Ditsworth v. Colvin

Decision Date12 November 2013
Docket NumberNo. C12–3100–LTS.,C12–3100–LTS.
Citation982 F.Supp.2d 935
PartiesKelly J. DITSWORTH, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

David A. Scott, Cornwall Avery Bjornstad Scott, Spencer, IA, for Plaintiff.

Rebecca Lyn Williams, Stephanie Johnson Wright, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEONARD T. STRAND, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Kelly J. Ditsworth seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income benefits (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Ditsworth contends that the administrative record (AR) does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that she is not disabled. For the reasons that follow, I find that the decision must be affirmed.

Background

Ditsworth was born in 1970. AR 161. She completed high school and has past relevant work as a certified nurse's aide. AR 32, 57, 308. She protectively filed applications for SSI and DIB on November 13, 2009, and alleged a disability onset date of February 11, 2008. AR 8. Both applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Id. She then requested a hearing, which was conducted September 14, 2011, by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jeffrey Marvel. Id. Ditsworth testified during the hearing, as did a vocational expert (VE). AR 29–62.

The ALJ issued a decision denying Ditsworth's applications on October 6, 2011. AR 8–20. On October 24, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Ditsworth's request for review. AR 1–3. As such, the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1; see also20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

On December 21, 2012, Ditsworth commenced an action in this court seeking review of the ALJ's decision. On February 12, 2013, with the parties' consent, United States District Judge Mark W. Bennett transferred the case to me. The parties have briefed the issues and the matter is now fully submitted.

Disability Determinations and the Burden of Proof

A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists ... in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir.2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).

Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir.2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707;see20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a), 416.920(c), 416.921(a).

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) respondingappropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. §§ 404.1521(b)(1–6), 416.921(b)(1–6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2291, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on her ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.1998).

Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) to determine the claimant's “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements” of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). “RFC is a medical question defined wholly in terms of the claimant's physical ability to perform exertional tasks or, in other words, what the claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's “complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at Step Four, and his or her age, education, and work experience. See Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 358–59 n. 5 (8th Cir.2000). The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant's RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir.2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, even though the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, the burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.2004).

Summary of ALJ's Decision

The ALJ made the following findings:

(1) The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2014.

(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 11, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

(3) The claimant has the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the right ankle status-post fracture and fusion; history of vulvar cancer status-post chemotherapy and radiation; major depression, recurrent; and obesity (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: the claimant can lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand and walk two hours out of an eight-hour workday; and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. The claimant is only able to walk for fifteen minutes at a time and then must rest for two to three minutes. The claimant is only able to occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb, and is never able to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding. The claimant is limited to working at no more than a regular pace.

(6) The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).

(7) The...

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2 cases
  • Santiago v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • February 15, 2017
    ...and prognosis, what an applicant is capable of doing despite the impairment, and the resulting restrictions." Ditsworth v. Colvin, 982 F. Supp. 2d 935, 945 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (citing Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 995 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The Commissioner defers to a treating physician's medic......
  • McDonald v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
    • July 29, 2016
    ...such, the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff's testimony was not entirely credible"); Ditsworth v. Colvin, 982 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (noting in credibility assessment that claimant applied for numerous jobs after her alleged onset date that would ......

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