Diversified Props. LLC v. Castleberry

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge
• Decision Date: 05 July 2017
• Docket Number: Case No: 8:17-cv-805-T-36TGW
• Citation: Diversified Props. LLC v. Castleberry, Case No: 8:17-cv-805-T-36TGW (M.D. Fla. Jul 05, 2017)
• Parties: DIVERSIFIED PROPERTIES LLC, Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL CASTLEBERRY, Defendant.

DIVERSIFIED PROPERTIES LLC, Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL CASTLEBERRY, Defendant.

Case No: 8:17-cv-805-T-36TGW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

July 5, 2017

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 9), filed on April 26, 2017. In the motion, Plaintiff states that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the Defendant has not demonstrated that the parties are diverse or that a federal question is at issue. Defendant did not file a response to the Motion within the time allotted. The Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing her to file a response, or risk having the Motion deemed unopposed. Doc. 10. As of the date of this Order, no response has been filed. Because the Complaint is a straightforward eviction action seeking removal of the tenant and recovery of past due rent, and does not allege any cause of action that arises under federal law, the Court must remand the case back to state court. The Court, having considered the motion and being fully advised in the premises, will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff, Diversified Properties LLC, ("Diversified") filed a complaint for tenant eviction from a residential property and recovery of past due rent in the County Court in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, against Defendant Crystal Castleberry. Doc. 2. The Complaint alleges that Castleberry's rent is past due; it demands eviction and damages in the amount of $2,600. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 9.

Castleberry's "Answer and Counterclaim," which she filed in state court pro se, alleges that she paid the rent for February 2017, but not the late fees or the rent for March 2017. Doc. 3 at 1. She alleges that there are several issues regarding the air conditioning in the apartment, which has left it either too cold or too hot. Id. And she claims that the rent office misplaced a $400 money order, for which she has not received any credit. Id. She does not explicitly mention any statute or law upon which she relies as a defense to the action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal court removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in part that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Id. at § 1441(a). Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), an action must be dismissed if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1261. Parties seeking to invoke subject matter jurisdiction must show that the underlying claim is based upon either diversity jurisdiction (cases in which the parties are of diverse citizenship and "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs"), or the existence of a federal question (i.e., "a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332.

Procedurally, removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which provides:

1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

Removal jurisdiction is construed narrowly with all doubts resolved in favor of remand. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999); Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998). "A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction." Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001)). In assessing whether removal is proper, the district court considers "only the limited universe of evidence available when the motion to remand is filed - i.e., the notice of removal and accompanying documents. If that evidence is insufficient to establish that removal was proper or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants nor the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice's failings." Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1213-15 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1080, 128 S.Ct. 2877, 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008).

Where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1331, as it is in this case, the removing defendant has the burden of demonstrating the action "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The federal question at issue "must appear on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint." Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2011). When only state-law claims are asserted in a complaint, a claim "aris[es] under" federal law if a federal issue is: "(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in the federal courtwithout disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013).

III. DISCUSSION

a. The Notice of Removal

Castleberry, proceeding pro se¹, filed a Notice of Removal alleging that Diversified's Complaint, although sounding in state law, actually raises a federal question because it "intentionally fails to allege compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1968" and the property has "multiple habitability issues including the AC and Heater that does [sic] not work right...." Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 6. She cites Grable & Sons Metal Prds. v. Darue Engr, & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308, 313-315 (2005) for the proposition that even if a case only alleges state law claims, "the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case if: 1) the federal issues are essential to the claims, 2) there is a substantial federal issue[] in resolving such issues, and 3) a Federal forum may entertain the State law claims without disturbing the balance of Federal and State judicial responsibilities." Doc. 1 at ¶ 8. She alleges that she is a member of a class protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Id. at ¶ 10. Castleberry also quotes several federal cases regarding bringing a private right of action.² Id. at ¶ 9.

b. Allegations regarding federal question jurisdiction

"A civil action filed in a state court may be removed to federal court if the claim is one 'arising under' federal law." Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). To determinewhether the claim arises under federal law, the Court examines "the 'well pleaded' allegations of the complaint and ignores potential defenses: [a] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution." Id. This legal proposition is known as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983).

Even if a complaint raises a potential defense involving federal law, the cause of action does not necessarily arise under federal law. So, for example, the following are insufficient to allege a basis for removal based on federal question jurisdiction: a plaintiff alleging an anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserting that the defense is invalidated by a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a defense that relies on the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment, and a defense that relies on the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 6 (citing Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, (1908); Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. 1)).

There is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. "[W]hen a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption," the state claim can be removed. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8. This is so because "[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law." Id.

An "independent corollary" to this rule is that "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions." Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475. Therefore, if a court concludes that a plaintiff has "artfully pleaded" claims this way, it may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Id. Stated differently,"[t]he artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff's state-law claim." Id.

c. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

The Notice of Removal is timely as it was filed within thirty days of the filing of the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). But Castleberry did not identify the specific provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 upon which she relies. She merely argues that Plaintiff has "artfully pled" the eviction cause of action in such a way to avoid pleading compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1968. And Castleberry did not identify any other federal statute or case law that preempts Diversified's causes of action. The Court presumes, based on Castleberry's allegations in the Notice of Removal and her Answer and...