Distilling & Cattle-Feeding Co. v. Barnwolt

• Decision Date: 28 March 1896
• Citation: 43 N.E. 779,161 Ill. 101
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: DISTILLING & CATTLE-FEEDING CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. BARNWOLT, County Treasurer.

161 Ill. 101

43 N.E. 779

DISTILLING & CATTLE-FEEDING CO.

v.PEOPLE ex rel. BARNWOLT, County Treasurer.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 28, 1896.

Appeal from Peoria county court; Robert H. Lovett, Judge.

Application by A. H. Barnwolt, as county treasurer, for judgment against a lot owned by the Distilling & Cattle-Feeding Company, for the amount of tax assessed on the capital stock of such company. There was a judgment for relator, and defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Stevens, Horton & Abbott, for appellant.

R. J. Cooney and F. J. Quinn, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the county court rendered upon the application of the county collector against lot 8, block 15, in the original town of Peoria, for the amount of the tax assessed by the state board of equalization upon the capital stock of the appellant company. Appellant refused to pay the tax, and the assessor returned it as a charge against said lot, which belongs to appellant. The objections filed by appellant to the application for judgment were overruled, and exception was taken. The appellant resists the payment of the tax assessed against its capital stock by the state board of equalization, upon the alleged ground that it is a corporation organized for purely manufacturing purposes.

If the appellant was, at the time its capital stock was assessed, a company organized for purely manufacturing purposes, then the board of equalization had no power to make the assessment; for, under clause 4 of section 3 of the revenue act, ‘the capital stock, including the franchise, of all incorporations organized for pecuniary profit, is required to be assessed by the state board of equalization, except corporations organized for purely manufacturing purposes, or for printing, or for publishing of newspapers, or for the improving and breeding of stock, which are to be assessed by the local assessors, in the same manner as the property of individuals.’ Coal Co. v. Finlen, 124 Ill. 666, 17 N. E. 11;Coke Co. v. Downey, 127 Ill. 201, 20 N. E. 20. In order to determine whether the appellant company was organized for purely manufacturing purposes or not, it will be necessary to compare the language of its charter with the language of the statute upon this subject. Said clause 4, so far as it is necessary to quote it for the purposes of this case, is as follows: ‘Fourth. The capital stock of all companies and associations now or hereafter created under the laws of this state (except those required to be assessed by the local assessors, which is hereinafter provided for) shall be so valued by the state board of equalization as to ascertain and determine, respectively, the fair cash value of such capital stock, including the franchise, over and above the assessed value of the tangible property of such company or association: * * * Provided, that in all cases where the tangible property or capital stock * * * is assessed under this act, the shares of capital stock of any such company or association shall not be assessed or taxed in this state: * * * Provided, further, that companies and associations organized for purely manufacturing purposes * * * shall be assessed by the local assessors in like manner as the property of individuals is required to be assessed.’ The appellant company was incorporated under the general incorporation act of this state on February 11, 1890, with a capital stock of $35,000,000. The object of its formation, as specified in clause 2 of its charter, was as follows: ‘(2) The object for which it is formed is to carry on a general business of distilling, re-distilling, and rectifying high wines, alcohol, spirits, gins, and whiskies of every kind and description, and deal in the same, in the state of Illinois and elsewhere, and owning the property necessary for that purpose; also, to engage in feeding and dealing in cattle and other live stock; also, malting, dealing in malt, and doing any other business incident to the main purposes of this corporation.’ It goes without saying that the purpose for which a corporation is organized must be ascertained by reference to the terms of its charter; and it seems to be clear, upon a careful examination of the terms of clause 2 of the charter as above quoted, that it was not organized for purely manufacturing purposes. ‘Feeding and dealing in cattle and other live stock’ is not manufacturing. Under the clause which permits the company ‘to engage in feeding and dealing in cattle and other live stock,’ it can buy and sell cattle and other live stock in such manner as it pleases, even to the extent of operating a butcher shop. We think that, upon a fair construction of the charter, the appellant company was not organized for purely manufacturing purposes, but for other purposes, distinct and separate from pure manufacturing, and that, therefore, its capital stock was subject to taxation...