District of Columbia v. Walker, 93-CV-113

• Decision Date: 06 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-113,94-CV-14 and 94-CV-1309.,93-CV-113
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. William WALKER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Patricia TOBEY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

689 A.2d 40

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. William WALKER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Patricia TOBEY, Appellee.

Nos. 93-CV-113, 94-CV-14 and 94-CV-1309.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 23, 1996.

Decided February 6, 1997.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Vanessa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Garland Pinkston, Acting Corporation Counsel at the time the reply brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the briefs, for District of Columbia.

Marc I. Fiedler, with whom Joseph H. Koonz, Jr., Paulette E. Chapman and Victor E. Long, Washington, were on the brief, for William Walker and Patricia Tobey.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and STEADMAN and KING, Associate Judges.

STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

These consolidated appeals involve the extent of the District's liability for high-speed chases by its law enforcement personnel. We set aside the judgments entered against the District in both cases.

I.

A juvenile driving a stolen car was pursued by Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers through the District of Columbia and into Maryland via Suitland Parkway, where the juvenile collided with another car and killed the driver, Terry Proctor Walker. Mrs. Walker's husband, William Walker, sued the District under Maryland's wrongful death and survival statutes,¹ alleging gross negligence in the MPD officers' pursuit of the stolen car and negligence in the MPD's training of the officers regarding proper pursuit procedures. After a trial, the jury found for Mr. Walker on both claims. The District moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied the motion.

In a separate action², Patricia Tobey—the guardian of Ray Brown, Mrs. Walker's son—filed a complaint against the District for wrongful death, making the same allegations that Mr. Walker made in his complaint. Taking note of the outcome of Mr. Walker's action, the trial court granted Tobey's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, based on a collateral estoppel theory. After a trial and jury verdict on the issue of Tobey's damages, the District filed a motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur. The trial court denied the motion. The District appeals from the denials of its motions for JNOV in the Walker and Tobey cases.³

Under the District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act, the District has waived its governmental immunity to damage suits for personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful operation of a District vehicle by a District employee acting within the scope of employment. D.C.Code § 1-1212 (1992 Repl.). However, § 1-1212 expressly limits the waiver by providing that "in the case of a claim arising out of the operation of an emergency vehicle on an emergency run the District shall be liable only for gross negligence." As we noted in another case involving § 1-1212, "generally... waivers of immunity are to be read narrowly." Abney v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C.1990). The necessary corollary to this rule is that limitations on waivers of immunity, such as the gross negligence provision in § 1-1212, are to be read broadly.

The District makes two dispositive arguments on appeal, both based on the gross negligence limitation of the Act. First, the District argues that, as a matter of law, the MPD officers' conduct did not amount to gross negligence, and therefore the District cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from the pursuit. Second, the District argues that, since it cannot be held directly liable for the collision based on the conduct of the MPD officers involved in the pursuit unless that conduct was grossly negligent, liability cannot be indirectly imposed based on the officers' training. We agree with the District on both issues.

II.

We turn first to the District's argument that, as a matter of law, the MPD officers' conduct in this case did not constitute gross negligence.

A.

In reviewing the denials of the District's motions for JNOV, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellees, and "we reverse only if no reasonable juror could have reached the verdict." Kane v. Ryan, 596 A.2d 562, 564 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). The basic facts of the pursuit, viewed in the light most favorable to appellees, are as follows.⁴

While driving a marked police car in Southeast Washington at approximately 1:30 p.m. on Saturday, February 9, 1991, MPD Officer Paul Wingate noticed a Toyota car with a driver and passenger who looked "rather young."⁵ Wingate began following the Toyota, without activating his lights or siren, and remained about two car lengths behind it. After learning that the Toyota had been reported stolen, Wingate decided to attempt to stop it, and radioed for assistance. Along with another police car driven by MPD Officer Teresa Butts and a police wagon, Wingate attempted to "box in" the Toyota at a stop sign on the corner of Sixth Street and Mississippi Avenue, near a junior high school. The attempt failed, however, and the Toyota turned left onto Sixth Street. Wingate activated his lights and siren and pursued the Toyota, with Butts following. The Toyota proceeded along Sixth Street in the wrong direction when the street turned one-way for a block, and Wingate and Butts continued to follow in their police cars. The Toyota then turned right onto Alabama Avenue, where its speed reached approximately fifty miles per hour, and it went through two or more red traffic lights, with Wingate and Butts following. The area in which this portion of the pursuit took place is partly residential and partly commercial in character.

The Toyota then entered Suitland Parkway, driving over a sidewalk or a bump, and fishtailing "a little bit" as it passed over gravel at the beginning of the entrance ramp, momentarily losing control. The Toyota continued to accelerate, reaching a speed of approximately ninety miles per hour. The Toyota, followed by Wingate and then Butts, with their lights and sirens activated, crossed the District-Maryland line into Prince George's County, Maryland. The MPD dispatcher had notified the Prince George's County police of the chase; a Prince George's police officer entered Suitland Parkway at Silver Hill Road in a marked police car and joined the pursuit. The Prince George's police car had its lights and siren activated, and was positioned between the Toyota and the MPD police cars. The three police cars were as close as five car lengths behind the Toyota. After Wingate radioed to the police dispatcher that the Prince George's County police were involved, the MPD deputy chief ordered Wingate to cease the pursuit.

The collision occurred within a minute or less after the Prince George's County police car entered the chase, approximately one-half mile after Silver Hill Road. The juvenile driver of the Toyota, who survived the collision, testified that prior to the collision, he noticed the Prince George's police car behind him, "right on his bumper." Shortly before the collision, Suitland Parkway had changed from a four-lane road divided by a grassy median strip into a two-lane road divided by a double yellow line. The Toyota crossed the double yellow line and pulled into the lane of oncoming traffic in order to pass three cars ahead of it. After clearing the three cars, the Toyota remained in the wrong lane and struck an oncoming car. According to the driver of the Toyota, he tried to return to the right lane prior to the collision, but his passenger grabbed his arm so that he lost control of the steering wheel until it was too late. Mrs. Walker, who was driving the oncoming car, died as a result of the collision.

The entire chase covered approximately five miles. Traffic was light, and the road conditions were clear and dry. A map introduced into evidence showed that the collision occurred about 2½ miles beyond the District line, and that there was access in this stretch of Suitland Parkway from only three streets (Naylor Road, Branch Avenue, and Silver Hill Road), the last two of which were by access ramps.

The area in which the collision occurred contained no cross streets and no pedestrians. The driver of the Toyota testified that he wanted to stop the car and run away at various points during the pursuit, but the police did not give him a chance to do so. Although the MPD helicopter was notified of the chase, it apparently did not reach the area to provide assistance.

B.

The Employee Non-Liability Act is itself silent as to the definition of gross negligence in its application.⁶ The jury in Mr. Walker's case was instructed without objection that "gross negligence occurs when a person is acting with a wanton, willful and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the rights and safety of others." The scope and meaning of this formulation can be illuminated by an examination of relevant case law. While we have never interpreted the concept of gross negligence in the context of emergency vehicle operation, we have defined the general concept of gross negligence as "the failure to exercise even slight care," and "such negligence as would shock fair-minded men." Shea v. Fridley, 123 A.2d 358, 363 (D.C.1956) (internal quotation, citations, and footnote omitted). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for this circuit has stated that "gross negligence implies an `extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care.'" Wager v. Pro, 195 U.S.App. D.C. 423, 428, 603 F.2d 1005, 1010 (1979) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 8, at 31 (1971)). We have applied Maryland law to define gross negligence in the driving context as "a wanton or reckless disregard for human life or for the rights of others," and "indifference to the consequences ... which implies malice and evil intention." Hall...