Discovery House v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, IP 97-0480-C-B/S.
Citation | 970 F.Supp. 655 |
Decision Date | 18 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. IP 97-0480-C-B/S.,IP 97-0480-C-B/S. |
Parties | DISCOVERY HOUSE, INC., Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS; and Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals at Marion County, Indiana, Defendant. |
Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of Indiana) |
Robert P. Kennedy, Merrillville, IN, for Plaintiff.
John T. Roy, Stephenson Daly Morow & Kurnik, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
ENTRY
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Discovery House, Inc.'s ("Discovery House") Amended Verified Motion for Preliminary Injunction and on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted and Discovery House's declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims are dismissed with prejudice and its monetary damages claims are dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is also denied.
Discovery House is an organization which operates outpatient methadone treatment centers for persons addicted to drugs. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 4). On October 20, 1995, Discovery House received a letter from the Department of Metropolitan Development stating that Discovery House's proposed use of property at 5626 E. 16th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, as a methadone treatment center would be proper under the area's Hospital District Two ("HD-2") zoning designation.1 Thereafter, Discovery House entered into a lease at 5626 E. 16th street and made improvements in preparation for the operation of a methadone treatment facility at that address
On June 5, 1996, the Department of Metropolitan Development received a petition challenging it's previous determination that a methadone treatment facility was a proper use in an HD-2 zoning district. On July 16, 1996, the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals ("MBZA") held a public hearing on the matter. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence on the matter, the MBZA reversed the Department of Metropolitan Development's initial approval of Discovery House's proposed use of the 16th Street property, and determined instead that a methadone treatment facility was not a permitted use in an HD-2 zoning district. On August 15, 1996, Discovery House appealed the MBZA's decision by filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Marion County Superior Court, pursuant to Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1003.2 In its certiorari petition, Discovery House alleged that the MBZA decision was illegal in the following respects:
1) the decision was contrary to the plain language of the HD-2 zoning ordinance permitting the operation of "offices for physicians, dentists and other professions dealing with public health," "pharmacies," and "other similar hospital-related or oriented uses;"
2) the decision unlawfully discriminates against a public health facility which distributes methadone for treatment of an illness;
3) the decision discriminates against individuals with disabilities and against a public health facility which provides a supervised rehabilitation program, in violation of the American Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. [a]nd the Rehabilitation [A]ct, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and
4) the decision deprives Discovery House of its interest in property without due process of law in violation of Indiana Constitution, Article 1, § 12 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and denies Discovery House and its patients equal protection of the law in violation of the Indiana Constitution Article I, § 23 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, ¶ 20).
On April 21, 1997, Discovery House filed in this Court its Amended Complaint and Amended Verified Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Amended Complaint alleges that the MBZA's determination that a methadone treatment center was not an approved use under the HD-2 zoning ordinance
1) discriminated against Discovery House on account of its treatment of and association with individuals with disabilities in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act (Amended Complaint, Counts I and II);
2) violated the Equal Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution "because the determination was arbitrary and the ordinance was applied and enforced with a discriminatory intent and purpose." (Amended Complaint, Count III); and
3) constitutes an unjust taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Indiana Constitution. (Amended Complaint, Count IV).
Discovery House requests injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment declaring that a methadone treatment facility is a permitted use in an HD-2 zoning district under the zoning ordinance, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs, and "all other appropriate relief under the circumstances." (Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief, at 9-10).
Defendants have moved to dismiss Discovery House's Amended Complaint under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. We decline to assert jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to the doctrine of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny, and accordingly dismiss Discovery House's Amended Complaint without deciding whether dismissal would be appropriate under any of the other grounds raised by Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss.
Whether we should dismiss Discovery House's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) standards is not immediately apparent, since abstaining from exercising jurisdiction is neither a finding that jurisdiction is lacking nor that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In ruling on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.1992). The standards for ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) differ from the 12(b)(6) standards in that the court may consider materials outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. English v. Cowell, 10 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir.1993). Thus, in ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, we may look both to the allegations in the complaint and to other materials relating to the issue of the court's jurisdiction. We need not decide here which standard to apply in determining whether to dismiss Discovery House's Amended Complaint under the doctrine of Younger abstention, for we need look no further than the Complaint and the applicable statutes and case law in order to determine whether Younger abstention is appropriate in this case.
The doctrine of abstention under Younger and its progeny embodies "a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2520, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger abstention rests upon the notion of "comity," which includes "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750). This notion of "comity" requires that federal courts "presume that state courts are capable of establishing and administering judicial process consistent with the requirements of the federal constitution, and `that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.'" Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 954-55 (7th Cir., 1996) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1528, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987)).
Over time, a three-part test has emerged for determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate in a given case:
(1) the judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings must be on-going;
(2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; and
(3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise constitutional challenges.
Trust & Investment Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521).
Discovery House argues first that Younger abstention does not apply here because it does not seek relief which enjoins or affects its appeal of the MBZA's decision in Marion Superior Court. This argument is entirely without merit. It is well-established that Younger abstention applies not only where a federal court action seeks to directly enjoin a pending state court action, but also where "important state interests" are involved. Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. Thus, so long as each prong of the three-prong test described above is met, Younger abstention is appropriate.
Discovery House concedes that state court proceedings are ongoing, but asserts that neither the second nor third prong is met in this case. We shall address each of these two requirements in turn.
Whether the State Proceeding Involves Important State Interests.
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