DiSanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2000
• Docket Number: INC,MCGRAW-HIL,Docket No. 99-9056
• Citation: 220 F.3d 61
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 2000) ROBERT J. DISANTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v./PLATT'S DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 61

220 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2000)

ROBERT J. DISANTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MCGRAW-HILL, INC./PLATT'S DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 99-9056

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 2000

Decided July 11, 2000

LEE NUWESRA, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

CLIFFORD R. ATLAS, New York, NY, (Vincent A. Cino, John A. Snyder II, Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FEINBERG, JACOBS and HALL,^* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The district court dismissed this employment claim, asserted under, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., on the ground that plaintiff failed to reconcile his application for Social Security disability benefits, which disclaimed ability to work, with the required showing under the ADA that he is able to perform essential job functions. We affirm.

I. Background

Plaintiff-appellant Robert J. DiSanto brought an action against his former employer, defendant-appellee McGraw-Hill, Inc./Platt's Division ("Platt's"), alleging that: (i) he was discharged because he is HIV-positive and suffers from depression, in violation of the ADA and the New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law 296; (ii) his disability was not accommodated, in violation of the ADA; and (iii) he was subjected to a hostile work environment, in violation of the ADA and NYHRL. After a trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Koeltl, J.), the jury found in the employer's favor on the failure to accommodate claim and on the hostile work environment claim, but in favor of DiSanto on his discriminatory discharge claim, and awarded $ 180,000 in back pay, $ 100,000 in compensatory damages and $ 1 million in punitive damages.

Platt's moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing, inter alia, that DiSanto failed to present a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the ADA or the NYHRL because he failed to prove that he could perform the essential functions of his job as a salesman.

Judge Koeltl ruled that DiSanto had not established a claim of discriminatory discharge under the NYHRL because: at the time of discharge, the NYHRL definition of "disability" was limited to "disabilities which do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held," N.Y. Exec. Law 292(21) (McKinney 1993) (amended 1997); employers had no duty under the NYHRL to provide disabled employees with reasonable accommodations; and the evidence presented at trial was "uncontested that [DiSanto] could not perform his job in a reasonable manner" when he was discharged, DiSanto v. McGraw Hill, Inc./Platt's Div., No. 97 Civ. 1090 (JGK), Tr. of Oral Decision at 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1999). DiSanto himself testified that he was not capable of working without an accommodation at the time of his discharge, and DiSanto's psychologist testified that DiSanto could not work at this time due to depression. See id. at 22.

The district court also ruled that DiSanto failed to establish discriminatory discharge under the ADA, reasoning that the statute protects only those individuals "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position," and DiSanto failed to show that he is in that protected class. Id. at 24-25 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 12111(8)). In support of its ruling, the district court relied on DiSanto's applications for Social Security benefits, in which he represented that he had been unable to work because of his disabling condition since July 30, 1994, well before his April 1995 discharge from Platt's. See id. at 26-27. In addition, in a May 1996 Social Security application, DiSanto cited his doctors' advice that "I am not well enough to work at present." Id. at 26. The district court found that DiSanto offered no explanation reconciling these statements with his contention at trial--crucial to recovery on the only claim on which he prevailed on the jury verdict--that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with an accommodation. See id. at 27. Finally, the district court stated that "any suggestion that [DiSanto] could have continued to work if some accommodation were made was rejected by the jury" in its finding in Platt's favor with respect to DiSanto's reasonable accommodation claim. Id.

On appeal, DiSanto argues that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law because: he in fact presented sufficient evidence that he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without an accommodation; and the statements in his Social Security applications, which were made more than a year after his discharge from Platt's, should not have been given controlling weight. DiSanto does not appeal the dismissal, pursuant to the jury verdict, of the hostile work environment and reasonable accommodation claims.

II. Discussion

This Court reviews the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, see Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1999), applying the same standards as the district court, see Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 1998); Stratton v. Department for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir. 1997). Those standards are well established:

Judgment as a matter of law may not properly be granted under Rule 50 unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in her favor. In deciding such a motion, the court must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and it may not itself weigh the credibility of witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence. Thus, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].

Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).

As the district court decided: (i) in order to prevail on the NYHRL claim, DiSanto was required to prove that he could perform his job in a reasonable manner, see N.Y. Exec. Law 292(21); and (ii) in order to prevail on the ADA claim, DiSanto was required to prove that he could perform the essential functions of his...