DIVISION 1287, AMAL. ASS'N OF ST., ELEC. RY., ETC., EMP. v. Dalton
| Decision Date | 22 June 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 784.,784. |
| Citation | 206 F. Supp. 629 |
| Parties | DIVISION 1287, AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. John M. DALTON, Governor of the State of Missouri, State of Missouri Board of Mediation, Daniel C. Rogers, Individually and as Chairman of the State of Missouri Board of Mediation, Charles Bibbs, Individually and as Member of the State of Missouri Board of Mediation, Albert Fults, Individually and as Member of the State of Missouri Board of Mediation, J. Raymond Lambright, Individually and as Member of the State of Missouri Board of Mediation, and Truman Henry, Individually and as Member of the State of Missouri Board of Mediation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
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John J. Manning and Robert S. Fousek, Kansas City, Mo., Bernard Cushman, Bernard Dunau, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., by J. Gordon Siddens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for defendant.
Before RIDGE, Circuit Judge, and DUNCAN and BECKER, District Judges.
This is a suit brought by a mass transit employees' union for a restraining order, injunction and declaratory judgment against officials of the State of Missouri, involving the validity of Missouri's Public Utility Seizure and Anti-Strike Law. This law, known as the King-Thompson Act, authorizes the Governor of Missouri to seize and operate a public utility affected by a work stoppage when, in his opinion, the public interest, health and welfare are jeopardized.
On November 14, 1961, the plaintiff Union filed this suit for declaratory judgment, restraining order, and for temporary and permanent injunctions, attacking the validity of the King-Thompson Act1 on the charge of conflict with the National Labor Relations Act2 and on many separate charges of unconstitutionality.
On November 15, 1961, the State of Missouri filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County a petition for a restraining order and injunction to enforce the no-strike provisions of the King-Thompson Act, securing an immediate temporary restraining order against continuance of the strike.
On November 27, the writer, acting as Judge of the United States District Court, denied the Union's motion for a temporary restraining order against the seizure and enforcement through state court suit of the King-Thompson Act. However, the Union's request to convene a Three-Judge Court to hear the Union's complaint was sustained.3 This Three-Judge Court was duly convened.
The Circuit Court of Jackson County, on November 27 and 28, 1961, heard the state court suit on the merits. After evidence was heard, the temporary restraining order was continued in force. Finally, on February 12, 1962, a permanent injunction was granted in a judgment upholding the seizure and enjoining the strike.
An appeal from this judgment to the Missouri Supreme Court was taken by the Union. This appeal was submitted on briefs without oral argument to expedite its determination. There is every evidence that the Missouri courts are adjudicating the state court suit with unusual speed.
The Union concedes that it defended the state court suit for enforcement of the seizure and anti-strike provisions upon all grounds of preemption and unconstitutionality decided previously in Local 8-6 v. State4 and also on two additional grounds stated in its brief5 in the Supreme Court of Missouri, as follows:
In moving in the Supreme Court of Missouri for summary affirmance6 the Union attempted to withdraw these additional questions on which the Missouri Supreme Court has not previously expressed itself.
The defendant State officials have moved this Court to dismiss or to stay this action on the doctrine of abstention. The Union opposes this motion and has moved for summary judgment on the merits. We have decided to stay this proceeding until the final determination of state court action now pending on the appeal submitted to the Supreme Court of Missouri. This decision includes deferring decision on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The reasons for this discretionary ruling follow.
Where (1) unsettled questions of state law are enmeshed with federal questions in determining the validity and constitutionality of a state law or of state action,7 and (2) the state law problems are delicate ones, resolution of which is not without substantial difficulty,8 proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that the controversy be decided in the state tribunal preliminary to a federal court's consideration of the underlying federal questions, usually a federal constitutional question.9 This is the "doctrine of abstention." The doctrine is not founded upon lack of power or jurisdiction but upon a sound judicial discretion of the District Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a proper case.10 It is applicable in cases of federal jurisdiction not involving charges of violation of the Federal Constitution.11 Therefore, the doctrine of abstention is applicable in this case whether the question of preemption be considered a constitutional question or a question of statutory construction.
In essence, the doctrine of abstention arose from federal policies of avoiding unnecessary decisions, of avoiding presumptuous and possibly erroneous first constructions of state statutes, and of avoiding needless friction between the federal and state systems. These themes recur in the many cases applying and refusing to apply the doctrine.
If anything prevents a prompt state court determination, this Court retains the power to take appropriate action necessary for a just disposition of this litigation.12
It has been suggested that because this case was filed before the state court action, that the doctrine of abstention does not apply. This contention is not supported by reason or precedent. The application of the doctrine does not depend upon the result of a race to the state and federal courthouses. It may be applicable where the state court suit is filed after the federal action is filed13 or even where the state court suit has not been, but can be, filed.14
In the case at bar, two unsettled questions of state law have been litigated in the Jackson County Circuit Court. These are the questions of extraterritoriality and propriety of the Governor's proclamation when considered in light of the actual facts. The Union has attempted to "withdraw" these litigated questions from consideration by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
In Missouri the scope of review cannot be regulated by an appellant, particularly in non-jury cases. The Supreme Court of Missouri has the power, ordinarily exercised, to pass upon all legal and factual issues presented by the record and to render such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. The review is de novo on the record made in the trial court.15
We have given consideration to the limitations on the doctrine of abstention reviewed in the authorities cited herein, and in plaintiff's brief, but find them inapplicable here.16
We accept the statement of the nature of the doctrine as an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy before it.17 We are conscious of the need for exceptional circumstances to justify invocation of the doctrine.
We find present in this case the following principal exceptional circumstances, inter alia, on which we base the action in this case:
These, among other factors, have appealed to our discretion to exercise the power of abstention.
For the reasons we have stated, the defendants' motion to stay this proceeding is sustained and the defendants' motion to dismiss is overruled. Decision on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is deferred.
It is so ordered.
1 The entire Act, Chapter 295, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1959, §§ 295.010-295.210, inclusive, V.A.M.S. See Amalgamated Association, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364, 22 A.L.R. 2d 814, invalidating a Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law which differs from the Missouri King-Thompson Act in that the Wisconsin Act (1) provided for compulsory arbitration, (2) did not provide for seizure and (3) was not limited to emergencies jeopardizing the public interest, health and welfare. Compare State v. Local No. 8-6 (Mo.Sup.1958) 317 S.W. 2d 309, en banc, judgment vacated as moot, Local 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 80 S.Ct. 391, 4 L.Ed.2d 373. There are other distinctions and perhaps real differences in the two acts. Shute, A...
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...pending determination by the state court of a controlling question of state law.10 In Division 1287, Amal. Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry., Etc., Emp. v. Dalton, W.D. Mo.1962, 206 F.Supp. 629, the court granted the defendant's motion to stay proceedings and deferred the plaintiff's motion for summa......
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