District of Columbia v. Colts
Decision Date | 24 November 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 96,96 |
Citation | 75 L.Ed. 177,51 S.Ct. 52,282 U.S. 63 |
Parties | DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. COLTS |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Robert E. Lynch, William W. Bride, and Robert P. Reeder, all of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 64-68 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Wm. B. O'Connell, Harry T. Whelan, and Louis L. Whitestone, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
An information filed in the Police Court of the District of Columbia charged the respondent, Colts, with having operated upon various streets, contrary to the statute set frth below, 'a certain motor vehicle at a greater rate of speed than twenty-two miles an hour over said public highway(s) recklessly, that is to say at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and proper, having regard to the width of said public highway(s), the use thereof, and the traffic thereon, in such manner and condition so as to endanger property and individuals.' Respondent was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and demanded a trial by jury. The demand was denied, and he was put upon trial before the judge without a jury and found guilty. Upon writ of error the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the judgment, holding that respondent, under the federal Constitution, was entitled to a jury trial. With that conclusion we agree.
The acts of Congress passed for the government of the District provide that prosecutions in the police court shall be on information; that where the accused would be entitled to a jury trial under the Constitution, trial shall be by jury unless waived; and that in cases where the accused would not by force of the Constitution be entitled to a trial by jury, trial shall be by the court without a jury, unless, in cases where the fine or penalty may be more than $300 or imprisonment more than ninety days, the accused shall demand a trial by jury, in which case the trial shall be by jury. D. C. Code (1930), title 18, c. 4, § 165.
Section 9 of the District of Columbia Traffic Act 1925, as amended, D. C. Code (1930), title 6, c. 9, § 246, provides:
'(a) No vehicle shall be operated upon any public highway in the District at a speed greater than twenty-two miles per hour except in such outlying districts and upon such highways as the director may designate. * * *
'(b) No individual shall operate a motor vehicle over any public highway in the District (1) recklessly; or (2) at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width of the public highway, the use thereof, and the traffic thereon; or (3) so as to endanger any property or individual; or (4) so as unnecessarily or unreasonably to damage the public highway.
'(c) Any individual violating any provision of this section where the offense constitutes reckless driving shall, upon conviction for the first offense, be fined not less than $25 nor more than $100 or imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more than 30 days; and upon conviction for the second or any subsequent offense such individual shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, and shall be imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than one year, and the clerk of the court shall certify forthwith such conviction to the director, who shall thereupon revoke the operator's permit of such individual.
'(d) Any individual violating any provision of this section except where the offense constitutes reckless driving, shall, upon conviction for the first offense, be fined not less than $5 nor more than $25; upon conviction for the second offense, such individual shall be fined not less than $25 nor more than $100; upon conviction for the third offense or any subsequent offense such individual shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500, and shall be imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than one year, and the clerk of the court shall certify forthwith such conviction to the director, who shall thereupon revoke the operator's permit of such individual.'
It will be seen that the respondent is not charged merely with the comparatively slight offense of exceeding the twenty-two mile limit of speed, subdivision (a), or merely with driving recklessly, subdivision (b)(1); but with the grave offense of having driven at the forbidden rate of speed and recklessly, 'so as to endanger property and individuals.'
By section 165 of title 18 of the D. C. Code, outlined above, the Constitution is made the test-as, of course, it must be-to...
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