District of Columbia v. Pace

• Citation: 64 S.Ct. 406,320 U.S. 698,88 L.Ed. 408
• Decision Date: 10 January 1944
• Docket Number: No. 117,117
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. PACE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

320 U.S. 698

64 S.Ct. 406

88 L.Ed. 408

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

v PACE.

No. 117.

Argued Dec. 13, 1943.

Decided Jan. 10, 1944.

Mr. Glenn Simmon, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Elmer E. Hazard, of Jacksonville, Fla., for respondent.

Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Charles F. Pace came to the District of Columbia in 1913 from Florida, where he had theretofore been domiciled. His only purpose in coming was to enter the federal service. He became Financial Clerk of the Senate and served continuously until his death in the District in 1940. During these twenty-seven years he lived in boarding houses and in rented apartments and owned no real property in the District. At all times he maintained his registration and qualification to vote in the State of Florida and exercised that right either in person or by absentee ballot. His will, made in 1937, recited that he was 'of the City of Washington, D.C.' It was probated in Florida, and ancillary letters were granted in the District to the respondent executrix. District authorities, upon the premise that Pace was domiciled in the District, assessed an inheritance tax upon the transfer of certain jointly owned bank deposits within the District. Respondents paid the tax under protest and then appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals of the District on the ground that decedent was domiciled in Florida at the time of his death. The Board of Tax Appeals after hearing argument determined that decedent was domiciled in Florida, and ordered refund of the tax paid. The District appealed to the Court of Appeals, but before hearing this Court decided District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329. The District thereupon moved to remand the case to the Board of Tax Appeals for reconsideration in the light of the intervening decision. The motion was granted. Upon reconsideration the Board re-adopted the findings theretofore made but concluded that the decedent had not overcome the presumption, arising from maintaining a home in the District, that he was domiciled therein and reversed its former ruling.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. It accepted and applied our decision in District of Columbia v. Murphy and, weighing the facts in the light of its principles, concluded that the decedent was domiciled in Florida at the time of his death. The evidence before the Board of Tax Appeals took a wide range, and we do not think it is necessary to recite it in detail. As is usual in cases of contested domicile, it gave rise to conflicting inferences, and a decision either way would be supported by substantial evidence. Whether the Board's determination or that of the Court of Appeals should be deemed correct would depend upon the weight to be given to many different items of evidence, the credibility to be given to testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from many admitted events. We did not take this case to determine where Mr. Pace was domiciled. But the scope of review of decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals of the District of Columbia is important to the administration of the District's tax laws, and since that question was not reached or decided in District of Columbia v. Murphy, we granted certiorari in this case.

Congress has seen fit in certain of the District's tax statutes to make liability dependent upon domicile. In the District, where a large proportion of the population owe their presence to Government service and have the strongest motives for retaining their political connections with and domicile in the enfranchised community from which they came, this test of taxability is bound to give rise to innumerable and difficult conflicts. These the Board of Tax Appeals is authorized in the first instance to resolve.

The provisions for review of Board of Tax Appeals decisions present complexities almost as baffling as the test of taxability itself. Section 4(a) of the Act creating the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia provides that its decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals and that upon such review the court 'shall have the power to affirm, or if the decision of the board is not in accordance with law, to modify or reverse the decision of the board, with or without remanding the case for hearing, as justice may require.' 52 Stat. 371, D.C.Code 1940, § 47—2404(a). Had this been all, a strong case would be made for applying the rule of finality applicable to the Federal Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court of the United States. Dobson v. Commissioner, 64 S.Ct. 239, decided December 20, 1943. However, the same organic act contains another and qualifying provision that is not to be found in the acts creating the Tax Court: 'The findings of fact by the board shall have the same effect as a finding of fact by an equity court or a verdict of a jury.' 52 Stat. 371, D.C.Code 1940, § 47—2404(a). Since findings of fact by an equity court and the verdict of a jury have from...