Disciplinary Counsel v. Spadoni

Decision Date20 September 2022
Docket NumberAC 44826
Citation215 Conn.App. 249,282 A.3d 1020
Parties DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. Charles B. SPADONI
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Charles B. Spadoni, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Paul C. Jensen, Jr., assistant bar counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, and Elizabeth M. Rowe, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant, Charles B. Spadoni, an attorney suspended from the practice of law, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for reinstatement to the bar of this state. On appeal, the defendant claims that the three judge panel of the Superior Court considering the defendant's application for reinstatement to the bar improperly accepted the report and recommendation of the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar for New Haven County (committee) because (1) the committee exceeded the scope of its investigative authority by inquiring as to the defendant's presuspension misconduct, and (2) the committee improperly found that the defendant failed to accept his federal conviction for obstruction of justice with sincerity and honesty. We disagree with the defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth in the court's memorandum of decision, are relevant to this appeal.1 "The [defendant] was admitted to the Connecticut bar on May 3, 1977.... In 1997, the [defendant] was hired as the general counsel for a Boston based private equity firm, Triumph Capital Group [Inc.] (Triumph). United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc. , 544 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2008). Triumph managed some of the investments of the state pension funds. Id., at 152–53. Certain investments made by the state pension funds with Triumph, contributions made by Triumph to the state Republican party and contracts Triumph had with Republican candidate Paul Silvester's campaign staffers came under federal scrutiny. Id., at 153. In connection with that scrutiny, on January 9, 2001, the [defendant] was indicted by a federal grand jury for committing various crimes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), [ 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ]. Id., at 156.

"On July 16, 2003, a jury found the [defendant] guilty of [racketeering, racketeering conspiracy] obstructing justice, bribery and [wire] fraud. Id., at 156. The [defendant] was sentenced principally to concurrent [thirty-six] month terms of imprisonment on all counts and a $50,000 fine. Id., at 158. Thereafter, the [defendant] appealed. On appeal, the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Second Circuit found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, which found the [defendant] guilty of [racketeering, racketeering conspiracy] bribery, wire fraud and obstruction of justice. Id., at 160, 169. The Second Circuit ordered a new trial on the racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery and wire fraud charges on the ground that the government unconstitutionally suppressed material exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Id., at 165. The Second Circuit did not order a new trial on the obstruction of justice charges, stating that, [e]ven if the suppressed notes had an impeaching effect so strong as to call into question Silvester's testimony on other matters, the government's evidence of [the defendant's] obstruction of justice was overwhelming. In light of the forensic examiner's detailed testimony regarding the suspicious timing of the deletion of relevant files from [the defendant's] laptop using Destroy-It! software, and its corroboration with [Robert] Trevisani's testimony about [the defendant's] mention of Destroy-It! as software to be used in order to hide something ... we do not think that the suppression of [Special] Agent [Charles E.] Urso's notes raises a reasonable probability that the verdict on the obstruction of justice count would have been different. ... Id., at 165 n.13.

"On November 10, 2008, the [defendant] and the government both filed motions for rehearing, and, on November 21, 2008, the Second Circuit denied both motions. The mandate issued on January 12, 2009. On November 16, 2009, the [defendant] served a copy of a motion to recall the mandate on the government, which was summarily denied by the Second Circuit on December 18, 2009. On September 15, 2011, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut resentenced the [defendant] to two years of incarceration, a $50,000 fine and three years of supervised release. On July 9, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction for obstruction of justice. United States v. Spadoni , 479 Fed. Appx. 392, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1019, 133 S. Ct. 625, 184 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2012). The [defendant's] license to practice law in Connecticut was suspended from January 31, 2007, through September 9, 2016." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

On April 19, 2017, the defendant filed in the Superior Court an application for reinstatement to the bar pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53. On May 9, 2017, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53 (f), the defendant's application was referred to the committee. On February 20, 2019, the committee held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's application, at which the defendant was present and permitted to testify. At the reinstatement hearing, the defendant refused to answer direct questions regarding his conduct during or surrounding the events that resulted in his racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud convictions, which were reversed on appeal. Specifically, the defendant "took the position that any conduct which did not result in his conviction of a crime was off limits for [the committee] in assessing his character and fitness to practice law."2

Further, when asked by committee member Howard K. Levine whether "the inquiry into [the defendant's] present moral fitness [allowed] ... the committee to look into matters that are not the subject of grievances or criminal convictions," the defendant responded: "On a going forward basis, you have full rein, plenary power to do—whatever my moral fitness is. But ... in terms of moral fitness, it's really limited to the presuspension. It's the conviction and it's not—you cannot then use a conviction and then go back and try to resurrect or investigate ... conduct that ... didn't result in a conviction." The committee asked if the defendant would reconsider his refusal to answer its questions, but the defendant refused and stood on his objection.3

Before the committee, the defendant also stated affirmatively that he believed that he was innocent of any wrongdoing and that he had not committed the crime of obstruction of justice, even though his conviction on that charge had been affirmed on appeal. In support of his belief, the defendant testified that the Second Circuit "articulated no factual predicate that exists in the trial evidence for its holding that the jury had sufficient evidence to find [the defendant] guilty of obstructing justice." The defendant focused his direct testimony on multiple exhibits, including contracts, transcripts from the criminal trial, and affidavits that he argued demonstrated his innocence. Additionally, on cross-examination, the defendant stated that there was "insufficient evidence to find [him] guilty because ... the finding of sufficiency was based on ... [nonexistent] evidence, and the allegation that ... [he] failed to turn over a disk that had been called for ... by a subpoena is not based on fact."

Ultimately, on February 5, 2021, the committee issued its written report in which it recommended that the defendant's application for reinstatement be denied because the defendant failed to meet the standards for good moral character to practice law as set forth in Practice Book § 2-5A. Specifically, the committee recommended that the defendant should not be reinstated because he "blatantly refused to accept his wrongdoing." The committee noted that, although the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's convictions of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, the court rejected the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on those charges. Consequently, the committee concluded that inquiry regarding the defendant's conduct surrounding these charges was relevant because "these offenses [are] antithetical to the qualities necessary for an attorney to maintain the trust of the public. Engaging in such conduct evinces a lack of moral character, honesty and respect for the public, law enforcement and the judiciary which should be inherent to all members of the bar." The committee was not persuaded that the Second Circuit's reversal of the defendant's convictions on these charges "negates the nature and seriousness of the original jury findings to the point where the committee should not consider and place considerable weight on them." The committee, therefore, concluded that the defendant's failure to answer questions about those charges demonstrated that he lacked "honesty and candor" and "deprived the committee [of] the opportunity even to assess whether whatever conduct he may have engaged in leading up to his suspension did or did not uphold the requirement that the [defendant] be of good moral character. ... [I]t is the [defendant's] lack of candor and honesty in refusing to answer that leads the committee to find that the [defendant] has not met his burden of proving he is of good moral character." (Footnotes omitted.)

Additionally, the committee found that "[t]he [defendant's] conviction for obstruction of justice strikes at the heart of public trust in the legal profession. Recognizing that the [defendant] continues to profess his innocence, the conviction stands and details his...

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