Disatell v. Smith

• Decision Date: 08 December 2021
• Docket Number: CA 21-282,CA 21-283
• Parties: STEPHANIE NICOLE DISATELL v. LANCE D. SMITH
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

STEPHANIE NICOLE DISATELL v. LANCE D. SMITH

Nos. CA 21-282, CA 21-283

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit

December 8, 2021

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO 256, 049 HONORABLE PATRICIA EVANS KOCH, DISTRICT JUDGE

E GREY BURNES TALLEY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: STEPHANIE NICOLE DISATELL

CANDACE WELLS-LOSAVIO COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: LANCE D. SMITH

Court composed of Billy H. Ezell, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar Judges.

BILLY H. EZELL, JUDGE

Stephanie Disatell Hart appeals the decision of the trial court below establishing the terms of the custody Lance Smith and his family exercise over the former couple's child. She also appeals evidentiary decisions made by the trial court and the allowing of Mr. Smith to claim Brody on his taxes every other year. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court.

Mrs Hart and Mr. Smith were never married, but had a child, Brody, born in 2013. Paternity was immediately acknowledged. When the couple separated in 2016, it began a long history of litigation concerning custody and child support. Several stipulations were entered into over the following years, as well as contempt motions and motions to modify both custody and child support. In March of 2020, Mr. Smith sought to modify custody, seeking to make up time he lost with his son while he was working out of state. On July 20, 2020, during a pretrial hearing, the pair entered a stipulation which was recited into the record in open court. Some issues, namely whether Mr. Smith would be allowed to claim Brody on his taxes in alternating years and whether he should receive a reduction in child support during summer months when he had him half the time, were in dispute and tabled for hearing at a later time. Soon thereafter, disputes arose concerning the agreement that had been reached and Mrs. Hart sought a hearing to resolve the alleged disputes. On December 9, 2020, the trial court issued a judgment based on the transcript of the July pretrial stipulation, allowing Mr. Smith's family to facilitate exchanges when he was unavailable due to work, and allowing his family to exercise his custodial periods when he was away. Mrs. Hart appeals that decision.

On December 14, 2020, the trial court held a hearing to determine the tax issue. Finding a prior stipulation granted Mr. Smith the right to claim Brody on his taxes in alternating years, the trial court ruled that the pattern should continue. Mrs. Hart also appeals that decision.

On appeal, Mrs. Hart asserts six assignments of error. She claims that the trial court erred in allegedly expanding the July 2020 stipulation on issues she claims were in dispute without a contradictory hearing. She also claims the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Smith's family to pick up or drop off Brody when Mr. Smith is out of town, in allowing any of Mr. Smith's family to exercise his custodial periods when he is out of town, and in ruling on her hearing regarding the allegedly disputed provisions without taking evidence. She also claims that the trial court erred in denying her discovery requests concerning Mr. Smith's work schedule and locations and in allowing Mr. Smith to claim Brody on his taxes every other year. We disagree.

Mrs. Hart's first four assignments of error concern the July 20, 2020 stipulation and the judgment of the trial court setting the oral recitation of that stipulation into written form. Because they overlap so greatly, we will address them together.

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between parties seeking an end to a lawsuit. La.Civ.Code art. 3071. A compromise must either be reduced in writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings. La.Civ.Code art. 3072. The agreement recited in open court confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form. Id. "The compromise has, as between the interested parties, a force equal to the authority of things adjudged." In re Succession of Cole, 12-802, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/12), 108 So.3d 240, 249, writ denied, 13-257 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 384.

They cannot be attacked on account of any error in law or any lesion, but an error in calculation may always be corrected. Autin-Germany v. Germany, 00-1924 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/01), 789 So.2d 608 (citing La.Civ.Code art. 3078). "A stipulation has the effect of binding all the parties and the court." Dolsen v. City of New Orleans, 559 So.2d 50, 52 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990).

Open court recitations where the parties agree to the stipulations offered by their respective attorneys constitute a binding compromise or agreement. Carlin v. Wallace, 00-2892 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 1017. "A declaration made by a party's attorney or mandatary has the same effect as one made by the party himself." C.T. Traina, Inc. v. Sunshine Plaza, Inc., 03-1003, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 156, 159; La.Civ.Code art. 1853. "[B]ecause a client speaks through his attorney in court, any statement made by the attorney is held to be an admission by the client. . . . [A] judicial confession is full proof against the party making it." Singleton v. Bunge Corp., 364 So.2d 1321, 1325 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1978). An admission by stipulation of counsel is of the strongest type. Irving v. E. Sondheimer Co., 126 So.2d 401 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1960).

Mrs. Hart argues that the trial court erred in allegedly supplementing the oral stipulation without a hearing or evidence. Specifically, she alleges that the trial court expanded the stipulation by allowing Mr. Smith's family to pick Brody up from school and in allowing his family to exercise his custodial periods if he is out of town for work. However, a plain reading of the transcript of the oral recitation of the stipulation shows these allegations are unfounded.

The transcript of the July 20, 2020 hearing begins with Mrs Hart's attorney stating that "we have a judgment, a consent judgment, and we're going to go through piece by piece." The attorneys then read from an agreement into the record, beginning by establishing a heightened Bergeron standard for custody alterations. Later, Mr. Smith's attorney states that "Lance's family shall be entitled to exercise any of his periods, period." Mrs. Hart begins to state she had believed it to be just Mr. Smith's mother, when her attorney states "Anyone in his family just like anyone in your family. . . . It's your time, anyone in your family can get him." Mrs. Hart then did not raise any concerns or objections to Mr. Smith's family having Brody during Mr. Smith's custody periods. She did not give any further indication that she did not understand what her counsel recited, nor any opposition after it was explained that his family was simply getting the same rights that were extended to hers. Her attorney was crystal clear in what was agreed to. Again, any...