District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 84-1299.
| Decision Date | 16 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1299.,No. 84-1471.,84-1299.,84-1471. |
| Citation | 533 A.2d 629 |
| Parties | DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Bobby Lee MITCHELL, Appellee. Bobby Lee MITCHELL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Richard B. Nettler, Asst. Corp. Counsel at the time of argument, with whom Inez Smith Reid, Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant, cross-appellee.
Samuel M. Shapiro, with whom David S. Greene and Cassandra P. Hicks, Rockville, Md., were on the brief, for appellee, cross-appellant.
Before FERREN, BELSON, and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.
Bobby Lee Mitchell, an inmate at Lorton Reformatory, sued to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by the District of Columbia's negligence in three unrelated occurrences: (1) in July 1979, District employees allegedly failed to secure a ventilation cover in a Lorton dormitory ceiling, causing it to fall on Mitchell's neck and shoulders (count I of the complaint); (2) the District allegedly failed to provide proper treatment following Mitchell's surgery in May 1980 for a ruptured hernia (count II); (3) the District allegedly failed to supervise and control inmates at the Lorton Central Facility, resulting in an inmate's assault on Mitchell in June 1982 (count III). In June 1984, after a seven-day trial, the jury returned verdicts for Mitchell on all three counts totaling $300,000—count I, $150,000; count II, $50,000; and count III, $100,000.
Both the District and Mitchell have appealed from the trial court's order of August 22, 1984, which (1) denied the District's motion for judgments n.o.v. on counts I and III; (2) granted the District's motion for judgment n.o.v. on count II; and (3) denied Mitchell's motion for assessment of interest on the judgment at the prevailing rate instead of 4%.
On appeal, the District contends: (1) the District is entitled to a new trial on counts I and III (and on count II if the judgment n.o.v. is not sustained) because the court misinstructed the jury on proximate cause; (2) the court erred in refusing to grant the District's requests for (a) contributory negligence and assumption of risk instructions on count I, and (b) a cautionary instruction on Mitchell's missing witness argument on count III; (3) the court erred in refusing to allow District medical and correctional employees to testify about their personal knowledge, respectively, of (a) Mitchell's medical condition (count II) and of (b) inmate control at Lorton (count III), because the court erroneously ruled that the District was required to list them in the pretrial statement as expert witnesses; and (4) the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the District's request for a continuance when a material witness became ill shortly before trial.
In his cross-appeal, Mitchell asserts the trial court erred in (1) granting the judgment n.o.v. on count II and (2) in rejecting his argument that D.C. Code § 28-3302(b) (1987 Supp.) violates the equal protection guarantee inherent in the due process clause of the fifth amendment, in that it limits interest on judgments against the District to 4% while providing for interest at the prevailing rate on all other judgments.
We affirm as to counts I and III; we reverse and remand for a new trial on count II; and we affirm the trial court's denial of Mitchell's motion for interest at the prevailing rate instead of 4%.
On July 2, 1979, a ventilation cover fell from the ceiling on Mitchell as he was leaning over a desk in his dormitory while talking with another inmate. Thomas Elder, also an inmate, had heard a "ventilation fan kick on," seen the ventilation cover fall, and yelled to Mitchell to look out. The cover nonetheless struck Mitchell on his neck and shoulders. Mitchell fell to the floor; other inmates took him to the Lorton Infirmary. He was then transported to D.C. General Hospital for treatment. Mitchell testified that his neck, shoulders, and back had continued to hurt since the ventilation cover struck him. He said he no longer could play sports, work in the furniture repair shop, or sit up for long periods of time.
Wholly unrelated to the ventilation cover incident, Mitchell developed a swelling in his abdominal area which led to a hernia operation at D.C. General Hospital in 1980. Mitchell complains about the medical services he received after this operation, when he developed an infection at the incision site. The infection was treated by periodic cleaning, antibiotics, and hot compresses but did not heal. In April 1981, doctors at D.C. General recommended exploratory surgery. Although scheduled, the surgery was never performed. Dr. David Robb, whom the court certified as an expert in family medicine, testified for Mitchell that "the level of care was below the competence that could be expected in a situation like this."
On June 8, 1982, at approximately 10:45 a.m., Henry Moore, another inmate, allegedly assaulted Mitchell with a lead pipe while Mitchell stood in an area outside the dormitory. According to Mitchell, he had seen Moore pouring coffee out of another inmate's coffee pot earlier that morning and had told Moore not to do so. Mitchell was struck on his wrist, ribs, and thumb, as well as on his left leg, which was broken during the incident. He was treated at D.C. General Hospital for three weeks, and a cast was placed on his leg for six months. Mitchell testified that, since the incident, he had had severe pain and stiffness in his leg and ankle. E. Eugene Miller, a penologist, testified for Mitchell. He acknowledged that the reformatory had complied with its own procedures, including shakedowns, and that no institution could be weapon free. But he opined, nonetheless, that the reformatory did not provide reasonable care and custody because it failed adequately to supervise the inmates.
On appeal, the District asserts the right to a new trial on all counts (except count II if we sustain the j.n.o.v.) because the trial court misinstructed the jury on proximate cause. Specifically, the District claims the court "inevitably confused" the jury when it gave three inconsistent instructions on proximate cause, two of which were incompatible with Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1980). The District says, more specifically, that the court should have defined proximate cause, in accordance with the instructions proposed by both parties, to include the "substantial factor" test and should have applied this test to all three counts.1 Mitchell replies that the District failed to preserve this issue for appeal; Super.Ct.Civ.R. 51 bars the District, he says, because it failed to raise any specific objection, either before or after the jury was instructed, to the court's instructions on proximate cause.2
The court and counsel did not discuss proximate cause during their initial colloquy on jury instructions. Immediately before the court read the instructions to the jury, however, the District objected "as to any departures from our proposed jury instructions." The court replied, "[T]hat's automatic." After the court had read the instructions to the jury, he asked counsel if they had any objection. The District's counsel replied,
Later, after the jury had retired, the jury sent the court a note asking whether count II was "a malpractice suit, negligence, or both." The court informed counsel that it proposed to inform the jury that count II was only a negligence claim and then to reinstruct on the elements of a negligence action, including proximate course, contributory negligence, and injury. District counsel clarified: "[Y]ou will give the four points that you gave yesterday." The court replied "Yes," and both counsel added that they had "no objection."
The court then reinstructed, in part, as follows:
Now, in order to recover, this is what Bobby Lee Mitchell must show by a preponderance of the evidence: That the District of Columbia had knowledge of the medical or health care need that he had; two, that the District of Columbia had a reasonable opportunity to provide the needed medical treatment and care; three, that they failed to provide it and they failed to provide adequate necessary treatment and care. They failed to provide necessary and adequate treatment and care. And finally, and this is very important as each one is, that as a result of their failure to provide it, he suffered injuries or damages, and that Bobby Lee Mitchell suffered injuries or damages as a result of the District of Columbia's failure to provide adequate and necessary treatment and care. Those are the four things that he must show.
Now, the District says the reason you're in the condition that you are in is that because you refused to take the treatment. And I spoke to you in reference to this about what we call contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Any time a person is injured because of their own contributory negligence or because they assume a known risk that he didn't have to assume, they can't recover from somebody else for what happens to them. So, it is necessary that Bobby Lee Mitchell prove that the District was negligent, and that as a result of that negligence, he was injured or damaged. And the burden of proof is on the District to prove contributory negligence or assumption of risk. It isn't just sufficient to prove negligence. You must prove that as a result of that negligence, he suffered some damage or risk.
The same thing with assumption of risk and contributory negligence. It isn't sufficient that the...
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...care, physicians owe the same standard of care to prisoners as physicians owe to private patients generally. District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 648 (D.C.App.1987). Once plaintiffs demonstrate a deviation from the accepted standard they must then present evidence from which a re......
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Banfi v. American Hosp. for Rehabilitation, 26659.
...(requiring expert testimony with respect to allegations of negligent treatment of patient's medical condition); District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629 (D.C.1987) (same); Saxton v. Toole, 240 Ill.App.3d 204, 181 Ill.Dec. 160, 608 N.E.2d 233 (1992) (same); Smith v. Weaver, 225 Neb. 56......
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