Ditton v. Dep't of Justice Motor Vehicle Div.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. DA 13–0376.,DA 13–0376.
• Citation: 374 Mont. 122,319 P.3d 1268
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael H. DITTON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, State of Montana, Respondent and Appellee.

374 Mont. 122

319 P.3d 1268

Michael H. DITTON, Petitioner and Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, State of Montana, Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 13–0376.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 2, 2014.

Decided March 4, 2014.

For Appellant: Michael H. Ditton, Self–Represented, Bozeman, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Susan Wordal, Assistant City Attorney, Bozeman, Montana.

Justice LAURIE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Michael H. Ditton appeals from the order of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denying his petition for reinstatement of his driver's license. We affirm.

¶ 2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court err in denying Ditton's request for the entry of default judgment against the State?

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it vacated its order granting judgment in favor of Ditton following his acquittal of the underlying offense?

3. Did the District Court err in denying Ditton's petition for reinstatement of his driver's license?

4. Were Ditton's constitutional rights to due process and privacy violated?

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 3, 2010, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Bozeman City Police Officer Joe Swanson responded to an accident involving a vehicle hitting a building. The damaged building, Bozeman Printing Company, is located at 702 West Main in Bozeman. Officer Swanson was the first to arrive at the scene of the accident, which was in the alley between Bozeman Printing Company and the Molly Brown Bar. The Scoop Bar and the Haufbrau are also located nearby. Officer Swanson observed a pickup truck backed up against the Bozeman Printing Company building. The truck appeared to have backed into the building and caused damage after crossing over a cement curb stop.

¶ 4 While Officer Swanson was examining the scene, Ditton approached him from behind the truck. Ditton's hands were over his head, displaying an attitude of surrender, and he stated something to the effect of, “I'm the one you're looking for. It's me.” Officer Swanson interpreted Ditton's actions and statement as indicating that he had been driving the truck when it hit the building. Officer Swanson testified that, in his experience, it is rare for a person to approach an officer in such a situation and indicate that he or she had been driving the vehicle in question when in fact the person had not been driving it. Officer Swanson spoke to Ditton briefly, asking whether Ditton was injured and needed assistance. Ditton indicated that he was fine, with no injuries.

¶ 5 Officer Tracy Senenfelder arrived at the scene shortly after Officer Swanson. Officer Senenfelder observed that the building had been damaged, that the back bumper of the truck was next to the building, and that the rear tires of the truck were over the cement curb stop, which was consistent with the vehicle striking the building. Officer Senenfelder spoke with Officer Swanson and learned that Ditton had approached Officer Swanson with his hands raised over his head, stating that “I'm the one you're looking for.” In speaking with Ditton, Officer Senenfelder noted that Ditton had the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person, that Ditton's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, that Ditton's speech was slurred, and that Ditton was unsteady on his feet. Based on these factors, Officer Senenfelder had Ditton perform several field sobriety maneuvers.

¶ 6 Ditton scored six out of six, the highest possible score indicating intoxication, on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, and eight out of eight, the highest possible score indicating intoxication, on the walk-and-turn maneuver. Ditton was unable to recite the alphabet beginning with the letter “D.” Officer Senenfelder did not ask Ditton to do the one-leg stand due to Ditton's lack of balance and inability to stand without stumbling and swaying. Moreover, Ditton indicated that he could not perform the one-leg stand because of his blood sugar related to his diabetes. Based on his observations, Officer Senenfelder read Ditton the implied consent advisory ( see§ 61–8–402, MCA) and requested that Ditton perform a preliminary breath test. After Ditton refused this test, Office Senenfelder placed Ditton under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of § 61–8–401, MCA.

¶ 7 Before bringing Ditton to the detention center, Officer Senenfelder drove Ditton to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital so that medical staff could evaluate Ditton's diabetes and clear him for incarceration. While at the hospital, Officer Senenfelder read Ditton the implied consent advisory a second time and asked him to submit to a blood test. Ditton refused the requested blood test. As part of their examination of Ditton, medical staff tested Ditton's blood. Officer Senenfelder did not request that medical staff perform this test. After Ditton was cleared by medical staff for incarceration, he was transported to the detention center and cited for DUI, third offense. Ditton's driver's license was seized pursuant to § 61–8–402, MCA, based on his refusal to submit to a blood or breath test.

¶ 8 On August 6, 2010, Ditton filed in the District Court a petition to reinstate his driver's license under § 61–8–403(1), MCA, and a motion to stay the suspension of his driver's license pending a hearing under § 61–8–403(3), MCA. Ditton represented himself throughout these proceedings, including his present appeal to this Court. The District Court granted the requested stay, ordered the return of Ditton's license, and scheduled a hearing for November 4, 2010.

¶ 9 On October 4, 2010, Ditton filed a request that the Clerk of the District Court enter default against the State pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Ditton also filed a request that the District Court enter default judgment against the State under Rule 55(b). Ditton premised these requests on the fact that the State had not filed an answer or response to his petition within 20 days after service of the petition. Ditton asserted that such a response was mandated under Rule 12(a) of the 2009 Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. As support for this proposition, Ditton cited our statement in Patterson v. State, 2002 MT 97, ¶ 12, 309 Mont. 381, 46 P.3d 642, that “a hearing held pursuant to § 61–8–403, MCA, is a civil proceeding, and, therefore, must be conducted in accordance with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.”

¶ 10 The District Court denied Ditton's requests. The court concluded that § 61–8–403, MCA, sets forth the procedure to be followed in a license reinstatement proceeding and that this statute does not require the State to appear and defend within 20 days after service of the petition. The court rejected Ditton's reliance on Patterson, observing that our opinion there did not hold that the State is required to file an answer or responsive pleading to a petition for reinstatement of a driver's license.

¶ 11 The hearing on Ditton's petition was continued several times pursuant to requests by both the State and Ditton. It was finally scheduled for March 29, 2012. Meanwhile, on June 24, 2011, a jury in Bozeman Municipal Court found Ditton not guilty of the underlying DUI charge. Based on this acquittal and “principles of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel,” Ditton filed a motion on March 16, 2012, asking the District Court to enter judgment against the State and to permanently reinstate his license.

¶ 12 The District Court granted Ditton's motion on March 16 (the day he had filed it), entered judgment in his favor, and vacated the March 29 hearing, all without obtaining any response from the State. On March 21, the State moved to vacate the District Court's March 16 order, arguing that the State had not been given an opportunity to respond to Ditton's motion and that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied. The District Court agreed that its entry of judgment had been premature. Thus, on April 2, the court vacated its March 16 order, set a hearing on Ditton's petition, and directed that his license “is not permanently reinstated, but is subject to suspension dependent upon the outcome of the hearing on the petition.”

¶ 13 The hearing on Ditton's petition for reinstatement of his driver's license was held December 10, 2012. The District Court heard testimony from Officer Swanson, Officer Senenfelder, and Ditton. The court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on May 14, 2013. The court denied Ditton's petition. Ditton now appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 14 We review a district court's ruling on a petition for reinstatement of a driver's license to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law correct. Muri v. State, 2004 MT 192, ¶ 5, 322 Mont. 219, 95 P.3d 149. The suspension of a driver's license is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the State's action was improper. Muri, ¶ 5;accord Kleinsasser v. State, 2002 MT 36, ¶ 10, 308 Mont. 325, 42 P.3d 801.

¶ 15 This Court exercises plenary review over questions of constitutional law. State v. Hauer, 2012 MT 120, ¶ 23, 365 Mont. 184, 279 P.3d 149. We review de novo a district court's construction of a statute to determine whether the district court's construction of the statute is correct. State v. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2010 MT 263, ¶ 31, 358 Mont. 325, 246 P.3d 415. Where a trial court has granted a motion to set aside a default judgment and opened the action for a decision on the merits, the court's ruling will be reversed only on a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Benintendi v. Hein, 2011 MT 298, ¶ 17, 363 Mont. 32, 265 P.3d 1239;Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose's Saloon, Inc., 2007 MT 202, ¶ 17, 338 Mont. 423, 166 P.3d 451. A manifest abuse of discretion is...