Disability Law Ctr. of Alaska v. Meyer
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-00173-JMK |
| Citation | 484 F.Supp.3d 693 |
| Parties | DISABILITY LAW CENTER OF ALASKA; Native Peoples Action Community Fund; Alaska Public Interest Research Group ; Aleija Stover; and Camille Rose Nelson, Plaintiffs, v. Kevin MEYER, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska; and State of Alaska, Division of Elections, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Scott M. Kendall, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Keri-Ann Baker, Reeves Amodio LLC, Anchorage, AK, Jason Seth Harrow, Equal Citizens, Los Angeles, CA, Michael Nicholas Donofrio, Stris & Maher LLP, Montpelier, VT, for Plaintiff Disability Law Center of Alaska.
Scott M. Kendall, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Anchorage, AK, Jason Seth Harrow, Equal Citizens, Los Angeles, CA, Michael Nicholas Donofrio, Stris & Maher LLP, Montpelier, VT, for Plaintiffs Native Peoples Action Community Fund, Alaska Public Interest Research Group, Aleija Stover, Camille Rose Nelson.
Margaret A. Paton-Walsh, State of Alaska, Department of Law, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.1 Defendants oppose the motion.2 Plaintiffs filed a reply.3 On August 25, 2020, the Court held a hearing and heard oral argument on this motion. The Court has carefully considered the arguments raised by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.
Plaintiffs ask this Court for an order requiring Defendants to "immediately mail absentee ballot applications to all registered Alaskan voters who have not yet received one."4 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief on this matter because they have not met their burden to establish irreparable harm, that the balance of equities and the public interest weighs in their favor; or that they are likely to succeed on the merits, or even raise serious questions going to the merits.5
The parties largely agree on the background facts in this case. The global pandemic caused by the COVID-19 illness has significantly affected life in Alaska since at least March 2020. Not long after then, public health officials, in coordination with government leaders, continuously have implemented restrictions on community, economic, and social activity with the aim of limiting person-to-person contact in order to slow the spread of COVID-19.
Every aspect of life outside the home—from grocery shopping, to classroom learning, to daily employment—has had to evolve. In response to this new reality, Defendants Alaska Division of Elections ("the Division") and Lt. Governor Kevin Meyer (collectively, "Defendants") have made decisions and taken action regarding the upcoming 2020 state elections.
Alaska's legislature and the U.S. Congress have passed legislation to address and provide funds for the State's COVID-19 responses.6 Congress earmarked $3 million for Alaska's elections via the CARES Act.7 The Alaska Legislature, in SB 241, authorized conducting the entirety of the elections by mail, but, as Defendants note, did not require it.8 Defendant Lt. Governor Meyer decided that while the State would still maintain in-person voting in 2020 elections, he would increase efforts and outreach for absentee voting, or vote by mail.9
Defendants list precautions taken during the pandemic in their response in opposition10 to the motion for preliminary injunction:
Staff are working hard to assure the primary and general elections run smoothly and meet the various critical deadlines set forth in state law. To this end, in addition to facilitating the many diverse voting options and procedures outlined above, the Division has arranged for social distancing, masks, gloves, and sanitizing in over 440 polling places around the state; recruited election workers to staff those polling places in a year when far fewer people are willing to serve in this role; created new distanced training to avoid unnecessary exposure for smaller communities and its employees; and already processed an unprecedented number of absentee ballot applications. At the same time, the Division is adjusting its internal workplace protocols to protect the safety of Division employees and poll workers. In addition, and in order to help mitigate the risk to Alaskans, the Lieutenant Governor explored ways to increase absentee voting while not overwhelming the administrative capacity of the Division of Elections. To that end, in May 2020 he decided to supplement the Division's new online absentee ballot application system with an additional absentee voting outreach effort, mailing voters aged 65 and older a paper absentee ballot application form.11
Plaintiffs, who are and represent individuals under the age of sixty-five that also may face high-risk complications from COVID-19, including rural Alaskan residents with decreased access to robust medical treatment facilities, say that Defendants’ decision to mail paper absentee ballot application forms only to senior citizen voters is discriminatory and harmful to them. Defendants justify their decision because only voters age 65 and older are (1) known to be high-risk as a group, and (2) can be identified from information that the Division already possessed.
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right."12 As articulated in Winter , the moving party must establish each of the following: (1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit does afford a certain level of malleability to this four-prong test.13 In other words, a court is permitted to issue a preliminary injunction when the moving party has effectively raised "serious questions on the merits," as opposed to the more arduous burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits, so long as the balance of hardships tips sharply in the their favor and they satisfy the other two Winter prongs.14 Regardless of whether the court chooses to adopt a sliding-scale approach, the moving party must "make a showing on all four prongs" of Winter to obtain a preliminary injunction.15 Ultimately, "[a] preliminary injunction ... should not be granted unless the movant[s], by a clear showing, carr[y] the burden of persuasion.’ "16
It also is important to note that a preliminary injunction can take two forms. A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and "preserve[s] the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits."17 A mandatory injunction "orders a responsible party to ‘take action.’ "18 A mandatory injunction " ‘goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo [p]endente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.’ "19 In cases such as this one, where a party seeks a mandatory injunction that goes well beyond maintaining the status quo, courts should be extremely cautious.20 When a mandatory preliminary injunction is requested, the district court should deny such relief " ‘unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.’ "21
The right to vote is a foundational and fundamental right, but a federal court cannot and should not interfere in a state election absent serious and compelling justification.22 Federal courts are "required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases."23 There are several aspects to litigation relating to election processes that require restraint from the court: (1) the fact-intensive character of disputes regarding election administration; (2) the democratic values at stake, which often are accompanied by impassioned partisan animus; and (3) the procedural posture, which often necessitates expedited consideration of an incomplete record. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that district courts "should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election."24
In evaluating voting schemes, the Court "must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury."26 The Court 27 While the State's "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" usually can be justified by important regulatory interests, strict scrutiny is required for more serious burdens.28
Although there is a heightened standard applicable in this matter, the prudent analytical path begins with an analysis of the four Winter prongs that Plaintiffs must establish.
The Court begins with the fourth prong: whether Plaintiffs have established that an injunction is in the public interest. Plaintiffs initially assert that the State has repeatedly and consistently advocated for the avoidance of public gatherings in an attempt to curb the spread of COVID-19. In a vacuum, that contention appears to be correct. However, rather than weave that assertion into...
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