Dishman v. W. Virginia-American Water Co.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-0066 |
| Parties | EARL DISHMAN, ADAM WELLMAN, ARLIE CRANE, and UTILITY WORKERS' UNITED ASSOCIATION,LOCAL 537, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs Arlie Crane, Earl Dishman Adam Wellman, and Utility Workers' United Association Local 537's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 48) and Defendant West Virginia-American Water Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50). For the reasons herein Defendant's Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.
Defendant West Virginia-American Water Company (“WVAWC”) is a public utilities corporation operating in West Virginia. Am. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff Utility Workers' United Association, Local 537 (“the Union”) is the certified collective bargaining agent for WVAWC's Huntington District unit. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs Earl Dishman, Adam Wellman, and Arlie Crane were WVAWC Huntington District unit employees who were represented by the Union for collective bargaining purposes. Id. ¶ 8.
Until September 2018, the Utilities Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, System Local 537 (“the predecessor Union”) represented the WVAWC's Huntington employees for collective bargaining purposes. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The predecessor Union was certified by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for those employees. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. On September 5, 2018, one of Defendant's employees filed a Petition for Decertification, leading the NLRB to decertify the predecessor Union and instead certify Plaintiff Union as the representative after elections. Id. ¶¶ 4, 12.
The predecessor Union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Defendant. Id. ¶ 11. When the NLRB certified Plaintiff as the new collective bargaining representative, it ordered that, from the date of certification, WVAWC was legally forbidden to make any unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employees. Id. ¶ 13-16. This “status quo” is required by law to remain in place between the Union and the Defendant until they either arrive at an impasse in their collective bargaining negotiations or agree on a new CBA. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14. During negotiations, WVAWC is required to honor the terms and conditions of the status quo stemming from the original CBA, which include a requirement that no discipline or discharge from employment may occur unless just cause for either action exists. Id. ¶ 16.
Three individuals, plaintiffs Earl Dishman, Adam Wellman, and Arlie Crane, were employees of WVAWC at the time of the original CBA and during the transition period. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. On July 30, 2020, these individuals were either disciplined or discharged, allegedly in violation of the just cause provision. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 33-34, 40-41. Mr. Dishman was discharged, while Mr. Wellman and Mr. Crane were issued disciplinary letters. Id. ¶¶ 26, 37, 44. Since this incident, Mr. Wellman is no longer employed by WVAWC, and WVAWC has removed the notice of discipline from Mr. Crane's record. Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 49 at 4 n.1. In April 2022, WVAWC and the Union ratified a new CBA. Id. at 3; Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 51 at 5.
Plaintiffs filed suit on January 26, 2021, alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of their employment. Compl., ECF No. 1; see Am. Compl. As of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs presented two theories for recovery: (1) that they could enforce the status quo created under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) as a contract implied-in-law and (2) alternatively that they had an enforceable “limited express agreement” with WVAWC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim concerning the status quo, as NLRB precedent demonstrates that the status quo obligation is statutory-not contractual-in nature. Mem. Op. and Order Den. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 11-12. However, this Court found that the allegations in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint created “a factual issue about what parties have agreed to, and whether a contract is in existence.” Id. at 13. Both Plaintiffs and Defendant have filed Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 48 & 50) on the issue of whether a contractual agreement existed concerning the just cause standard at the time of the disciplinary incident.
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
And yet, the nonmoving party must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has not met the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case after allowing adequate time for discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy the burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
As a preliminary matter, all parties agree that the claims of Mr. Wellman and Mr. Crane have been rendered moot by subsequent events. Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 n.1; Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4; Pls.' Reply to Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 1. Mr. Wellman is no longer employed by WVAWC, and WVAWC has removed the notice of discipline from Mr. Crane's record. See Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. Thus, neither of them has a current cognizable case or controversy which this Court could adjudicate. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S.Ct. 792, 796 (2021) (discussing mootness). The Court therefore GRANTS the Defendants' unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment as to Mr. Wellman and Mr. Crane.
Turning to the remaining claim, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) requires that Plaintiffs demonstrate that there was a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301(a) “provides for suits in the district courts for violation of collective-bargaining contracts between labor organizations and employers.” Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 561 (1976). Section 301 broadly encompasses violation of contracts struck between employers and labor organizations, not just violation of CBAs. Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Loc. Unions Nos. 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26 (1962) (concerning a strike settlement agreement); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Facetglas, Inc., 845 F.2d 1250, 1253 (4th Cir. 1988) (). Courts apply the federal common law of contracts when adjudicating the existence of a contract for the purposes of Section 301, often looking to the Restatements to determine general principles of contract law. Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc. 625 v. Nitro Constr. Servs., Inc., 27 F.4th 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2022).
The parties do not dispute that no CBA existed between them at the time of the disciplinary incident. Am. Compl. ¶ 15; Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J at 9. Plaintiffs claim that a separate “limited express agreement” was struck between the parties on the issue of requiring just cause for disciplining employees, prior to the disciplinary incident, which this Court may treat as a contract for the purposes of Section 301. Pls. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 9. However, the NLRB has held that tentative agreements made during collective bargaining negotiations are not binding on the parties until a final bargaining agreement is reached. See Sec. Walls, Inc. & Int'l Union, Sec. Police & Fire Pros. of Am., 365 NLRB No. 99, 5 (June 15, 2017); Taylor Warehouse Corp., 314 NLRB 516, 517 (1994), enf'd 98 F.3d 892 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Under Board law, tentative agreements made during the course of contract negotiations are not final and binding.”). Yet, the Fourth Circuit has noted that parties' manifestations of intent may create a contract despite the absence of a completed CBA. See Cumberland Typographical Union No. 244 v. Times & Alleganian Co., 943 F.2d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 1991). Similarly, in some situations an employer may be bound by a contract it has not signed if it has, by its conduct, manifested an intent to abide by it. N.L.R.B. v. Haberman Const. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1981); Super Save, 273 NLRB 20, 29 (1984). Therefore, finding that it was theoretically possible for a “limited express agreement” struck during the CBA-bargaining process to be enforced under Section 301, this Court allowed Plaintiffs' disputed factual claim of an enforceable “limited express agreement” to survive Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and proceed to discovery. Mem. Op. and Order Den. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 13.
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