District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Etc., 80-1311.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-1312.,No. 80-1311.,80-1311.,80-1312.
• Citation: 442 A.2d 110
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. The GREATER WASHINGTON CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL, AFL — CIO, Appellee, Food and Allied Service Trades Council of Metropolitan Washington, Intervenor. The GREATER WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

442 A.2d 110

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. The GREATER WASHINGTON CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL, AFL — CIO, Appellee, Food and Allied Service Trades Council of Metropolitan Washington, Intervenor.

The GREATER WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.

No. 80-1311.

No. 80-1312.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 24, 1981.

Decided January 28, 1982.

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., was on the briefs, for appellant in No. 80-1311 and appellees in No. 80-1312.

Joseph H. Koonz, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Mark J. Brice and Patrick M. Regan, Landover, Md., were on the brief, for appellee in No. 80-1311.

Mark L. Schaffer, Washington, D. C., with whom James A. Mannino and James F. Green, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for intervenor.

John R. Risher, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Stanley J. Brown and Judith A. Malone, Washington, D. C., were on the briefs, for amicus curiae in No. 80-1311 and appellant in No. 80-1312.

Thomas D. Wilcox, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for the Alliance of American Insurers, American Insurance Association, and National Association of Independent Insurers, as amici curiae.

Before HARRIS and PRYOR, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.

PRYOR, Associate Judge:

This case presents the issue of whether the District of Columbia Council exceeded its legislative authority under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, D.C.Code 1981, §§ 1-201 et seq., (Self-Government Act), when it enacted the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979, D.C.Law 3-77, 27 D.C.Reg. 2503 (1980) (codified at D.C.Code 1981, §§ 36-301 et seq.), and repealed the existing workmen's compensation legislation applicable to the private sector in the District of Columbia. The trial court concluded that it did. In addition, we are asked to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Greater Washington Board of Trade's motion for leave to intervene in the action below. We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the Council exceeded its authority in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Greater Washington Board of Trade's motion to intervene. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

I

An understanding of several pertinent statutes is necessary to our analysis of the Council's enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act. Before reaching the issue of whether the Council exceeded its legislative authority in passing the Workers' Compensation Act, we review the history of workmen's compensation in the District of Columbia, the Self-Government Act, and the new District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act.

A. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

Since 1928, workmen's compensation for the District of Columbia has been governed by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1976) (Longshoremen's Act). In 1927, in response to the continuing concern about compensation for maritime workers injured on navigable waters, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's Act, "a modern and reasonable workmen's compensation law for certain local maritime workers who are injured while loading or unloading or repairing vessels at the dock — provided their injury occurs while on board the vessel." S.Rep.No.852, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1928).

The Longshoremen's Act vests the responsibility for the administration of the workmen's compensation program in the United States Secretary of Labor. 33 U.S.C. § 939 (1976). The administrative procedure provided by the Act consists of a three-tier system. At the first stage, a deputy commissioner issues a recommendation as to whether the workmen's compensation claim should be paid. Id., § 919(a)(c). At this point, either party may request a formal hearing before a Department of Labor administrative law judge. Id., § 919(d) (Supp. III 1979). Review of the administrative law judge's formal order is provided by the Benefits Review Board. Id., § 921(b) (1976, Supp. III 1979). Persons adversely affected by the final order of the Benefits Review Board may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred. Id., § 921(c) (1976). In the event that an employer fails to comply with a compensation award, the beneficiary of the award or the deputy commissioner making the order may seek enforcement in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred. Id., § 921(d) (1976). Although public employees of the District of Columbia government were protected by a federal workmen's compensation program at the time of the passage of the Longshoremen's Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 8139 (1976), no similar program existed for their counterparts in the local private sector. Between 1921 and 1926, several bills creating workmen's compensation programs for private employees in the District of Columbia were introduced in Congress. However, "disagreements over the system of insurance and the plan of administration led to a legislative deadlock." S.Rep.No.852, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1928). Recognizing that the Longshoremen's Act provided a solution to its inability to agree on a program to cover private employees in the District of Columbia, see generally id., at 2; H.R.Rep. No.859, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926), Congress passed a workmen's compensation law for the District of Columbia, Act of May 17, 1928, ch. 612, § 1-3, 45 Stat. 600 (1928) (Workmen's Compensation Act of 1928) (codified at D.C.Code 1973, §§ 36-501, -502), which extended the provisions of the federal statute to cover the private employment sector. Section 36-501 provided in pertinent part:

The provisions of chapter 18 of title 33, U.S.Code, including all amendments that may hereafter be made thereto, shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs . . . .

This section incorporated both the substantive and procedural provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. National Van Lines, Inc., 198 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 246, 613 F.2d 972, 979 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 3049, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980).

B. The Self-Government Act

The United States Constitution vests Congress with the exclusive legislative authority for the District of Columbia. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In 1973, Congress passed the Self-Government Act to "relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters." D.C. Code 1981, § 1-201(a). Subject to its retention of the ultimate legislative authority over the District of Columbia, Congress delegated certain specific legislative powers to the District of Columbia government. Id. These legislative powers "extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of [the] Act . . . ." Id., § 1-204. Congress expressly reserved its right

to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by [the] Act, including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or after enactment of [the] Act and any act passed by the Council. [Id., § 1-206.]

In addition, Congress placed several explicit limitations on the Council's legislative authority. The specific limitations which are pertinent to the issue before us are enumerated in § 1-233:

(a) The Council shall have no authority to pass any act contrary to the provision of this Act except as specifically provided in this Act, or to —

* * * * * *

(3) [e]nact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District;

(4) [e]nact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 [of the District of Columbia Code] (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts);

* * * * * * (8) [e]nact any act or regulation relating to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or any other court of the United States in the District other than the District courts, or relating to the duties or powers of the United States Attorney or the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia[.]

(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as vesting in the District government any greater authority over the National Zoological Park, the National Guard of the District of Columbia, the Washington Aqueduct, the National Capital Planning Commission, or, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, over any federal agency, than was vested in the Commissioner prior to January 2, 1975.

C. Workers' Compensation Act of 1979

On May 6, 1980, the District of Columbia Council passed the Workers' Compensation Act of 1979. Following the approval of Mayor Marion S. Barry, Jr., this legislation was forwarded to Congress on May 15, 1980, for the 30-day review period required by D.C.Code 1981, § 1-233(c)(1). On July 1, 1980, in the absence of congressional disapproval, the Workers' Compensation Act officially became law. See 27 D.C.Reg. 2974 (1980). Pursuant to § 47 of the Act, it was scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1981.

The Workers' Compensation Act provides an administrative scheme for compensation claims in the private sector of employment. See generally 27 D.C.Reg. 2503 (1980). It provides compensation for work-related injuries or death to employees of private...