed. DAI has also proven that its constituents are not opposed to receiving services in more integrated settings. Therefore, DAI has established a violation of the integration mandate of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Defendants are the New York State Department of Health ("DOH"), the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH"), as well as Governor David A. Paterson and the Commissioners of DOH and OMH (collectively, "Defendants").1 Defendants are required under New York law "to develop a comprehensive, integrated system of treatment and rehabilitative services for the mentally ill." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 7.01; see id. §§ 5.07, 7.07. They administer the State's mental health service system, plan the settings in which mental health services are provided—by both public and private entities—and allocate resources within the mental health service system. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 5.07, 7.07, 41.03, 41.42, 41.39; N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18 §§ 485-87. In carrying out these duties, Defendants have denied thousands of individuals with mental illness in New York City the opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Defendants' actions constitute discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Although Defendants have raised an affirmative defense, they have not satisfied their burden of proof to establish that the relief DAI seeks would constitute a "fundamental alteration" of the State's mental health service system. Accordingly, DAI is entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND

DAI filed this suit on June 30, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶ 34 (Docket Entry # 1).) Discovery concluded on November 14, 2006. On February 19, 2009, the court denied the parties' motions for summary judgment. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson ("DAI I"), 598 F.Supp.2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). After considering a voluminous factual record of over 13,000 pages and approximately 675 exhibits, this court resolved a host of legal issues raised by the parties. See id. at 293-94. As threshold matters, the court concluded that: (1) DAI has statutory and Article III standing, (2) Title II of the ADA applies to DAI's claims in this case, and (3) the Governor is a proper party. See id. at 307-311, 313-19, 356-57. The court also discussed at length the components of the fundamental alteration defense. See id. at 333-39.

In DAI I, the court identified several issues for trial. To determine whether DAI's constituents are in the "most integrated setting appropriate for their needs," the court would have to determine at trial (1) whether adult homes are the most integrated setting appropriate for DAI's constituents to receive services, and (2) whether DAI's constituents are "qualified" for supported housing. See id. at 319-20 (framing legal inquiry); id. at 331, 333 (concluding that issues of material fact precluded granting summary judgment to Defendants). The court also determined that issues of material fact remained as to the fundamental alteration defense, on which both sides had sought summary judgment. Id. at 349, 356.

The court presided over an eighteen-day bench trial from May 11 to June 16, 2009. The court heard testimony from State officials, mental health and other experts, lay witnesses with extensive experience in State government, service providers, and current and former adult home residents two of whom now live in supported housing. Twenty-nine witnesses testified, more than three hundred exhibits were admitted into evidence, and excerpts from the deposition transcripts of twenty-three additional witnesses were entered into the record, along with the 3,500 page trial transcript. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 13, 2009 and responses on July 22, 2009.2

The parties have engaged in numerous settlement discussions over the last six years.3 After a recent round of settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go, the parties remain unable to settle the case.4 Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, this court issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5

II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT

DAI I explains in detail the court's resolution of numerous legal issues in this case, including the meaning and application of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 598 F.Supp.2d at 311-12, 331, 333-39. Here, the court provides a brief overview of the relevant legal standards. It then sets forth the core holdings of DAI I with respect to the applicability of Title II to Plaintiff's claims.

A. LEGAL STANDARDS

The ADA was enacted to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress recognized that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." Id. § 12101(a)(2). Congress found that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... segregation." Id. § 12101(a)(5). Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in connection with access to public services, requiring that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132; DAI I, 598 F.Supp.2d at 311.

To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she is a "qualified individual"...

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