District of Columbia v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 26 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-753.,93-CV-753.
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Shirley COLEMAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Ramseur, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

667 A.2d 811

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Shirley COLEMAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Ramseur, Appellee.

No. 93-CV-753.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 7, 1995.

Decided October 26, 1995.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Vanessa Ruiz, Acting Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellant.

Blair G. Brown, with whom Gregory H. Gust, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellee.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and STEADMAN and KING, Associate Judges.

STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

This case arises from an incident in which an on-duty District of Columbia police detective, passing through Maryland on his way between two points in the District of Columbia, intervened to stop an apparent assault and in the process shot and killed one of the two men involved in the attack on a third man. Both the police detective and the decedent were Maryland residents. After a two-week jury trial, a jury found in favor of the decedent's estate and against the District on respondeat superior liability for the police detective's negligence, and awarded $610,000 to the estate.¹ We agree with the District that Maryland law should have controlled the question whether the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were available on the negligence count. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

On the evening of September 20, 1988, Detective David Pigford, a member of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), was serving subpoenas in the southeast area of the District until approximately 9:30 p.m. Pigford was driving an unmarked police vehicle and was wearing a suit, his usual work attire. On his way back to the MPD, Detective Pigford stopped to buy dinner at a carry-out on Kenilworth Avenue, near the intersection of Eastern Avenue; Pigford then headed north on Kenilworth Avenue and entered Prince George's County, Maryland. As he was driving on Kenilworth Avenue, Pigford saw three men run into the street. Two men, later identified as Michael Ramseur and Bobby Davenport, were chasing and striking a third man, later identified as Dana Harris; Davenport was armed with a club, which he used to strike Harris, and Ramseur appeared to be striking Harris either with his fist or with a light-colored object. Harris ran up to several cars ahead of Pigford's car and yelled, "Help, help, they're gonna kill me, help," but the cars pulled away and Ramseur and Davenport continued to strike Harris.

Harris then ran to the driver's side of Pigford's car, continuing to yell for help. Pigford stopped his vehicle and attempted to get out of his door three times, but each time he was prevented by Davenport swinging the club at him. Davenport and Ramseur continued attacking Harris, and Harris continued to cry for help. Pigford then successfully kicked his door open and pulled out his gun; Pigford later testified that

Things were happening fast. When the door opened, they made moves toward me. The guy that had the stick; had it raised about to strike; the guy that had this thing in his hand, he had squared himself in a position like to either swing or throw whatever it was at me; and this happened simultaneously, irrespective of my telling them to halt ... I was in fear of my life.

Pigford fired his gun, first at Ramseur and then at Davenport; the first bullet struck Ramseur, who fell to the ground, and the second missed Davenport, who fled from the scene. Pigford radioed for an ambulance, which arrived soon after; Ramseur was pronounced dead at the emergency room of Prince George's County Hospital.

Ramseur's mother, Shirley Coleman², brought suit on behalf of his estate against the District on a respondeat superior theory, alleging that Pigford had committed assault and battery and had acted negligently in shooting Ramseur.³ The trial took place in December 1992 and lasted for two weeks; the jury found that Pigford had not committed assault and battery, but that he had acted negligently in shooting Ramseur.⁴

II.

The trial court refused the request of the District for an instruction on the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.⁵ In District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1274 (D.C.1987), the court ruled that those defenses could not be raised to bar recovery in that action based on a police officer's negligence in failing to follow certain statutes and regulations prohibiting excessive force.⁶ Appellee contends that the District, in the trial court, conceded that if District law applies, under Peters it would not be entitled to a contributory negligence or assumption of risk instruction. In this court the District does not challenge that assertion; therefore, we will assume, without deciding, that under those circumstances those instructions should not be given if District law were to apply.⁷

The question before us, then, is whether the trial court erred when it denied the District's request to apply Maryland law on the issue of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. This inquiry requires two steps. First, we examine whether Maryland or District law applies to this particular issue. Second, if we conclude that Maryland law applies, we examine what that law is, in order to determine whether the outcome would be the same in any event.⁸

A.

We review questions of choice of law on a de novo basis. Atkins v. Industrial Telecommunications Association, 660 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C.1995). In determining which jurisdiction's law to apply in a tort case, we use the "governmental interests" analysis, under which we evaluate the governmental policies underlying the applicable laws and determine which jurisdiction's policy would be more advanced by the application of its law to the facts of the case under review. Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant, 566 A.2d 31, 40-41 (D.C.1989). As part of this analysis, we also consider the four factors enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145:

a) the place where the injury occurred;

b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and

d) the place where the relationship is centered.

Id. (citing Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1361 n. 2 (D.C.1985)).

Using the governmental interests test, we first look at each jurisdiction's policy to see what interests the policy is meant to protect, and then consider which jurisdiction's policy would be most advanced by applying the law of that jurisdiction. Part of the test of determining the jurisdiction whose policy would be most advanced is determining which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the dispute. Hercules, supra, 566 A.2d at 41 n. 18 (the governmental interests test and the most significant relationship test have sometimes been treated as separate approaches to choice of law questions, but we have applied a constructive blending of the two approaches). "When the policy of one jurisdiction would be advanced by application of its law, and the policy of the other jurisdiction would not be advanced by application of its law, a false conflict appears and the law of the interested jurisdiction prevails." Kaiser-Georgetown Community v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Biscoe v. Arlington County, 238 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 214, 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985)). When both jurisdictions have an interest in applying their own laws to the facts of the case, "the forum law will be applied unless the foreign jurisdiction has a greater interest in the controversy." 491 A.2d at 509. We are not bound to decide all issues under the law of a single jurisdiction; choice of law involves examination of the various jurisdictional interests as applied to the various distinct issues to be adjudicated. Hercules, supra, 566 A.2d at 40.

As already mentioned, appellee here invoked the holding in Peters, supra, 527 A.2d at 1274, that affirmed a trial court's refusal to instruct on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in a suit alleging that a police officer violated a District statute and police regulation concerning the use of force. Peters, supra, 527 A.2d at 1274. The court reasoned that the public policy behind these provisions was "to promote the safety of citizens by deterring police use of excessive force" and that this policy would be undermined by allowing such defenses.⁹ Id.; see also Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 916 (D.C. 1993) (the public policy behind statute imposing criminal liability for excessive force is "to promote the safety of citizens by deterring police use of excessive force"); District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1982) ("sanctions penalizing police use of excessive force promote the safety of city residents by deterrence"). The major focus of the policy, then, is on public safety within the District itself, where the obligations and concerns of the District are paramount and where the police have the special authority to resort to use of force granted to law enforcement officers. See Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 916.

Conversely, however, the District of Columbia can have no compelling interest in ensuring that a District of Columbia officer (or the District itself) who is found to have committed acts in Maryland which would be negligent violations of District regulations must pay damages to a Maryland resident when a similarly situated Maryland citizen who was not a District officer (or Maryland itself) would be entitled to assert the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and therefore might be absolved from liability altogether. See Estrada, supra, 488 A.2d at 1365, cit...