District of Columbia v. De Hart, 7779.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1941
• Docket Number: No. 7779.,7779.
• Citation: 119 F.2d 449,73 App. DC 345
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. DE HART.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

73 App. DC 345, 119 F.2d 449 (1941)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. DE HART.

No. 7779.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

March 24, 1941.

Richmond B. Keech, Corp. Counsel, Vernon E. West, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Glenn Simmon, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Paul M. DeHart, pro se.

Phineas Indritz, amicus curiae.

Before STEPHENS, MILLER and VINSON, Associate Justices.

MILLER, Associate Justice.

The question presented on this appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, in favor of respondent DeHart, is whether he is entitled to a refund of income tax paid to the District of Columbia for the year ending December 31, 1939, in the amount of $16.36. The pertinent language of the applicable statute reads as follows:¹

"Tax on Individuals. — There is hereby levied for each taxable year upon the taxable income of every individual domiciled in the District of Columbia on the last day of the taxable year a tax at the following rates: * * * Italics supplied"

In the case of Sweeney v. District of Columbia,² this court decided that the controlling consideration in determining the domicil of a person engaged in government service in the District of Columbia is found not in length or definiteness of term, nor in election as against appointment, nor in any compulsion peculiar to military men, but in the fact that federal duty requires residential presence in the District, upon the part of all who must come and remain here to do the work of the government. Accordingly, we held that one who comes to the District and remains to render service to the government which requires his presence here may retain his domicil in the state from which he comes until the service terminates, unless he gives clear evidence of his intention to forego his state allegiance; that the presumption of continuity of state domiciliation would require strong evidence to overcome it; that mere proof of long residence in the District, or ambiguous showing of intention to change, would be insufficient for this purpose; but that, instead, evidence of intention to change domicil must be clear and unequivocal. An examination of the legislative history of the Act involved in the present case clearly reveals Congressional intent that the same result should be reached in its administration.³

This, therefore, is the established law of the District of Columbia; as both parties agree. The District has prosecuted its appeal to determine, however, whether the facts of the present case bring it within the law as thus declared. The Board of Tax Appeals found, among other things, that respondent DeHart for several years last past has been and still is residing in the District of Columbia; he is in the Civil Service of the United States as Chief Clerk of the Personnel and Organization Division of the National Guard Bureau, War Department, with offices in Washington, D. C.; he was born and reared in Pennsylvania and resided there until 1914, when he came to the District of Columbia; his parents continue to reside at 1933 North Fourth Street, Harrisburg, in which premises respondent's room is maintained intact and in which room some of his clothes and his childhood toys are kept; he claims these premises as his "legal residence;" he pays no sum as rent or for lodging, but makes monetary presents to his parents from time to time; he visits his parents' home over week ends at least eight times a year, and has been there between Christmas and New Year of each year; he is, and has been since he came of age, a registered voter in Pennsylvania, and has voted in all general elections there during that period; he paid the Pennsylvania poll tax each year until the repeal of the poll tax law, and since that time has annually paid the Pennsylvania...