Disbrow v. Secor

• Decision Date: 03 June 1889
• Citation: 58 Conn. 35,18 A. 981
• Parties: DISBROW v. SECOR et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

18 A. 981

58 Conn. 35

DISBROW

v. SECOR et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 3, 1889.

Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; F ENN, Judge.

Suit by W. E. Disbrow against J. B. Secor, L. F. Curtis, and Edward Moran for interpleader as to the ownership of certain pictures. The court awarded the property to Curtis and Secor. Moran appeals.

A. Thain, (D. F. Hollister, of counsel,) for appellant. J. C. Chamberlain, for respondent Jerome B. Secor. C. Thompson, for respondent L. F. Curtis.

BEARDSLET, J. The court finds that D. P. Secord, with whom the claimant Moran entered into the agreement to exchange the pictures in question for the real estate, falsely represented to Moran that the real estate was the property of one Taylor, while in fact it was his own; and that Moran, relying upon such representation, confided in the statements of Secord regarding the property, and made him his agent to procure it for him; and that Secord, while professing to act as such agent, and for the best interests of Moran, was selling his own property to him for the best price he could get.

The first claim of Moran is that the agreement of exchange was void by reason of this fraud of Secord. The rule of law unquestionably is that one undertaking to act as agent for another cannot, in the matter to which his agency relates, act for himself. He cannot, if employed to purchase from another be himself the seller. If he does so, it is the right of the principal, upon learning it, to rescind the contract, and reclaim whatever he has paid as the consideration of the purchase. But the sale is not void. The principal may, if he will, retain the property so sold; and, if he does so, he cannot, of course, reclaim the consideration paid. Chit. Cont. 815; 1 Benj. Sales, 568; Brown v. Pierce, 97 Mass. 46; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307.

But Moran claims that if the agreement in question is voidable only, and not void, he had avoided it by exercising his right to rescind it, and that thereby the title to the pictures vested in him. The facts to which we have referred in connection with the claim of Moran would, if standing alone, have entitled him to annul the contract, but they are complicated with another fact which might raise a question as to his right to do so. Moran employed Secord as his agent to exchange his pictures for real estate, believing that Taylor owned the real estate, and that Taylor had employed him to dispose of it for the pictures, and had intrusted him with the selection and valuation of the pictures. Moran paid Secord for promoting his interest in the bargain, which he must have believed could be done only at the expense of his supposed employer's interest. It seems clear that, if Secord's story in relation to his agency for Taylor had been true, Taylor would have been entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds of a corrupt combination between Moran and Taylor's agent. We do not decide whether, upon the facts, Moran would have had a right to rescind. The question was not raised upon the argument, and is immaterial to a decision of the case, because, aside from this, Moran has not rescinded the contract. The finding is that he fully...