District of Columbia v. Smith, 6971.
| Decision Date | 15 November 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 6971.,6971. |
| Parties | DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. SMITH. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Elwood H. Seal, Corp. Counsel, D. C., Vernon E. West, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, D. C., and James W. Lauderdale, Asst. Corp. Counsel, D. C., all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Z. Montford Smith, pro se, and Milton Kaplan, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before ROBB, GRONER, and MILLER, Associate Justices, and WHEAT, Chief Justice of District Court.
Appellee was prosecuted for the violation of paragraph (h) of Article XIV, Section 71, Part 2, of the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia.
The trial court held the regulation unreasonable and dismissed the information. We granted an appeal. The regulation is as follows:
* * *"
Appellee parked his automobile unattended within the prohibited hours on one of the prohibited streets.
The regulation was made in order to enable the snow removal machinery of the city to function whenever it should become necessary to clear snow from the streets. Appellee contends that it is unreasonable because it applies without regard to whether snow is then present on the streets. We think this contention wholly without merit. The regulation is effective from December of each year until March of the following year, the season when snow may be expected. Its necessity arises from a condition almost certain to exist at many — but unpredictable — times during that period. We may take notice of the fact that, if there is snow in the streets, its removal will be altogether obstructed or at least seriously hampered by the presence of automobiles parked along the curbs; and this, we think, is enough to justify the regulation. The Act of Congress of February 27, 1931 (D.C.Code 1929, Supp. II, title...
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