Disability Rights Tex. v. Pacillas

Docket NumberEP-21-CV-00211-DCG
Decision Date06 June 2023
PartiesDISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS,, v. PETER PACILLAS, in his official capacity as the interim Police Chief of the El Paso Police Department, .
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID C. GUADERRAMA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Disability Rights Texas (“DRTx”) moves for summary judgment on its claim against Defendant Peter Pacillas in his official capacity as the interim Chief of the El Paso Police Department (“EPPD”).[1]Mot., ECF No. 19; Reply, ECF No. 33. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DRTx requests declaratory and injunctive relief for Pacillas's alleged violation of the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (“PADD Act”),[2]42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (“PAIR Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794e (collectively, the “Protection and Advocacy Acts” or “P&A Acts”).[3]Mot. at 20; Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32-44. Pacillas opposes DRTx's Motion. Resp., ECF No. 31.

Like so many others, this case arises from an interaction-gone-wrong between law enforcement officers and an individual with mental illness.[4] E.C., who is DRTx's client, was experiencing a mental health crisis. At E.C.'s mother's request, EPPD dispatched officers to his home. EPPD officers arrived intending to apprehend and transport E.C. to a mental health facility. But that did not happen. After a short standoff, EPPD officers discharged three different weapons, striking and injuring E.C. with tasers beanbags, and a bullet. DRTx, invoking its investigatory authority under the P&A Acts, is investigating this incident as probable abuse and neglect that EPPD officers committed against E.C. As part of its investigation, DRTx has requested certain records from EPPD related to the incident. EPPD is withholding those records and asserting that DRTx lacks the authority under the P&A Acts to obtain them.

The Court first concludes there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to resolve. The Court then determines that the P&A Acts don't authorize DRTx to investigate abuse and neglect that EPPD officers allegedly committed against E.C. The Court therefore DENIES DRTx's Motion.

Because the Court concludes there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court is considering entering summary judgment in Pacillas's favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)(1). Before doing so, however the Court will give the parties an opportunity to object within 14 days.[5]

I. BACKGROUND
A. Protection and Advocacy Acts

In the 1980s, acting in response to what Congress characterized as widespread mistreatment of people with mental illness, Congress took several steps to better understand the problem and enhance protections for those individuals. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 99-109, at 1-3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361, 1361-63; see also Amanda Peters, Lawyers Who Break the Law: What Congress Can Do to Prevent Mental Health Patient Advocates from Violating Federal Legislation, 89 OR. L. REV. 133, 133-45 (2010) (reviewing history of treatment of people with mental illness and the enactment of PAIMI). Included in those steps was a nine-month investigation into the “conditions in state-operated facilities” that provided inpatient services for people with mental illness. S. Rep. No. 99-109, at 1-3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361, 1361-63. After that investigation, Congress found, among other things, that “individuals with mental illness are vulnerable to abuse and serious injury” and that “State systems for monitoring compliance with respect to the rights of individuals with mental illness var[ied] widely and [we]re frequently inadequate.” 42 U.S.C. § 10801(a)(1), (4).

So Congress identified a remedial measure. Each of the state-operated facilities Congress investigated had some type of internal advocacy system for patients, but Congress found that some facilities “were unable to investigate complaints adequately for various reasons” and that advocates had “limited authority” to “investigate certain complaints under state definitions of abuse and neglect.” S. Rep. No. 99-109, at 2-3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361, 1362-63. Advocates' limited authority, according to Congress, was “a serious impediment to effective protection of patients.” Id. at 1363. Congress thus concluded there was “a need for an advocacy system independent of any service provider.” Id. at 1362.

Enter PAIMI. Under its Spending Clause authority, Congress enacted PAIMI to (1) “ensure that the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected” and (2) help states “establish and operate a protection and advocacy system for individuals with mental illness.” 42 U.S.C. § 10801(b), Pub. L. No. 99-319, Title I, § 101 (1986). To receive funding under the Act, states must establish a protection and advocacy system (“P&A system” or “P&A organization”).[6]42 U.S.C. § 10804; see also Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 250 (2011). A state may choose to establish either a private nonprofit entity or a public institution as its P&A organization.[7] 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(c)(1), 15044. P&A organizations have a mission to, among other things, “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the [P&A] system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred.” Id. §§ 10801(b)(2)(B), 10805(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 15043(a)(2)(B).

As originally enacted, PAIMI limited P&A organizations' mission to protecting and advocating for people with mental illness living in residential or overnight facilities, such as mental health hospitals. Pub. L. No. 99-319, Title I, § 102(3)(B), 100 Stat. 478, 479 (1986) (covering “an inpatient or resident in a facility rendering care or treatment”). But after PADD and PAIMI's successes,[8]Congress twice expanded PAIMI's scope, once in 1988 and again in 2000. In 1988, Congress added to P&A organizations' purview the protection and advocacy of individuals with mental illness who are “in the process of being admitted” or are “being transported” to a mental health facility. Compare Pub. L. No. 99-319, Title I, § 102(3), 100 Stat. 478, 478-79 (1986), with Pub. L. No. 100-509, Title I, § 102(2)(C), 102 Stat. 2543, 2543 (1988).[9]The 2000 amendment “extend[ed] the responsibilities of the Protection and Advocacy program” to people with mental illness not living in inpatient or residential facilities. See S. Rep. No. 106-196, at 8 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 10802(4)(B)(ii). P&A organizations can now advocate for persons with mental illness who “live[] in a community setting, including their own home.”[10] 42 U.S.C. § 10802(4)(B)(ii).[11]

To ensure P&A organizations would effectively accomplish their missions, Congress specified their privileges and authorities by statute. First, Congress provided P&A organizations independence from state agencies that provide treatment or services to individuals with mental illness. Id. § 10805(a)(2). Second, Congress authorized P&A organizations to “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies” on behalf of individuals with mental illness, id. § 10805(a)(1)(B), to access facilities that provide care or treatment, id. § 10805(a)(3), and to access their clients' records, id. §§ 10805(a)(4), 10806.

DRTx demands documents from EPPD under the PAIMI's record-access provision, which gives P&A organizations “access to all records of any individual who is a client of the system.” 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4); see also Stewart, 563 U.S. at 250-51 ([A P&A system] must be given access to all records of individuals who may have been abused as well as other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation.” (quotations omitted)).

B. Factual Background[12]

Because this case raises novel questions about the scope of P&A organizations' authorities, some context is helpful. The Court will discuss the role EPPD plays in the community with respect to individuals with mental illness before turning to the incident that brought about this case.

1. EPPD's Role in the Community

In Texas, peace officers have the authority, under certain circumstances, to involuntarily detain people with mental illness.[13]Officers can detain people with mental illness with or without a warrant, subject to certain statutory requirements.[14] Officers' power is fairly broad. In the warrantless context, for example, only peace officers have the authority to detain someone with a mental illness.[15]Whether an officer detains someone with or without a warrant, the officer must immediately transport the person to a mental health facility.[16]EPPD calls the detention of a person with mental illness “emergency detention” and a warrant authorizing an emergency detention an “emergency detention order” (“EDO”).[17]

EPPD's own policies further explain how its officers should interact with people with mental illness. The Department's Procedures Manual includes instructions on emergency detention: “When officers have reason to believe a person poses a substantial risk of harm to themselves or others . . . they may take that person into custody for the purpose of obtaining an evaluation of the person's mental health and potential need for involuntary hospitalization.”[18]Consistent with Texas law, the Department's Procedures Manual instructs EPPD officers to transport the person to a “psychiatric facility.”[19] EPPD also trains its officers on how to interact with people with mental illness.[20]This training includes instruction on emergency detention (with and without a...

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