District of Columbia v. Tench Ringgold, Esq Marshal of the District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 01 January 1831
• Citation: District of Columbia v. Tench Ringgold, Esq Marshal of the District of Columbia, 30 U.S. 451, 5 Pet. 451, 8 L.Ed. 188 (1831)
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. TENCH RINGGOLD, ESQ. MARSHAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

30 U.S. 451

5 Pet. 451

8 L.Ed. 188

THE LEVY COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, IN THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

v. TENCH RINGGOLD, ESQ. MARSHAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

January Term, 1831

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the county of Washington.

The case was argued by Mr Key for the appellants; and by Mr Swann for the appellee.

Mr Justice THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was a summary proceeding in the circuit court of the district of Columbia, on the application of the levy court of Washington county, against the marshal of the district, to recover their proportion of the fines, forfeitures and penalties collected, or which it is alleged ought to have been collected, by the marshal, and paid over to the levy court, under the provisions of the second section of the act of congress, supplementary to the act entitled, 'an act concerning the district of Columbia,' passed 3d of March 1801. Burch's Dig. 233.

The account containing the claim on the part of the plaintiffs was referred to the auditor to examine and receive testimony thereon, and report to the court. By his first report a balance of three hundred and sixty-four dollars forty-six cents was found in favour of the marshal. Exceptions were taken to this report, and the account was again referred to the auditor, with directions to disallow eight hundred and fourteen dollars ninety-five cents, which in the first report had been allowed for the repairs of the jail; and upon the second report a balance of six hundred and thirteen dollars thirty-one cents was found against the marshal.

To this report exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs; but disallowed by the court; and judgment rendered for the balance reported by the auditor. Upon which a writ of error has been brought to this court, and the exceptions taken have been presented under the following heads:

1. Does not the law require the marshal to apply to the district attorney for executions in all cases of fines levied by the circuit court, and make him liable for neglecting to do so, if no execution be issued?

2. Is not the levy court entitled to one half of all the fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the circuit court in cases at common law, and under the acts of congress, as well as the acts of the assembly of Maryland, adopted as the law of this district by congress?

3. Is the marshal liable to pay interest on the money found to be due from him to the levy court, and which he has or ought to have collected and paid over?

The decisions of these questions must depend entirely upon the acts of congress and the laws of Maryland, which have been adopted as the law of Washington county in this district.

The act of congress of 1801, before referred to, provides that the marshal shall have the same power regarding the collection of the fines, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as to the payment thereof, as the sheriffs of Maryland are subject to in relation to the same.

The first point turns upon the question whether it was the marshal's duty to apply to the district attorney for executions; and his duty to issue them on such application.

The second section of the Maryland act of 1795, ch. 74, declares, that it shall and may be lawful for the attorney general of this state, or either of his deputies, ex officio, and they are hereby directed and required, on the application of the sheriffs of the respective counties in this state, to order a writ or writs of capias ad satisfaciendum to be issued for the recovery of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, which have or may hereafter be imposed by any court of record in this state, together with the costs accruing thereon. And by the seventh section, the sheriffs are made answerable for all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, imposed by the judgment of any court, where no writ of execution shall issue for the recovery of such fine, &c. unless the sheriff shall make it appear to the satisfaction of the treasurer that the party on whom such fine, &c. was imposed was insolvent and unable to pay the same.

This latter section may well admit of the construction, that it applies only to cases where the party is committed by order of the court, without an execution. But if construed in connexion with the second section, it will still leave the question open, whether the district attorney was bound on the application of the marshal to issue a capias ad satisfaciendum in all cases; and if he was not, it can hardly be pretended that the marshal is made responsible for not collecting the fine. If this question rested entirely upon the Maryland laws before referred to, there would be strong grounds for the conclusion that it was the duty of the marshal to apply to the district attorney to issue the executions, and that he was bound to issue them accordingly. But the district attorney here derives his authority from the acts of congress, and not from the laws of Maryland, and his rights and duties are to be collected from those acts; and although the attorney general in Maryland might have been bound to issue executions on the application of the sheriff, it does not follow that the district...