Disability Rights Pa. v. Pa. Dep't of Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-737 |
| Parties | DISABILITY RIGHTS PENNSYLVANIA, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Chief Judge Conner)
Plaintiff Disability Rights Pennsylvania ("DRP") brings this lawsuit directly and in a representative capacity against defendants Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS") and several DHS officers and employees. Defendants move to dismiss DRP's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that DRP lacks standing and that it falls outside the relevant statutory zones of interest. We will deny defendants' motion.
DRP is a nonprofit Pennsylvania corporation that has brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its constituents who were allegedly injured while residing in the Commonwealth's Youth Development Centers ("Centers"). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 19). Defendants are DHS and various DHS officials and employees.1 (See id. ¶¶ 20-32). Each individual defendant is named in their official capacity. (See id. ¶¶ 21-32).
DHS established residential Centers in 1959. (Id. ¶ 33). DHS, through the Bureau of Juvenile Justice Services, operates the Commonwealth's three Centers: Loysville Youth Development Center, North Central Secure Treatment Unit, and South Mountain Secure Treatment Unit. (Id. ¶ 34). DHS is responsible for the management, operations, program planning, and oversight of these facilities. (Id.)
Center residents are juvenile offenders between the ages of 12 and 21. (Id. ¶ 40). Most Center residents have mental health, developmental, or intellectual disabilities. (Id. ¶ 42). The average resident lives at a Center between six and nine months, (id. ¶ 35), during which time the Center provides them with a variety of different treatments. The Centers specifically offer long-term services and othertailored programming, like mental health services and drug and alcohol rehabilitation. (Id. ¶ 36). Each Center aims to offer appropriate treatment, reformation, and rehabilitation, (id. ¶ 37), consistent with their statutory obligation to "provide for the care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development of children," (id. ¶ 38 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(1.1)); see also id. ¶ 39). DHS proclaims that all Center residents receive individualized treatment based on their respective strengths and needs. (Id. ¶ 45).
The Commonwealth has designated DRP as its protection and advocacy ("P&A") system under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act ("PAIMI Act"),2 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10807, and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("DD Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045. (Id. ¶ 19(a)). As a P&A system, DRP is subject to statutory requirements regarding its structure and management. (Id. ¶ 19(b)-(j)). It is also tasked with certain advocacy responsibilities on behalf of individuals with mental illness and intellectual or developmental disabilities. (Id.)
Pursuant to its statutory duties, DRP investigates potential abuse of those with mental illness and intellectual or developmental disabilities. (Id. ¶ 19(c) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 1386.19; 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801(b)(2)(B), 10805(a)(1)(A)). In or about September 2017, DRP learned of an alleged assault of a resident with a mental illness by staff at the Loysville Center. (Id. ¶ 84). DRP visited the Loysville Center in November 2017 and began an investigation. (Id. ¶ 86). Its employees interviewed residents and reviewed records at the Center, including videos of physical restraints of residents by Center staff. (Id.) It then expanded its investigation to include the Commonwealth's two other Centers. In December 2018, DRP visited the Loysville Center again, in addition to visiting the North Central and South Mountain Centers. (Id. ¶ 87-88). DRP staff interviewed residents at each facility and reviewed various records and documents relating to those facilities. (Id.) DRP diverted resources from its other activities to investigate defendants' alleged misconduct. (Id. ¶ 19(h)).
The investigation revealed the following:
Residents with disabilities suffered injuries as a result of this treatment, (id. ¶ 96), and lived in a hostile environment, (id. ¶¶ 105-16). In support of these allegations, DRP identifies 11 exemplar Center residents who claim Center staff abused them. (See id. ¶¶ 126-529).
DRP maintains that Center staff impeded or attempted to impede its investigation into alleged misconduct at the Centers. (See id. ¶¶ 543-63). The complaint specifically charges that Center staff tried to coerce Center residents into rescinding previously-signed records releases that would grant DRP access to the residents' confidential files. (Id. ¶¶ 543-56).
DRP interviewed and obtained records releases from 25 female residents while investigating the North Central Center in late November 2018. (Id. ¶ 543). DRP then requested the residents' records from defendant Seabrook. (Id. ¶ 544). According to DRP, just over a week later, defendants Swank, McDonald, Moore, Knittle, Sebastian, and John Does 1-10 "directed, intimidated and/or coerced female residents to write letters to DRP rescinding their authorizations for DRP to access their records." (Id. ¶ 545). DRP alleges that these defendants falsely informed residents that DRP was trying to shut down juvenile placements and that residents would be sent to adult jail if DRP was successful, that the releases would unseal the residents' records and make them publicly available, and that giving DRP access tothe records "would not be good for them." (Id. ¶¶ 546-48). DRP claims that these defendants provided residents with DRP's address and standard language to use in their rescission letters. (Id. ¶¶ 549, 550; see also id. ¶¶ 551-56).
DRP filed suit in this court in April 2019 asserting four statutory claims against the defendants in its own right and on behalf of its constituents. Defendants now move to dismiss DRP's complaint. Defendants' motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Such jurisdictional challenges take of one two forms: (1) parties may levy a "factual" attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the court's jurisdictional ken; or (2) they may assert a "facial" challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's allegations but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court's jurisdiction. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008)). In either instance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts "that allow[]the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678...
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