Disciplinary Counsel v. Spadoni
Decision Date | 20 September 2022 |
Docket Number | AC 44826 |
Citation | 215 Conn.App. 249,282 A.3d 1020 |
Parties | DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. Charles B. SPADONI |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Charles B. Spadoni, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Paul C. Jensen, Jr., assistant bar counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, and Elizabeth M. Rowe, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant, Charles B. Spadoni, an attorney suspended from the practice of law, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for reinstatement to the bar of this state. On appeal, the defendant claims that the three judge panel of the Superior Court considering the defendant's application for reinstatement to the bar improperly accepted the report and recommendation of the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar for New Haven County (committee) because (1) the committee exceeded the scope of its investigative authority by inquiring as to the defendant's presuspension misconduct, and (2) the committee improperly found that the defendant failed to accept his federal conviction for obstruction of justice with sincerity and honesty. We disagree with the defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history, as set forth in the court's memorandum of decision, are relevant to this appeal.1 "The [defendant] was admitted to the Connecticut bar on May 3, 1977.... In 1997, the [defendant] was hired as the general counsel for a Boston based private equity firm, Triumph Capital Group [Inc.] (Triumph). United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc. , 544 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2008). Triumph managed some of the investments of the state pension funds. Id., at 152–53. Certain investments made by the state pension funds with Triumph, contributions made by Triumph to the state Republican party and contracts Triumph had with Republican candidate Paul Silvester's campaign staffers came under federal scrutiny. Id., at 153. In connection with that scrutiny, on January 9, 2001, the [defendant] was indicted by a federal grand jury for committing various crimes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), [ 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ]. Id., at 156.
On April 19, 2017, the defendant filed in the Superior Court an application for reinstatement to the bar pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53. On May 9, 2017, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53 (f), the defendant's application was referred to the committee. On February 20, 2019, the committee held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's application, at which the defendant was present and permitted to testify. At the reinstatement hearing, the defendant refused to answer direct questions regarding his conduct during or surrounding the events that resulted in his racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud convictions, which were reversed on appeal. Specifically, the defendant "took the position that any conduct which did not result in his conviction of a crime was off limits for [the committee] in assessing his character and fitness to practice law."2
Further, when asked by committee member Howard K. Levine whether "the inquiry into [the defendant's] present moral fitness [allowed] ... the committee to look into matters that are not the subject of grievances or criminal convictions," the defendant responded: The committee asked if the defendant would reconsider his refusal to answer its questions, but the defendant refused and stood on his objection.3
Before the committee, the defendant also stated affirmatively that he believed that he was innocent of any wrongdoing and that he had not committed the crime of obstruction of justice, even though his conviction on that charge had been affirmed on appeal. In support of his belief, the defendant testified that the Second Circuit "articulated no factual predicate that exists in the trial evidence for its holding that the jury had sufficient evidence to find [the defendant] guilty of obstructing justice." The defendant focused his direct testimony on multiple exhibits, including contracts, transcripts from the criminal trial, and affidavits that he argued demonstrated his innocence. Additionally, on cross-examination, the defendant stated that there was "insufficient evidence to find [him] guilty because ... the finding of sufficiency was based on ... [nonexistent] evidence, and the allegation that ... [he] failed to turn over a disk that had been called for ... by a subpoena is not based on fact."
Ultimately, on February 5, 2021, the committee issued its written report in which it recommended that the defendant's application for reinstatement be denied because the defendant failed to meet the standards for good moral character to practice law as set forth in Practice Book § 2-5A. Specifically, the committee recommended that the defendant should not be reinstated because he "blatantly refused to accept his wrongdoing." The committee noted that, although the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's convictions of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, the court rejected the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on those charges. Consequently, the committee concluded that inquiry regarding the defendant's conduct surrounding these charges was relevant because The committee was not persuaded that the Second Circuit's reversal of the defendant's convictions on these charges "negates the nature and seriousness of the original jury findings to the point where the committee should not consider and place considerable weight on them." The committee, therefore, concluded that the defendant's failure to answer questions about those charges demonstrated that he lacked "honesty and candor" and (Footnotes omitted.)
Additionally, the committee found that ...
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